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Abstract 
 
This dissertation consists of two empirical essays. The first chapter titled: “Hedge Fund Activism 
and Dual Ownership of U.S. Multinationals”.  Harford, Wang & Zhang (2017) conclude that 
holding high cash balances abroad to avoid US taxes causes internal capital markets and 
investments distortions. We posit that hedge funds target MNCs with more severe internal capital 
and agency problems. We demonstrate that upon acquiring dual ownership in these firms, hedge 
funds reduce internal capital problems and improve investment, especially innovation, 
efficiencies. To further reduce agency costs of foreign cash holdings, hedge funds engage dual 
firms in focused acquisitions. These improvements are reflected in superior performances of dual 
firms relative to non-dual firms. Chapter 2 titled as “Innovation Strategies & IPO Underpricing”.  
In this chapter, we investigate how a firms’ choice of pre-IPO innovation strategies affect IPO 
pricing. We differentiate the orientation of the issuing firm’s innovation portfolio in terms of 
exploitative orientation versus explorative orientation based on citations of patents across 
technology classes. We introduce a measure of innovation power to generate breakthrough 
innovations. We show that the issuing firms with greater innovation power, especially firms with 
exploratory orientation of a patent, significantly decrease underpricing and have the power to 
bargain a higher offer price. Our results suggest that a higher exploration strategy requires more 
time to negotiate a higher offer price while more valuable innovation requires less time to bargain 
at the higher offer price.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Dual Holders, Institutional Investor Activism, Innovation, Product Market 
Competition, Foreign Cash Innovation Strategy; Exploratory Innovation; Exploitative Innovation; 
Underpricing; Bargain Power
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Chapter 1 
Hedge Fund Activism and Dual Ownership of U.S. Multinationals 
 
“BlackRock also engages to understand a company’s priorities for investing for long-term 
growth, such as research, technology and, critically, employee development and long-term 
financial well-being…. If tax reform also includes some form of reduced taxation for repatriation 
of cash trapped overseas, BlackRock will be looking to companies’ strategic frameworks for an 
explanation of whether they will bring cash back to the U.S., and if so, how they plan to use it. Will 
it be used simply for more share buybacks? Or is it a part of a capital plan that appropriately 
balances returning capital to shareholders with prudently investing for future growth?” 
 
 –Laurence Fink, CEO, BlackRock, 2017 
I. Introduction 
Empirical evidence generally supports the view that hedge fund activism creates value for 
shareholders by effectively influencing the governance, capital structure decisions, and operating 
performance of target firms (Brav et al. 2010). Brav et al. (2016) find that resulting from hedge 
fund activism, target firms experience increases in innovation output, measured by both patent 
counts and citations. They argue that the reallocation of innovative resources and the redeployment 
of human capital contribute to the refocusing of the scope of innovation. Alsan and Kumar (2016) 
show that hedge fund activism has negative impact on real and shareholder wealth of target’s rivals 
and improves productivity and capital allocation of target. 
If hedge funds are able to create long-term value of the target and improve innovation 
output (measured by patent counts and citations) by holding shares of the target firm, what 
incentive do they have to simultaneously hold debt (dual ownership) of the same company? 
Various explanations exist regarding why hedge funds hold dual ownerships. First, Bodnaruk and 
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Rossi, 2016 suggest that dual holders might accept lower premium in merger negotiations when 
they stand to gain more from appreciation of their bond stakes in the target. Second, Jiang, Li, and 
Shao (2010) argue that dual ownership mitigates shareholder-creditor conflicts and thereby lowers 
loan yield spreads. In a similar vein, Yang (2017) propose that institutional dual-holders can curb 
excessive risk taking (i.e., wealth transfer) by lowering shareholder-creditor conflicts.   
Based on Harford, Wang and Zhang (2017) (hereafter HWZ), we posit in this paper that an 
additional motive of dual ownership is to provide capital to firms facing internal capital problems 
resulting from situations where MNCs hold a large amount of foreign cash holdings to avoid 
(reduce) repatriation tax cost. According to HWZ (2017), investors place a significant discount on 
a firm’s foreign cash holdings, leading to disruptions in the internal capital market and resulting 
investment distortions (i.e., domestic underinvestment and overseas overinvestment). In this paper, 
we demonstrate that an equally important motive why less-regulated funds (hereafter, LRFs)1, 
comprised mainly of hedge funds, acquire dual ownership (hereafter, DLOs) is to reduce capital 
market as well as investment inefficiencies resulting from foreign cash reserves. US multinational 
companies (MNCs) provide a perfect laboratory to test this proposition as these companies are 
known to accumulate a large cash balance abroad in order to avoid repatriation tax.   
We propose that LRFs’ motive in taking dual positions in the target firm is to bring about 
permanent improvements in these firms. In so doing, DLOs would first inject debt capital as a 
means to mitigate internal capital and investment distortions. Second, to further improve internal 
capital markets and investment efficiencies, DLOs would wrest control from the current 
management by adopting strategies (as suggested in the literature on hedge fund activism) that 
include a) reducing insider ownership, b) engaging in proxy contests and c) weakening anti-
                                                          
1 In this paper, we use the term “hedge funds” and “LRFs” interchangeably.  
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takeover provisions. Third, improved investment efficiencies will likely entail enhanced 
innovation efficiency (IE) (see Hirshleifer et al. 2013)2. Fourth, in efficiently addressing the 
agency problems associated with foreign cash holdings, DLOs will get affiliated firms involved in 
focused acquisitions. Finally, these combined efforts would have a positive impact on DLO-
affiliated firm’s future operating as well as marketing performances.  
We hypothesize that  1) hedge funds systematically target those MNCs whose foreign cash 
balances are likely to exhibit the severest distortions in the internal capital markets, causing thereby 
potentially greater investment distortions; 2) upon acquiring the dual position, hedge funds gain 
control from the existing management by taking strategic steps that include reducing insider 
ownership, resorting to proxy contest and fighting anti-takeover provisions, 3) successful 
implementation of these tactics should lead to more efficient investment decisions, especially the 
innovation efficiencies of the dually-owned firms, 4) DLOs would engage dually-owned firms in 
acquiring targets that would bring about synergies, and 5) DLO-firms would experience better 
operating and market performances.  
Our results are consistent with the hypotheses above. The firms in which less regulated 
institutions take dual positions are decidedly the ones with more severe internal capital problems. 
In the post-dual stage, the DLOs engage in tactics to take away control from the pre-dual 
management in their successful efforts to improve the target’s investment as well as innovative 
efficiency (both at the parent and the foreign subsidiary level).  Dually-owned MNCs are more 
likely than their non-dual counterparts to engage in and complete focused acquisitions abroad. We 
                                                          
2 According to Hirshleifer et al. (2013), innovation efficiency, which is positively related to the future operating 
performance and stock returns, will improve by using current technological potential to explore new technologies and 
current technological capabilities to innovate products with higher quality and higher economic value.  
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find that the target’s innovative efficiency is a good predictor of the future operating performance 
and the future stock returns. Overall, we show that DLOs mitigate internal capital problems by 
mobilizing the internal capital market and improving investment efficiencies of target MNCs.  
 
II. Hypotheses Development 
II.1. Identifying Targets 
The MNCs are many and almost all of them carry heavy cash balance abroad to avoid 
repatriation tax. How do DLOs select their target from this universe? According to HWZ (2017), 
the higher the repatriation tax, borrowing costs and agency problems, the higher are the investment 
distortions.  Thus, we propose the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1. DLOs would likely take dual position in MNCs which are more severely 
exposed to agency costs of foreign cash holdings.   
II.2. Strategies to Reduce Control Exercised by Pre-Dual Management  
Undertaking the dual positions is just the first step in the strategic scheme of DLOs. In their 
goal to reduce distortions in internal capital markets and investment efficiencies of targets, DLOs 
are likely to take actions to consolidate their power in order to forge a long-term investment 
efficiencies of target firms. Brav, Jiang and Kim (2010) find that hedge funds create value for 
shareholders by effectively influencing the corporate governance of target firms. The pertinent 
literature identifies the means adopted by DLOs to influence the governance mechanisms by 
gaining control from the existing management via a) elimination of insider trading, b) proxy 
contests for control, and c) removal of anti-takeover provisions. 
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Insider trading allows corporate insiders to exploit other investors (Porta et al. 2006 and 
Djankov et al. 2008). Companies with larger excess control rights of insiders are more financially 
constrained (Lin et al. 2011). Constraining corporate insiders by enforcing insider trading laws 
may promote innovations (Levine et al. 2017). Additionally, the extant literature suggests that 
reducing insider trading increases stock liquidity that incentivize managers to invest in long-run, 
value-maximizing projects (for example, Levine et al. 2017). Thus, it is expected that DLOs would 
engage in activities that mitigate insiders’ ability to exploit other investors. Our hypothesis appears 
below. 
Hypothesis 2 A. DLOs will engage in measures that reduce the control of insider owners. 
Proxy Fight is an effective mechanism to reduce insiders’ control (Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), Bhattacharya (1997), Maug (1999), Bebchuk and Hart (2001), and Gilson and Schwartz 
(2001)).  Because of their position as a debtor, DLOs would have an advantage in gaining corporate 
control via proxy contests through restrictive covenants or expedited repayment requirement. For 
example, creditors may agree to provide lower cost capital for business strategy under the 
agreement of “Proxy Put” as a protection from expropriation of their wealth.  In this context, the 
proxy put provides an incentive to shareholders to vote for the nominees put up by the DLOs. 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2 B.  DLOs will engage in proxy contests towards seizing control of the dual-
affiliated firm.  
Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988), among others, contend that anti-
takeover provisions (ATPs) serve to entrench firm management and lessen the effectiveness of 
equity market discipline on management.  It is expected that DLOs would engage in activities to 
thwart ATPs.  
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Hypothesis 2 C.  DLOs will engage in minimizing anti-takeover provisions.  
II.3. Improved Efficiency 
  According to Brav et al. (2016) firms targeted by hedge fund activists experience 
an improvement in innovation efficiency in terms of increased innovation output, measured by 
both patent counts and citations. with stronger effects seen among firms with more diversified 
innovation portfolios. The authors add that the reallocation of innovative resources and the 
redeployment of human capital contribute to the refocusing of the scope of innovation. Consistent 
with their goal of reducing internal capital and investment distortions, DLOs are expected to bring 
about improved efficiencies in investment and innovation decisions in the post-dual period.  
Hypothesis 3. DLO-affiliated firms would exhibit higher investment and innovation 
efficiencies in the post-dual period. 
II.4. Focused Acquisitions 
Foreign cash holdings create similar agency problems as free cash flows do, with the main 
difference being that, in the first scenario, free cash flows accumulate abroad. HWZ (2017) report 
that investors discount value of foreign cash holdings in anticipation of the misuse of cash by the 
management.  
Jensen (1986) recommends three main ways to reduce agency costs of free cash flows: 
paying dividends, increasing debt, and getting involved in acquisitions. Jensen goes on to suggest 
that increasing debt is a better tool than increasing dividends (since debt entails commitments, 
while dividends do not) and focused mergers are superior to conglomerate merger (as synergy adds 
value).  Increasing dividend is not a viable option for the DLO-held firms since the parent firm 
suffers from illiquidity, a problem that is rooted in their inability to access its cash holdings abroad. 
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Issuance of debt is an effective tool for controlling free cash-flow related agency costs but falls 
short when controlling agency costs that are related to foreign cash holdings. These limitations 
leave only one option open to DLOs which is to use foreign cash holdings to acquire foreign firms, 
focusing primarily on mergers that create synergy. In the same vein, HWZ (2017) suggest that, in 
a trade-off between cash repatriation and foreign investments, the managers would opt to keep 
money abroad if they think the money could be used to make foreign acquisitions with valuable 
synergies. Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4. DLOs would engage in foreign acquisitions, especially those that create 
synergy.  
 
III.  Data  
III.1. Sample 
We define U.S. MNCs as corporations incorporated in the U.S. that report foreign sales, 
foreign income or foreign taxes in any year in our sample. We exclude firms in finance and utility 
industries. Our treatment sample consists of 658 firms in which hedge funds hold dual positions 
(DLO firms) during the 2007-2014 period. This period is characterized by US firms holding 
increased leverage along with a surge of institutional investor activism.  
Appendix A describes issued new bonds and equity held by DLOs by year. Appendix A 
also reports average equity held by DLOs as a percentage of total equity. On average DLOs hold 
$14.958 billion in newly issued bonds and 6.13 percent of total equity.   
III.1.1. Sub-sample 
To facilitate hypothesis testing, we form a control group consisting of MNCs in which 
LRFs owns shares but do not simultaneously hold bonds.  The control firms are matched with 
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treated firms in terms of the industry and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, 
distinct number of foreign subsidiaries and distinct number of subsidiaries in tax haven countries. 
The combined sample (treatment and control) comprises 9070 firm-year observations. 
Table 1. Firm Characteristics: DLOs vs. Controls 
This table reports summary statics for US MNCs with DLOs along with matched control firms. 
The sample consists of 658 unique U.S. MNCs in which DLOs hold dual positions during the 
2007-2014 period. The control firms are firms matched with treated firms in the same industry 
and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct number of foreign 
subsidiaries and distinct number of subsidiaries in the tax haven country.  The combined sample 
comprises 9070 firm (both DLO and control)-year observations. We compute foreign and 
domestic assets and profit margins using the Compustat geographic segment file. Upper-
asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.      
 (1) (2) (3) 
 DLOs  Control DLOs-Control 
Size 8.406 5.952 2.455*** 
Domestic Assets/Total Assets 0.804 0.910 -0.106*** 
Foreign Assets/Total Assets 0.196 0.090 0.106*** 
Cash (in $mil) 1630.107 712.470 917.637*** 
Cash/Total Assets 0.338 0.976 -0.638*** 
Leverage 0.318 0.237 0.081*** 
Domestic Profit Margin 0.010 0.014 -0.004** 
Foreign Profit Margin 0.033 0.020 0.013*** 
Dividend-paying firms /total # of firms 0.718 0.461 0.257*** 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the DLO firms as well as the control group. The 
treatment group is significantly larger in size than the control group. As a percentage of total assets, 
the treatment group invests significantly more in foreign assets and significantly less in domestic 
assets than their control counterpart, providing preliminary evidence of more severe internal 
capital distortions of the treatment group. A significantly larger number of DLO firms are dividend 
payers and carry more debt.  Finally, the control group carries more cash (as a percentage of total 
assets) than the treatment group.  
III. 2. Variables  
III.2.1. Dual ownership 
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We identify dual ownership by adopting “brand matching” approach developed by 
Bodnaruk & Rossi (2016) and measure dual ownership at the financial conglomerate level. The 
financial conglomerate holding is aggregated holdings from the subsidiary to the parent level.  We 
follow our matching procedure with manual check for accuracy. Finally, we exclude firms, which 
have dual ownership by highly regulated institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension 
funds and insurance companies from our main sample. We determine bond ownership by using 
several SEC filings such as: 
a) Schedule 13D which makes it mandatory to file for anyone acquires beneficial 
ownership of more than 5% of any security class of publicly traded;   
b) Schedule 13F and Proxy Statements for owners with beneficial ownership of less than 
5% in bonds. 
III.2.2. Governance variables 
Insider Trading: Insiders’ stock purchases (sales), denoted as ISP (ISS), are measured as 
the amount of stock purchased (sold) by insiders scaled by total assets at time t. Insider 
ownership (IS) is measured as percentage of shares held by insiders relative to total shares 
outstanding. The Insider trading data are collected from the Bloomberg.   
Covenants violations: This is an indicator variable (CV) that takes on a value of 1 if 
information about a firm’s covenant violation is available in the dataset of Roberts and Sufi 
(2009). The dataset contains all covenants violation filed with the SEC during 1996 to 
2012. 
Proxy contest: Information about victory of a dissident in a proxy contest (Vict) is measured 
as the sum of its full victory (Vict Full), partial victory (Vict Part) and settlement 
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(Settle).  The information about results of proxy contests is retrieved from the SDC 
Platinum. 
Anti-takeover provisions:  The proxy variables representing anti-takeover provisions take 
on a value of one if a firm has the following anti-takeover provision: Classified board 
(CBoard), Bylaw, poison pills and golden parachute. Bylaw is charter or amendments 
designed to guard against a hostile takeover. The Bylaw restricts shareholders’ ability to 
change the board of directors or reject an undesirable takeover bid.  The relevant data have 
been obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services.  
III.2.3. Innovation measures 
Innovation quantity: To construct the innovation variables, we use patent applications filed 
with the USPTO 3. We measure innovation output by the total number of patent counts.  
Following Bena and Li (2014), we compute the patent count as follows. First, we calculate 
the total number of awarded patents to firm i in each technology class k and each 
application year t and scaled it by the average number of awarded patents in corresponding 
technology class k and application year t across all firms that were granted at least one 
patent. Second, for each firm in each year we calculate total scaled number of awarded 
patents across all technology class k in year t: it is the total number of awarded patents to 
firm i in year t in technology class k scaled by the median4 number of granted applications 
in this firm’s technology class k in year t.   
                                                          
3 The existing innovation literature discusses truncation problems associated with the NBER database. The truncation 
problem occurs because many patent applications filed during 2005 and 2006 had not been granted by 2006. We used 
the patent database retrieved in May 2017, which provides us with about two-years safety lag. Therefore, our study is 
less subject to the truncation problem pointed out by Hall et al. (2001). 
4 The results are robust when innovation measures are scaled by average number of granted applications in 
corresponding to firm’s i technology class k and application year t. 
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Innovation quantity.  Following the innovation literature, we measure a firm’s innovation 
in the year of application. Griliches et al. (1986) argue that the application year better 
captures the actual time of innovation than the grant year. We set the number of patents to 
zero for companies that have no patent information available from the patent database.5 To 
measure the quality of innovation: we use two proxies: Citation and Patent Scope.  
Innovation quality 1: Citation 
The citation is calculated as the total quantity of forward citations received during 
the latest five years since granting of a patent.  According to the innovation 
literature, the number of forward citations measures the technological importance 
of the patent for the development of subsequent technologies and reflects the 
economic value of inventions. In contrast, the backward citations are citations that 
assess the degree of novelty of invention and investigate the knowledge transfers 
in terms of citations networks.  
Innovation quality 2: Scope 
We measure technological and economic value of patent by patent scope. The 
patent scope was first discussed by Lerner (1994) who argues that technological 
scope of a firm portfolio significantly affects the valuation of the firm. Following 
Lerner (1994), we construct patent scope as the number of unique four digits classes 
of International Patent Classification (IPC) in a given patent documentation relative 
                                                          
5 The full description of variables is provided in Appendix B. 
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to the maximum scope in the same IPC class and application year. The higher the 
patent scope, the higher is the market value of a patent.  
Innovation efficiency: We measure innovative efficiency in terms of patent efficiency 
(IE_pat) and citation efficiency (IE_cite) by following Hirshleifer et al (2013). We also 
measure scope efficiency (IE_scope) in a similar manner.  For example, IE_pat is 
constructed as patents count scaled by cumulative R&D over past five years with 20% 
depreciation rate: 
IEpat𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
(𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2 + 0.8 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3 + 0.6 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4 + 0.4 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6)
 
The efficiency of innovation quality is the sum of citation received during last five years 
scaled by cumulative R&D expenditure over past five years as follows:  
IE_cite𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡−5𝑡
(𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7)
 
The efficiency of patent scope is computed in the same way as IE_cite: 
IE_scope𝑖,𝑡 =
#𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡
(𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7)
 
 
 
IV. Results 
In this section, we test the hypothesis that DLO-firms have greater internal capital and 
investment distortions than non-target firms. HWZ (2017) conclude that the repatriation costs of 
foreign cash cause a significant discount that investors place on a firm’s foreign cash holdings, 
leading to disruptions in the internal capital market and resulting investment distortion (i.e., 
domestic underinvestment and overseas overinvestment): the higher the repatriation tax, 
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borrowing costs and agency problems, the higher are the investment distortions. We measure the 
severity of the repatriation tax problems by the following measures: foreign pre-tax income as a 
percentage of the total income, ratio of the number of tax-heaven subsidiaries to the total number 
of foreign subsidiaries, 3-year average of free cash flows divided by 3-year average total assets 
(Free CF/TA), dividend payout ratios (Div/E), and leverage (total debt divided by total assets).In 
this section, we also compare the dual firms and non-dual funds in terms of a) corporate 
governance issues, b) innovation efficiency, as well as c) performance during the pre-dual period. 
IV.1.  Testing Hypothesis 1: Identification of Targets (Pre-dual Period) 
IV.1.1. Repatriation tax cost 
Table 2, Panel A compares the DLO-group and the control group based on the extent of 
their exposure to repatriation costs. 
Table 2. Panel A: Exposure to repatriation costs 
Pre-tax Income foreign (FPI) and total income (TI) comes from COMPUSTAT. # of foreign 
subsidiaries (TFS) and # tax haven subsidiaries (THS) comes from 10-k, where if no information 
is reported we set # of subsidiaries in tax haven countries to zero. Free cash flow, dividend, total 
debt and assets derived from COMPUSTAT.  The ratio of dividends (Div) to the total assets 
(TA) denoted as Div/TA. The ratio of dividends (Div) to earnings (E) is denoted as a Div/E. 
This table contains of 3686 firm-year observations of the three years, pre-event window. The 
control firms are firms matched with treated firms in the same industry and year using propensity 
scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct number of foreign subsidiaries and distinct number of 
subsidiaries in the tax haven country. Industry classification based on the Fama and French 
(1997) 49 industries.  All variables are defined at Appendix B.  To dilute the influence of outliers, 
all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Upper-asterisks such as 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 DLOs Control Diff (DLOs-Control) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
FPI/TI 0.240 0.128 0.112*** 
THS/TFS 0.163 0.108 0.055*** 
FCF/TA 0.015 -0.017 0.032*** 
Debt Ratio 0.319 0.242 0.077*** 
Div/E 0.211 0.179 0.032 
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Table 2. Panel B: Shareholdings by Less Regulated Funds (LRFs) - DLOs vs. Control 
This table summarize institutional ownership in pre-dual ownership period. The institutional 
ownership computed from 13-F filings.  The shares held by less regulated funds (LRF) as the 
percent of total shares outstanding (TSO) is denoted as LRF/TSO. The sharers held by LRF as 
percent of shares held by all institutional owners denoted as LRF/TIO. The percentage of shares 
outstanding held by DLOs denoted as DLO_SH. The percentage of DLO_SH in LRF is denoted 
as DLO_SH /LRF.  The DLO_SH at time t relative to the legged DLO_SH is measured as a 
ratio. This table contains of 3686 firm-year observations of the three years, pre-event window. 
The control firms are firms matched with treated firms in the same industry and year using 
propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct number of foreign subsidiaries and distinct 
number of subsidiaries in the tax haven country. Industry classification based on the Fama and 
French (1997) 49 industries.  All variables are defined at Appendix B.  To dilute the influence 
of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Upper-
asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
DLOs Control Diff (DLOs-Control) 
(1) (2) (3) 
𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡−1/𝑇𝑆𝑂𝑡−1 38.122 35.581 2.541 
𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡−2/𝑇𝑆𝑂𝑡−2 38.376 33.586 4.791*** 
𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡−3/𝑇𝑆𝑂𝑡−3 39.158 32.452 6.706*** 
[𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡/𝑇𝑆𝑂𝑡] − [𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡−1/𝑇𝑆𝑂𝑡−1] 17.670 -8.285 25.955*** 
[𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡/𝑇𝑆𝑂𝑡] − [𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡−2/𝑇𝑆𝑂𝑡−2] 19.704 -3.718 23.422*** 
[𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡/𝑇𝑆𝑂𝑡] − [𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡−3/𝑇𝑆𝑂𝑡−3] 21.059 0.687 20.372*** 
[𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡/𝐼𝑂𝑡] − [𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡−1/𝐼𝑂𝑡−1] 17.105 -11.415 28.520*** 
[𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡/𝐼𝑂𝑡] − [𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡−1/𝐼𝑂𝑡−2] 19.868 -4.490 24.358*** 
[𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡/𝐼𝑂𝑡] − [𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡−1/𝐼𝑂𝑡−3] 21.127 1.780 19.347*** 
𝐷𝐿𝑂_𝑆𝐻𝑡/𝐷𝐿𝑂_𝑆𝐻𝑡−1 12.879 0 - 
𝐷𝐿𝑂_𝑆𝐻𝑡/𝐷𝐿𝑂_𝑆𝐻𝑡−2 43.146 0 - 
𝐷𝐿𝑂_𝑆𝐻𝑡/𝐷𝐿𝑂_𝑆𝐻𝑡−3 64.037 0 - 
[𝐷𝐿𝑂_𝑆𝐻𝑡/𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡] − [𝐷𝐿𝑂_𝑆𝐻𝑡−1/𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡−1] 5.593 0 - 
[𝐷𝐿𝑂_𝑆𝐻𝑡/𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡] − [𝐷𝐿𝑂_𝑆𝐻𝑡−1/𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡−2] 6.147 0 - 
[𝐷𝐿𝑂_𝑆𝐻𝑡/𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡] − [𝐷𝐿𝑂_𝑆𝐻𝑡−1/𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡−3] 6.781 0 - 
It shows that DLO firms have a significantly larger proportion of foreign pre-tax income 
in total income and significantly higher ratio of subsidiaries in the tax haven countries relative to 
all foreign subsidiaries than control firms, with both variables being significant at the 1% level. 
This confirms our expectation that the target firms might face more inflexibility of internal capital 
markets due to the immobility or trap of foreign income overseas. Panel A also shows that targets 
firms have on average significantly higher free cash flow (Free CF/TA) than the control group, 
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due to a higher portion of cash flows being trapped abroad. These findings suggest that DLOs 
choose their targets based on the severity of their exposure to repatriation taxes.  
Panel B of Table 2 shows that hedge funds begin to increase their shareholdings starting at 
least three years before they take dual ownerships in the targets, while decreasing their holdings 
in the control firms. This evidence might imply that dual ownerships involve a long-term planning. 
IV.1.2. Managerial control 
The management has the incentive to maintain control of the firm it manages. Three major 
ways the management would like to retain its control are via a) performing insider trading, b) 
maintaining anti-takeover provisions (ATPs), and c) combatting proxy fights. In this subsection, 
we compare Dual firms with control firms in terms of managerial efforts to entrench themselves.  
Table 3. Panel A: Insider Trading and Covenants Violation – Pre-Dual Period  
This table contains of 1770 (3686) firm-years observations of insider trading (covenant 
violations) during the three years, pre-event window. All variables are defined at Appendix B.  
The insider trading data comes from Bloomberg and is from 2010. Insider Ownership (IS) 
measured as stock held by insiders relative to total shares outstanding, in per cent ages. Insiders 
stock purchases (sales) denoted as ISP (ISS) measured as the amount of stock purchased (sold) 
by insiders scaled by total assets at time t.  CV is an indicator variable, which takes value of 1 if 
information about a firm covenant violation is available in the dataset of Roberts and Sufi, 
(2009). The dataset contains all covenants violation filed with SEC during 1996 to 2012. The 
control firms are firms matched with treated firms in the same industry and year using propensity 
scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct number of foreign subsidiaries and distinct number of 
subsidiaries in the tax haven country. Industry classification based on the Fama and French 
(1997) 49 industries. To dilute the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Upper-asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
 
DLOs Control Diff (DLOs-Control) 
(1) (2) (3) 
IS 2.69 10.15 -7.46*** 
ISP 7.15 10.11 -2.96 
ISS 0.01 0.02 -0.01** 
CV 0.01 0.02 -0.01*** 
Table 3, Panel A compares 3-year average of insider trading and covenants violations 
between the target group and the control group during the pre-dual period. Panel A demonstrates 
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that insider ownership as well as insider activities are actually lower for the target group than the 
control group.  This phenomenon might be explained in the following manner: as the DLOs acquire 
more shares of the target group (than the control group) preceding the acquisition of dual 
ownerships (Table 2, Panel B), their activism (i.e., reducing the insider trading) might have begun 
years before they take on dual ownership. 
Table 3. Panel B: Proxy Fight --Pre-event period.  
This table compares the means of proxy fights between the DLO group and the control group 
during the pre-event window. Appendix B describes all variables. The victory of a dissident in 
proxy contest (Vict) is measured as sum of its full victory (Vict Full), partial victory (Vict Part) 
and settlement (Settle). The control firms are firms matched with treated firms in the same 
industry and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct number of foreign 
subsidiaries and distinct number of subsidiaries in the tax haven country. We use proportion 
two-tailed z-test to examine the significance of difference in proportion between groups. Upper-
asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
  
DLOs Control 
Diff (DLOs-
Control) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Vict 0.025 0.031 -0.005 
Vict Part 0.020 0.023 -0.003 
Vict Full 0.020 0.023 -0.003 
Settle 0.024 0.028 -0.004 
Table 3, Panel B compares the success rates in proxy contests between DLO firms and the 
control group.  The success occurs when the three-year average number of victories in proxy fight 
after dual ownership exceeds the average number of victories in the three years prior to dual 
ownership. Panel A shows that DLO firms do not experience greater success than the control firms. 
Perhaps the same explanation as offered in the context of insider trading applies here. 
Panel C of Table 3 indicates that DLO firms have more stringent anti-takeover provisions 
than the control firms during the pre-dual period. The former group exhibits higher classified board 
(0.208), Bylaw amendments (0.384), poison pills (0.108) and golden parachutes (0.287) compared 
to 0.137, 0.214, 0.075, and 0.170 respectively for the control group. The presence of a higher 
number of different classes of ATPs might be another reason why DLOs select these firms. To 
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sum up the findings of Table 3, managers of DLO firms are more entrenched than their non-DLO 
counterparts. 
Table 3. Panel C: Antitakeover provision (Pre-Event Period). This table compares the means 
of antitakeover provisions between the DLO group and the control group during the of pre-event 
window. Antitakeover provisions are Staggered Board (CBoard), bylaw provision (Bylaw), 
Poison Pills and Golden Parachute. Appendix B describes all variables. The control firms are 
firms matched with treated firms in the same industry and year using propensity scores (nearest 
neighbor) on size, distinct number of foreign subsidiaries and distinct number of subsidiaries in 
tax haven countries. We use proportion two-tailed z-test to examine the significance of 
difference in proportion between groups. Upper-asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
  
DLOs Control Diff (DLOs-Control) 
(1) (2) (3) 
CBoard 0.208 0.137 0.070*** 
Bylaw 0.384 0.214 0.171*** 
Poison Pills 0.108 0.075 0.034*** 
Golden Parachute 0.287 0.170 0.117*** 
Table 4 employs a logit model to identify the features that differentiate the DLO group 
from the control group.  The dependent variable is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 for a target 
firm, and 0 for a control firm. Overall, Table 4 shows that DLOs are more likely to target MNCs 
that have higher anti-takeover provision, higher free cashflow, with higher proportion of foreign 
pre-tax income, and higher proportion of subsidiaries in the tax haven countries.  In other words, 
potential agency problems are greater for the DLO group than the non-DLO one. 
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Table 4. Which MNCs are more likely to have DLOs? 
This table reports coefficient estimates from logit models. The dependent variable is equal to one for the MNCs with DLOs, 
and zero for the MNCs without DLOs.  Both DLOs and control are MNCs. The control firms are firms matched with treated 
firms in the same industry and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct number of foreign subsidiaries 
and distinct number of subsidiaries in the tax haven country. Industry classification based on the Fama and French (1997) 49 
industries.  Specifications include either no fixed effects (columns: 1,3,5 and 7) or industry and year fixed effects (columns: 
2,4,6 and 8). All variables are defined in Appendix B. Antitakeover defenses are measured by staggered board (CBoard), 
Bylaw profession, poison pills and golden parachutes. FPI/TI is a ratio of foreign pre-tax income (FPI) to the total income 
(TI). The variable THS/TS is the ratio of number of foreign subsidiaries in the tax haven countries (THS) to the total number 
of subsidiaries (TS). All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% level. Z-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Upper-
asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CBoard 0.340*** 0.354***       
 (5.995) (6.013)       
Bylaw   0.916*** 0.961***     
   (18.688) (18.852)     
Poison Pills     0.303*** 0.313***   
     (3.959) (3.944)   
Golden Parachutes       0.683*** 0.751*** 
       (13.451) (14.067) 
FCF/TA 0.712*** 0.956*** 0.185 0.425** 0.793*** 1.028*** 0.459** 0.691*** 
 (3.923) (4.780) (1.007) (2.099) (4.387) (5.153) (2.515) (3.440) 
FPI/TI 0.314*** 0.337*** 0.271*** 0.299*** 0.315*** 0.336*** 0.292*** 0.317*** 
 (7.437) (7.689) (6.374) (6.754) (7.470) (7.660) (6.907) (7.203) 
THS/TS 1.374*** 1.481*** 1.124*** 1.237*** 1.385*** 1.490*** 1.259*** 1.372*** 
 (11.633) (12.106) (9.487) (10.065) (11.736) (12.204) (10.648) (11.199) 
R&D -2.624*** -1.310*** -2.597*** -1.292*** -2.641*** -1.243*** -2.599*** -1.260*** 
 (-7.531) (-2.861) (-7.367) (-2.791) (-7.577) (-2.716) (-7.422) (-2.740) 
N 8306 8292 8306 8292 8306 8292 8306 8292 
pseudo R-sq 0.036 0.052 0.064 0.081 0.035 0.050 0.049 0.066 
Year Dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry Dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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IV.1. 3.  Innovation 
Table 5 provides evidence that indicates that the targets were more efficient in terms of 
innovations even before hedge funds took dual positions in these firms. 
Table 5. Innovation Efficiency in the Pre-Dual Period 
This table reports analysis of difference in means (t-test) of innovation performance and capital 
expenditures of DLO firms and control firms over the three-year pre-event window. (Definitions 
of all variables are provided in Appendix B.) Patent counts (Pat) and Patent’s forward citations 
are retrieved from the USPTO. Dollar measure of patents (Pat($)) obtained from Kogan et al. 
(2017).   The number of patents and number of citations normalized by median # of patents 
(citations) in the corresponding technological class. R&D, CAPEX and assets derived from 
COMPUSTAT. The measures of innovation efficiency constructed following Hirshleifer et al 
(2013) and are log transformation one plus innovative efficiency aggregated at the US MNCs 
(aggregated foreign level) such as: patent counts denoted as IE Pat (IE FPat); efficiency of the 
recent five years forward citations denoted as IE Cite (IE FCite); and efficiency of patent scope 
denoted as IE scope (IE FScope). The control firms are firms matched with treated firms in the 
same industry and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct number of 
foreign subsidiaries and distinct number of subsidiaries in the tax haven country. Industry 
classification based on the Fama and French (1997) 49 industries. To dilute the influence of 
outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at 
Appendix B.  To dilute the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles.  Upper-asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
DLOs Control Diff (DLOs-Control) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Pat($)/TA 0.0007 0.0004 .0003*** 
Pat/TA 0.0007 0.0012 -.0005*** 
FPat/TA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cit/Pat 0.5428 0.4084 .13435*** 
FCit/FPat 0.0905 0.0320 .05840*** 
R&D/FCF 0.056 0.111 -0.055 
CAPX/FCF 0.075 0.604 -0.529* 
Pat/R&D 0.0156 0.0161 -0.0006 
FPat/R&D 0.0002 0.0169 -0.0168 
IE Pat 3.0933 2.6747 0.4187 
IE Cite 8.5335 5.8206 2.7129*** 
IE Scope 4.0813 3.5285 0.5528 
IE FPat 0.0157 0.0080 .0077*** 
IE FCite 0.0282 0.0100 .01824*** 
IE FScope 0.0148 0.0059 .0089*** 
 A possible explanation might lie in DLOs being attracted by superior performance of the 
targets to begin with as suggested by Brav et al. (2008) that hedge funds target over performing 
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firms. Table 2 shows that while hedge funds increase their equity ownership in DLO firms in the 
pre-dual period, they decrease their equity holding in the control group actually diminishes during 
the same period. On a net basis, DLOs’ equity ownership as a percentage of total number of shares 
significantly increases (at the 1% significance level) from t-1, t-2, and t-3 to t by 25.95%, 23.42%, 
and 20.37% respectively. Also, during the same period, the DLO equity ownership as a proportion 
to total institutional ownerships increases by 28.52%, 24.36%, 19.34% respectively.  
IV.1. 4. Performance 
Table 6 compares the accounting (ROA, ROE, and EBITDA/SALES) as well as market 
performance (P/B) between the target group and the control group during the pre-dual period.   The 
table shows that accounting performance of the target group is superior to that of the control group. 
The results imply that in spite of a greater exposure to repatriation tax costs, target firms exhibit a 
better performance record in the pre-dual period.  
Table 6. Performance in the Pre-Dual Period: DLOs vs. Control 
This table compares the operating performances of DLO firms and their peers over the three-
year pre-event window. All variables are defined at Appendix B. The control firms are firms 
matched with treated firms in the same industry and year using propensity scores (nearest 
neighbor) on size, distinct number of foreign subsidiaries and distinct number of subsidiaries in 
the tax haven country. Industry classification based on the Fama and French (1997) 49 
industries.   To dilute the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles.  Upper-asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively.  
 
DLOs Control Diff (DLOs-Control) 
(1) (2) (3) 
ROA 0.013 -0.020 0.032*** 
ROE 0.070 0.012 0.058** 
M/B 2.268 2.118 0.150 
EBITDA/SALES 0.107 -0.070 0.176*** 
The market performance (M/B) of dual target firms, however, is not significantly different 
from that of the control firms. It is possible that the market’s positive reaction to the superior 
innovation occurs with a lag. In explaining such lag, Hirshleifer et al. (2013) state   
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“.... investors will underreact to the information content in innovative efficiency because 
of the difficulty evaluating the economic implications of patents and patent citations. If so, 
then firms that are more efficient in innovations will be undervalued relative to firms that 
are less efficient in innovations.” (page 2) 
IV.1.5. Summarizing test results: Hypothesis 1 
 Before taking dual position, hedge funds seem to solidify their equity holdings in 
the MNCs they target;  
 In terms of innovation activities and overall performance, dual firms are at least as 
efficient as non-dual firms: increasing equity ownership by hedge funds in dual 
firms might explain this phenomenon;  
 The main factors that differentiate dual firms from non-duals in the pre-dual period 
are that the former group 1) has greater exposure to repatriation tax costs, and 2) 
exhibit greater managerial entrenchment problems than the latter group. 
IV.2. Testing Hypothesis 2: Strategies to Reduce Managerial Control  
IV. 2.1. Reducing inside trading 
   Table 7, Panel A compares changes in insider trading and covenants violations 
between the target and control from the pre-dual period to the post-dual period. The average insider 
ownership decreased for both groups following the dual ownership year, but the decrease is 
significantly higher for the control firms (by 0.036 points). The average insider purchases and sales 
for the DLO firms, however, decrease more than those of the control group (i.e., the former group 
experiences a higher decrease in insider purchases (-6.557) and insider sales (-0.023) than the 
latter. In terms of covenant violations too, the former group faces a greater decrease in covenant 
violation than the control group.  
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Table 7. Panel A: Insider Trading and Covenants Violation --Pre-Post Periods  
This Table compares changes in insider trading activities between the DLO group and the control 
group from before to after the dual ownerships.  The source of the insider trading data is 
Bloomberg, available starting 2010. The sample includes firms with DLOs firms and their control 
firms. The control firms are firms matched with treated firms in the same industry and year using 
propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct number of foreign subsidiaries and distinct 
number of subsidiaries in the tax haven country. ∆ denotes average three-year change between 
post- and pre-periods in insider purchase (∆InsPurch), insider sales (∆InsSale) and insider share 
outstanding (∆InsShare). The control firms are firms matched with DLOs firms in the same 
industry and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) without replacement on total assets, 
number of foreign subsidiaries and number of subsidiaries in the tax haven countries. To dilute the 
influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are 
defined at Appendix B. Upper-asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively.       
 DLOs Control Diff (DLOs-Control) 
∆IS -0.040 -0.076 .036*** 
∆ISP -6.557 -4.157 -2.340*** 
∆ISS -0.023 -0.013 -.009*** 
∆CV -0.005 -0.001 -.004** 
Overall findings support our prediction that insider trading activities as well as covenant 
violations would decrease more for the DLO firms than for control firms.   
 IV. 2.2. Success rate of proxy fights 
Table 7, Panel B compares the success history of proxy contests between the target group 
and the control group both in pre-dual and post-dual periods. Table 3, Panel B shows that there is 
no significant difference between the two groups in terms of the final outcome of proxy fights (i.e., 
partial victory, full victory, and settlements successes) in the pre-dual period.  Panel B of Table 7, 
however, shows that proportion of activists’ victories in target firms are higher (0.68) than the 
control firms (0.32). Moreover, DLO firms achieve greater proportion of full, partial, settlement 
in target firms (0.69, 0.69 and 0.51) than control firms.  The test of independence of the contests 
success is significant at the 1% significance level for total successes, full successes and partial 
successes.   
23 
 
Thus, successes in proxy contests is contingent on hedge funds taking on dual positions.  
The independence test does not find significant difference in settlement successes between the two 
groups. Overall, Panel B suggests that affiliation with DLOs has brought greater proxy-contest 
success for the stockholders of DLO firms.   
Table 7. Panel B:  Independence Test of Proxy Contests from DLOs. 
This Table compares changes in proxy contests between the DLO group and the control group 
from before to after the dual ownerships.  This table reports proportion of positive changes of a 
dissident victory in proxy contests (column 1 and 2). The change is computed as average 
difference between proxy contests frequencies during three succeeding and preceding years on 
average at year t. The column (3) report total frequencies of the positive change. The victory of 
proxy contest (Vict) is measured as sum of full victory (Vict Full), partial victory (Vict Part) and 
settlement (Settle).  Column (4) reports p-value from Chi square test of independence of the 
positive change in proxy fights on DLOs. The control firms are firms matched with treated firms 
in the same industry and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct number 
of foreign subsidiaries and distinct number of subsidiaries in the tax haven country.  
 DLOs Control 
Total Positive 
(∆) P-value 
Positive Change (∆) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆Vict 0.68 0.32 446 0.00 
∆Vict Part 0.69 0.31 377 0.00 
∆Vict Full 0.69 0.31 399 0.00 
∆Settle 0.51 0.49 277 0.76 
 
IV. 2.3. Fighting anti-takeover provisions 
 Table 7, Panel C reports changes in proportion of ATPs from 3-year average before to 3-
year average after the dual ownership.  We define success as when the change is negative (i.e., 
ATPs decline). Panel B demonstrates that DLO firms have greater success in removing ATPs than 
their non-dual counterparts, especially in removing Classified Board (0.68), in amending bylaw 
provision (0.70), removing poison pills (0.69) and removing golden parachutes (0.71).  The 
independence test is significant at the 1% significance level across all measures of ATPs and 
suggests that the success rate of removing ATPs is contingent on dual ownership.  
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Table 7. Panel C:  Independence Test of Change in ATPs from DLOs.  
The table compares change in ATPs (Cboard, ByLaw, Ppills and Gpapprachute) between the DLO 
group and the control group from before to after the dual ownerships. The change is computed as 
average difference between ATP frequencies during three succeeding and preceding years on 
average at year t. Colum (1) and column (2) report proportion of decrease in ATPs, while column 
(3) total number of cases where negative changes have occurred. Column (4) reports p-value from 
Chi square test of independence change in ATP on DLOs. The control firms are firms matched 
with treated firms in the same industry and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, 
distinct number of foreign subsidiaries and distinct number of subsidiaries in the tax haven country. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Negative Change (∆) DLOs Control Total Negative (∆) P-value 
∆Cboard 0.68 0.32 948 0.00 
∆Bylaw 0.70 0.30 1,400 0.00 
∆Ppills 0.69 0.31 663 0.00 
∆Gparachute 0.71 0.29 1,161 0.00 
 
IV. 2.4. Summarizing test results: Hypothesis 2 
 In the post-dual period, DLO firms have greater success than non-DLO firms in  a) reducing 
insider trading activities as well as covenant violations;  b) increasing the success rate of proxy 
contests;  c) removing ATPs.  
IV.3. Hypothesis 3: Reducing Internal Capital Problems & Improving Investment 
Efficiencies 
HWZ (2017) report that, stemming from high foreign cash balances, MNCs face internal 
capital problems that translate into investment distortions---domestic underinvestment and foreign 
overinvestment.  Our premise is that less regulated funds would first target those MNCs that are 
likely to face greater repatriation costs, then engage in efforts to usurp control from the 
management of these firms, and finally, act on reducing internal capital problems and improving 
investment efficiencies.  In the next few subsections, we assess the extent of success of the DLOs 
in improving the efficiencies in these areas.
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Table 8. Analysis of Investment Constraints  
This panel shows changes in financial delays around new debt issuance. The dependent variables are text based measures of financial 
constraints developed by Hoberg and Maksimovic, (2014). The higher value of a dependent variable shows that a firm is more similar 
to a set of firms known to be at risk of liquidity issues (Investment Delay) and presumes solving this delay by: equity issuance (Equity 
Delay), issuing debt (Debt Delay) and issuing private placement (Private Placement). We control for Leverage (Total Debt/Total 
Assets), Size (log transformation of one plus Total Assets) and total share outstanding held by institutional investors (IO). The control 
firms are firms matched with treated firms in the same industry and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct 
number of foreign subsidiaries and distinct number of subsidiaries in the tax haven country. Industry classification based on the Fama 
and French (1997) 49 industries. DLOs is a dummy variable, which takes value of one if a firm belongs to DLOs group and zero 
otherwise.  Post is a dummy variable, which indicates the three-year window [+1, +3] after DLOs activism. Post is excluded from the 
model because it was subsumed by year fixed effects.  To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix B. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis (calculated based on robust standard 
errors). Upper-asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Investme
nt Delay 
Investment 
Delay 
Equity 
Delay 
Equity 
Delay 
Debt 
Delay 
Debt 
Delay 
Private 
Placement 
Private 
Placement 
DLOs 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.003* 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.001 
 (5.461) (5.742) (5.473) (4.039) (1.887) (4.938) (3.918) (0.619) 
DLOs*Post -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.005* -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.000 -0.005** 
 (-3.064) (-3.842) (-1.827) (-3.379) (-2.578) (-2.055) (-0.195) (-2.290) 
Leverage 0.025***  0.013***  0.033***  -0.002  
 (5.715)  (3.148)  (11.062)  (-0.706)  
Size -0.001**  -0.002***  -0.000  -0.003***  
 (-2.307)  (-4.200)  (-0.294)  (-6.581)  
IO -0.002  -0.005**  0.010***  -0.003  
 (-0.729)  (-2.143)  (5.533)  (-1.577)  
N 6220 6220 6220 6220 6220 6220 6220 6220 
adj. R-sq 0.051 0.045 0.055 0.048 0.077 0.057 0.088 0.080 
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IV.3.1. Reducing internal capital problems 
An indirect result of distortions in the internal capital market is illiquidity stemming from 
increasing costs of external financing.6 Illiquidity causes the firm to postpone investments 
(Investment Delay), delay equity (Equity Delay) and/or debt issues (Debt Delay) and constrain it 
to resort to private placement (Private Placement) (Hoberg and Maksimovic, 2014).  If DLOs are 
successful in mitigating the illiquidity problem, we should find DLO firms to lessen delays in 
investments, equity issuance, and/or debt issuance. 
The results presented in Table 8 show that DLO firms more effectively mitigate illiquidity 
problem than their non-DLO counterparts.  It shows a significant decrease (at 1% significance 
level) in investments delays in the post dual period relative to non-DLO firms. Similarly, DLO 
firms reduce delay in issuing new equity or debt and the reliance on private placement: the results 
hold after controlling for a firm’s leverage, size and shares held by institutional investors across 
all measures of financial constraints except the private placement.  
IV.3. 2. Increasing investment efficiency---domestic and foreign  
In this subsection, we answer the following question: Were DLOs able to reduce 
investment distortions (domestic underinvestment and foreign overinvestment) in the post-dual 
period?  In so doing, we modify the HWZ (2017) model to compare DLO firms with control firms 
in terms of their domestic, foreign, and R&D investments. To check for robustness, we also use 
the HWZ (2017) model to estimate potential domestic underinvestment using domestic and foreign 
                                                          
6 Froot, Scharfstein, Stein (1993) concluded that cost and difficulties of raising external finance my force firms to 
underinvest.   
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sales, profit margin and assets in one of the models. The results are presented in Table 9 (Panel A 
and Panel B).  
Table 9. Underinvestment After Dual Ownership  
Panel A of this table presents modeling of domestic underinvestment following Harford, Wang and 
Zhang (2017). We modeled underinvestment by retaining residuals from regressing domestic 
investments of US MNCs’ (domestic capital expenses scaled by domestic assets) on US MNC 
segments’ characteristics such as: domestic sales growth over current period (Domestic Sale Growth), 
foreign sales growth over current period (Foreign Sale Growth), net domestic income over domestic 
sales (Domestic Profit Margin), net foreign income over foreign sales (Foreign Profit Margin) and log 
of one plus domestic as well foreign book assets. Next, we construct Domestic underinvestment as 
absolute value of negative residuals and zeros otherwise. Panel B. Probit and Difference-in-Difference 
analysis using regression model of domestic underinvestment. Columns (1) - (4) of this table reports 
results of probit analysis. While, column (5) reports results from Difference-in-difference analysis. 
DLOs is a dummy variable, which takes value of one if a firm belongs to a foreign subsidiary of the 
DLOs group and zero otherwise.  Post is a dummy variable, which indicates the three-year window 
[+1, +3] after DLOs activism. DLOs*Post is an interaction term between DLOs and Post-dual period.  
All models include industry and year fixed effects. To dilute the influence of outliers, all continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  T-statistics are reported in parenthesis 
(calculated based on standard clustered on firm level). Upper-asterisks *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Domestic capital expenditures/ Domestic Assets 
Domestic Sale Growth 0.014** 
 (2.242) 
Foreign Sale Growth 0.017 
 (0.388) 
Domestic Profit Margin 0.183*** 
 (4.033) 
Foreign Profit Margin 0.094 
 (0.993) 
Domestic assets 0.001 
 (0.498) 
Foreign Assets 0.000 
 (0.282) 
N 1706 
adj. R-sq 0.417 
Panel A, Table 9 reports modeling of domestic underinvestment following HWZ (2017) 
while Panel B reports probit analysis (Columns 1- 4) while panel B reports difference-in-difference 
analysis of domestic underinvestment. The domestic investment is defined as domestic capital 
expenditures and expenses as a percentage of book value of domestic assets. The coefficients on 
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Post (Columns 1 - 4) suggest decrease in domestic underinvestment for DLO firms and interaction 
term between DLOs and Post (Column 5) suggest that in the post-dual period, dual firms reduce 
total domestic underinvestment (at the 5% significant level) relative to their peers.  Overall, results 
of these section suggest that dual ownership has been more effective in decreasing domestic 
underinvestment.  
Table 9. Panel B: Probit and Difference-in-Difference analysis of domestic underinvestment 
Probit and Difference-in-Difference analysis using regression model of domestic underinvestment. Columns 
(1) - (4) of this table reports results of probit analysis. While, column (5) reports results from Difference-in-
difference analysis. DLOs is a dummy variable, which takes value of one if a firm belongs to a foreign 
subsidiary of the DLOs group and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable, which indicates the three-year 
window [+1, +3] after DLOs activism. DLOs*Post is an interaction term between DLOs and Post-dual period. 
All models include industry and year fixed effects. To dilute the influence of outliers, all continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  T-statistics are reported in parenthesis (calculated based on 
standard clustered on firm level). Upper-asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. All specifications include industry and year fixed effects. 
 DLOs Controls DLOs Controls 
Difference-in-
Difference 
 (1) (3) (2) (4) (5) 
 
Domestic 
Underinvest
ment 
(=1 if 
residual < 0) 
Domestic 
Underinvestme
nt 
(=1 if bottom 
quartile) 
Domestic 
Underinvestm
ent 
(=1 if residual 
< 0) 
Domestic 
Underinvestme
nt 
(=1 if bottom 
quartile) 
Domestic 
Underinvestme
nt 
(absolute value 
of residual <0) 
Post -0.652** -0.158 -0.506** -0.282  
 (-2.254) (-1.101) (-2.458) (-1.644)  
DLOs*Post     -0.008** 
     (-2.169) 
DLOs     0.005 
     (1.366) 
Leverage 0.920* -0.646** 0.128 -0.782** -0.003 
 (1.787) (-2.270) (0.363) (-2.280) (-0.469) 
Size 0.247*** 0.024 0.114* 0.020 -0.002** 
 (2.659) (0.613) (1.817) (0.458) (-2.060) 
IO -0.498 -0.391** -0.333 -0.183 -0.002 
 (-1.554) (-2.237) (-1.542) (-0.916) (-0.422) 
      
N 497 530 363 418 1206 
pseudo R-sq 0.099 0.069 0.076 0.133  
adj. R-sq     0.381 
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Table 10. Panel A: Difference-in-difference Analysis of Innovative Measures 
This table consists of two panels: a) aggregate innovation measures at the US MNCs level and b) aggregated foreign innovation measures 
at the US MNCs level. The sample includes firms with DLOs and their control firms. The dependent variables measured at time t, t1 and t2 
and are log transformation one plus patent counts (Pat), sum of five years forward citations (Cite) and patent scope (Scope). The innovation 
measures are scaled by the median value of the corresponding technological class.  The control firms are firms matched with treated firms 
in the same industry and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct number of foreign subsidiaries and distinct number 
of subsidiaries in the tax haven country. Industry classification based on the Fama and French (1997) 49 industries. DLOs is a dummy 
variable, which takes value of one if a firm belongs to DLOs group and zero otherwise.  Post is a dummy variable, which indicates the three-
year window [+1, +3] after DLOs activism. DLOs*Post is an interaction term between DLOs and Post-dual period. Post is excluded from 
the model because it was subsumed by year fixed effects.  To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix B. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis (calculated based on robust standard errors). 
Upper-asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.        
 
Pat Pat_t1 Pat_t2 Cite Cite_t1 Cite_t2 Scope Scope_t1 Scope_t2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DLOs*Post 0.186*** 0.292*** 0.311*** 0.221*** 0.193*** 0.200*** 0.195*** 0.172*** 0.166*** 
 (5.008) (4.809) (5.147) (4.954) (4.128) (4.008) (5.175) (4.297) (3.797) 
DLOs -0.021 -0.043 -0.044 -0.033 -0.024 -0.018 -0.030 -0.017 -0.003 
 (-0.993) (-1.107) (-1.132) (-1.283) (-0.855) (-0.563) (-1.364) (-0.707) (-0.099) 
R&D 1.461*** 3.780*** 3.785*** 1.842*** 2.239*** 2.583*** 1.507*** 1.841*** 2.088*** 
 (9.465) (12.549) (12.603) (8.556) (9.687) (10.237) (9.366) (10.314) (10.277) 
CAPX 0.003 0.019 -0.001 0.092 -0.080 -0.132 -0.002 -0.173 -0.176 
 (0.024) (0.091) (-0.004) (0.651) (-0.495) (-0.759) (-0.015) (-1.246) (-1.130) 
Size 0.134*** 0.261*** 0.279*** 0.159*** 0.184*** 0.211*** 0.136*** 0.160*** 0.186*** 
 (20.443) (22.966) (24.291) (20.125) (21.266) (22.781) (20.392) (21.333) (22.578) 
Age 0.127*** 0.249*** 0.277*** 0.136*** 0.170*** 0.208*** 0.128*** 0.155*** 0.192*** 
 (13.126) (14.465) (15.774) (11.906) (13.465) (14.915) (12.935) (14.057) (15.460) 
N 6146 6146 6146 6146 6146 6146 6146 6146 6146 
adj. R-sq 0.342 0.428 0.454 0.325 0.366 0.401 0.339 0.382 0.412 
Year and 
Industry FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10. Panel B: Difference-in-difference Analysis of Innovative Measures. 
This panel reports the aggregated foreign innovation measures at the US MNCs’ parent level. The sample includes firms with DLOs 
and their control firms. The dependent variables measured at time t, t1 and t2 and are log transformation one plus foreign patent counts 
(FPat), sum of five years forward citations received by the foreign patents (FCite) and scope of foreign patents (FScope). The innovation 
measures are scaled by the median value of the corresponding technological class. The control firms are firms matched with treated 
firms in the same industry and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct number of foreign subsidiaries and 
distinct number of subsidiaries in the tax haven country. Industry classification based on the Fama and French (1997) 49 industries. 
DLOs is a dummy variable, which takes value of one if a firm belongs to DLOs group and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable, 
which indicates the three-year window [+1, +3] after DLOs activism. DLOs*Post is an interaction term between DLOs and Post dual 
period. Post is excluded from the model because it was subsumed by year fixed effects.  To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix B. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis (calculated 
based on robust standard errors). Upper-asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.         
Panel B 
FPat FPat_t1 FPat_t2 FCite FCite_t1 FCite_t2 FScope FScope_t1 FScope_t2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DLOs*Post 0.013*** 0.001 -0.010 0.010** -0.001 -0.014 0.012*** -0.001 -0.011 
 (3.997) (0.106) (-1.141) (2.262) (-0.170) (-1.211) (3.744) (-0.145) (-1.340) 
DLOs -0.001 0.003 0.010* -0.000 0.007 0.015** -0.001 0.003 0.012** 
 (-0.635) (1.105) (1.923) (-0.169) (1.497) (2.251) (-0.869) (1.131) (2.338) 
R&D 0.033*** 0.071*** 0.163*** 0.035** 0.092*** 0.189*** 0.030*** 0.063*** 0.165*** 
 (3.213) (3.543) (4.556) (2.354) (2.914) (4.019) (2.828) (3.338) (4.433) 
CAPX -0.006 -0.033** -0.056** -0.015 -0.040* -0.067* -0.005 -0.034** -0.046* 
 (-0.739) (-1.998) (-1.996) (-1.267) (-1.881) (-1.952) (-0.558) (-2.144) (-1.667) 
Size 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.023*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 
 (9.935) (10.576) (11.604) (7.584) (9.395) (10.605) (9.457) (10.331) (11.376) 
Age 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.021*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 
 (8.147) (7.300) (7.748) (6.759) (6.461) (7.617) (7.681) (7.108) (7.548) 
N 6146 6146 6146 6146 6146 6146 6146 6146 6146 
adj. R-sq 0.102 0.156 0.176 0.071 0.120 0.143 0.094 0.150 0.167 
Year and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 11. Difference-in-difference analysis of Innovation Efficiency of Aggregated & Foreign Innovation Measures.   
This table presents analysis of innovation efficiency of DLOs firms relative to the control group during the post-dual period. The 
dependent variables are constructed following Hirshleifer et al (2013) and are log transformation of one plus innovative efficiency 
aggregated at the parent (foreign segment) level: patent efficiency, IE_pat (IE_fpat); efficiency of the recent five years forward 
citations, IE_cite (IE_fcite); and efficiency of patent scope, IE_scope (IE_fscope). The control firms are firms matched with treated 
firms in the same industry and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct number of foreign subsidiaries and 
distinct number of subsidiaries in the tax haven country. Industry classification are based on the Fama and French’s (1997) 49 
industries. DLOs is a dummy variable, which takes value of one if a firm belongs to DLO group and zero otherwise.  Post is a dummy 
variable, which indicates the three-year window [+1, +3] after DLOs activism. DLOs*Post is an interaction term between DLOs and 
Post-dual period. Post is excluded from the model because it was subsumed by year fixed effects.  To dilute the influence of outliers, 
all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix B. T-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis (calculated based on robust standard errors). Upper-asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.        
  
IE_pat IE_fpat IE_cite IE_fcite IE_scope IE_fscope 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DLOs*Post 1.357*** 0.009*** 1.088 0.009 1.447*** 0.007** 
 (3.682) (2.757) (1.331) (1.520) (3.027) (2.081) 
DLOs 0.198 0.003 1.355** 0.005 0.318 0.003 
 (0.744) (1.094) (2.060) (1.336) (0.875) (1.639) 
CAPX 1.619 0.001 6.283* 0.001 3.051 0.005 
 (1.163) (0.088) (1.663) (0.037) (1.548) (0.568) 
Size -0.130* 0.002*** 0.227 0.005*** -0.111 0.002*** 
 (-1.903) (3.594) (1.524) (6.265) (-1.254) (5.313) 
Age 0.782*** 0.003*** 1.031*** 0.006*** 0.776*** 0.003*** 
 (7.034) (3.902) (4.179) (3.913) (5.219) (3.983) 
N 6146 6146 6146 6146 6146 6146 
adj. R-sq 0.132 0.051 0.149 0.054 0.127 0.056 
Year and Industry 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 12: Difference-in-difference Analysis of Innovative Measures at the Foreign Subsidiary Level. 
This table reports difference-in-indifference analysis of DLOs activism on innovations of US MNCs’ foreign subsidiaries relative to 
its peers in the same country and industry. The dependent variables measured at time t, t1 and t2 and are log transformation one plus 
patent counts (Pat), log transformation of one plus total number of citations received (Cite) and patent scope (Scope). Cite and Scope 
are measured as a percentage of technological median. The innovation measures are scaled by the median value of the corresponding 
technological class.  The control firms are firms matched with foreign subsidiaries of treated firms in the same country, industry and 
year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size of a foreign subsidiary without replacement. DLOs is a dummy variable, which 
takes value of one if a firm belongs to a foreign subsidiary of the DLOs group and zero otherwise.  Post is a dummy variable, which 
indicates the three-year window [+1, +3] after DLOs activism. DLOs*Post is an interaction term between DLOs and Post-dual period.  
Post is excluded from the model because it was subsumed by year fixed effects.  Industry classification based on the Fama and French 
(1997) 49 industries.  To dilute the influence of outliers, all explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All 
variables are defined at Appendix B. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis (calculated based on robust standard errors). Upper-
asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  All specifications include Industry, Year, 
Country & US MNC Dummies. 
 Pat Pat_t1 Pat_t2 Cite Cite_t1 Cite_t2 Scope Scope_t1 Scope_t2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DLOs*Post 0.003 0.037 0.493*** 0.040*** -0.050* 0.090*** 0.234 0.018 1.752 
 (1.432) (0.156) (2.706) (3.138) (-1.701) (2.786) (1.529) (0.283) (0.283) 
DLOs 0.000 -1.578*** -1.765*** -0.033*** -0.127*** -0.185*** 0.010 -0.028* -2.763* 
 (1.149) (-3.962) (-4.187) (-2.643) (-9.888) (-3.241) (0.262) (-1.872) (-1.872) 
Cash 0.005* 1.610* 1.153 0.371*** 0.110*** 0.147*** 0.285** 0.024 2.394 
 (1.965) (1.910) (1.086) (3.478) (4.212) (2.842) (2.205) (0.365) (0.365) 
R&D 0.025*** 39.742*** 43.183*** 0.617 1.925** 1.985*** 2.842*** 2.742*** 274.172*** 
 (2.924) (3.068) (3.066) (0.935) (2.199) (5.010) (3.647) (2.972) (2.972) 
CAPX -0.007 -3.356* -4.543** -0.163*** -0.197*** 0.094 -0.515 -0.225 -22.540 
 (-1.070) (-1.673) (-2.231) (-2.972) (-4.310) (0.529) (-0.945) (-0.792) (-0.792) 
Size 0.000 0.316*** 0.336*** 0.033* 0.031*** 0.073*** 0.014 0.019** 1.863** 
 (0.709) (3.320) (3.681) (1.924) (2.676) (2.757) (1.087) (2.075) (2.075) 
Age -0.001** -0.058 0.209 -0.056*** 0.012 0.152*** -0.022 0.013 1.275 
 (-2.321) (-0.302) (0.846) (-5.941) (1.044) (2.791) (-0.927) (0.715) (0.715) 
N 2267 2267 2267 2267 2267 2267 2267 2267 2267 
R-sq 0.066 0.200 0.246 0.057 0.077 0.066 0.077 0.092 0.092 
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Table 13. Difference-in-difference Analysis of Innovation Efficiency (IE) at the Foreign Subsidiary Level. 
This table reports results of difference-in-difference analysis of DLOs activism on innovations of US MNCs’ foreign subsidiaries 
relative to its peers in the same country and industry. The dependent variables constructed following Hirshleifer et al (2013) and are 
log transformation one plus innovative efficiency aggregated at the publicly traded subsidiary level of US MNCs (foreign subsidiary 
level) such as: patent counts, IE_fpat; efficiency of the recent five years forward citations, IE_fcite; and efficiency of patent scope 
IE_fscope. The innovation efficiency variables expressed in percentages. The control firms are firms matched with foreign subsidiaries 
of treated firms in the same country, industry and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size of a foreign subsidiary 
without replacement. DLOs is a dummy variable, which takes value of one if a firm belongs to a foreign subsidiary of the DLOs group 
and zero otherwise.  Post is a dummy variable, which indicates the three-year window [+1, +3] after DLOs activism. DLOs*Post is 
an interaction term between DLOs and Post-dual period. Post is excluded from the model because it was subsumed by year fixed 
effects.  Industry classification based on the Fama and French (1997) 49 industries.  To dilute the influence of outliers, all explanatory 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix B. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis 
(calculated based on robust standard errors). Upper-asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.    All specifications include Industry, Year, Country & US MNC Dummies.     
 (1) (2) (3) 
 IE_pat IE_cite IE_scope 
DLOs*Post 0.031*** 0.060*** 0.098*** 
 (2.990) (3.628) (3.129) 
DLOs 0.064*** -0.001 0.118*** 
 (3.312) (-0.091) (2.793) 
Cash 0.543*** 0.412** 1.107*** 
 (4.571) (2.461) (5.242) 
CAPX -0.263*** -0.212*** -0.539*** 
 (-4.237) (-3.452) (-3.984) 
Size -0.005 0.008 -0.015** 
 (-1.274) (1.328) (-2.057) 
Age -0.049*** -0.044*** -0.080*** 
 (-4.094) (-3.914) (-3.572) 
N 2286 2286 2286 
adj. R-sq 0.023 0.027 0.001 
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IV.3.3. Increasing Innovation Efficiencies 
Do DLOs contribute to targets’ innovation efficiency in the post dual period? We answer 
this question in this section by examining innovation output, quality and innovation efficiency by 
employing Difference-in-Difference analysis. The results are presented in Tables 10, 11, and 12. 
IV. 3.3.1. Innovation output & quality 
Table 10, Panel A shows that in the post-dual period, DLO firms significantly increase 
their innovation output and quality relative to control firms. The results apply to longer time 
horizon (i.e., t+1 and t+2). For instance, targets significantly increase their innovation output by 
0.186 (at the 1% significant level), citations by 0.221 (at the 1% significance level), and scope by 
0.195 (at the 1% significance level) during the post-dual era.   
Panel B of Table 10 analyzes the same innovation measures in the global context. It shows 
that aggregate at the parent level foreign measures are qualitatively similar to overall aggregate 
innovation measures but significant only for the shorter period.  For example, three years after dual 
holdings, the number of foreign patents increased by 0.013 (at the 1% significance level), the 
number of foreign citations increased by 0.10 (at the 5% significance level) and the foreign scope 
increased by 0.012 (at the 1% significance level). 
IV. 3.3.2. Innovation efficiency 
Table 11 shows that targets increase patent innovation efficiency (IE_patent) by 1.357 (at 
the 1% significance level) as well as scope innovation efficiency (IE_scope) by 1.447 (at the 1% 
significance level). These results are consistent with corresponding foreign measures. For 
example, foreign patent innovation efficiency (IE_fpat) increase by 0.009 (at the 1% significance 
level) and foreign scope efficiency increased (IE_fscope) by 0.007 (at the 5% significance level). 
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However, aggregated and foreign citation efficiency measures (IE_cite and IE_fcite) are not 
significant.  Taken together, Table 10 and Table 11 show that increases in innovation efficiency in 
the post-dual period are larger for DLO firms than control firms.  
IV. 3.3.3. Innovation----foreign subsidiaries of the DLO firms 
Tables 12 and 13 explore if increased innovation efficiencies observed with respect to DLO 
firms are equally applicable to foreign subsidiaries of these targets. These tables compare 
innovation measures of foreign subsidiaries of DLO firms with foreign firms in the same industry 
and in the same country.   
Table 12 shows that the number of patents and citations of the subsidiaries of target firms 
in time t+2 experience a greater increase of 0.493 (at the 1% significance level) and 0.040 (at the 
1% significance level) than their foreign counterparts. This result suggest that foreign subsidiaries 
of the targets increased their innovativeness more than the firms in the countries where the 
subsidiaries exist.  
In Table 13, we compare subsidiaries’ innovation efficiency to that of the comparable 
foreign firms. The subsidiaries enjoy greater increase in their innovation efficiencies than their 
foreign peers in the post-dual period. For example, innovative efficiency of patents increased by 
0.031 (at the 1% significant level), efficiency of citations by 0.060 (at the 1% significance level) 
and efficiency of scope by 0.098 (at the 1% significance level). 
IV. 3.4. Summarizing test results: Hypothesis 3 
Overall, the results support our hypothesis that, in the post-dual period, DLO firms have been 
able to reduce internal capital market deficiencies and improve investment efficiencies not only 
relative to the pre-dual period but to non-DLO firms as well. More specifically,  
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 DLO firms, more than non-DLO firms, are able to reduce the inefficiencies induced by 
internal capital market; 
 Dual ownership is more effective in decreasing domestic underinvestment; 
 Increases in innovation efficiency in the post-dual period are larger for DLO firms than 
control firms.  
IV. 4. Testing Hypothesis 4: Focused Acquisitions  
In practical sense, agency costs of free cash flows are similar to those of foreign cash 
balance. Therefore, we examine the extent to which Jensen’s (1986) prescriptions for mitigating 
such costs are applicable to foreign cash balances. Jensen (1986) recommends three principal ways 
to reduce agency costs of free cash flows: increasing dividends, increasing debt, and getting 
involved in acquisitions. Jensen further suggests that increasing debt is a better way than increasing 
dividends (since debt requires future commitment, but dividends do not), and a focused merger is 
superior to conglomerate merger (since the former adds value to the combined firm).   
Increasing dividend is not a viable option for the DLO firms or control firms. since the 
parent firm cannot access the foreign cash holdings. Similarly, issuance of debt has no effect on 
reducing the cash buildup abroad. Therefore, DLOs are likely to lead their affiliated firms to use 
the cash abroad to aggressively acquire foreign firms. Bena and Li (2014) suggests that firms with 
low R&D but lager patent portfolio (more efficient in terms of innovations) would more likely to 
be an acquirer than target. Since evidence produced above point to DLOs acting long term, an 
argument can be made in support of them being involved in focused acquisitions. The focused 
acquisition strategy is reinforced by HWZ (2017):  
” … if managers think that the firm will be able to repatriate foreign cash later at a 
much reduced or zero cost (due to tax reform or holiday), or the managers think 
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(correctly or not) that foreign cash can be used to make foreign acquisitions that would 
have valuable synergies, then managers would view the trade-off 
differently” (p.1513). 
We make the following predictions about merger activities of DLO firms versus non-DLO 
firms: 
 Both DLOs and non-DLOs would use foreign cash holdings to acquire foreign firms; 
 The coordination hypothesis proposed by Bodnaruk and Rossi (2016) suggest that 
DLOs have stronger incentive for facilitating deal completions; Therefore, we expect 
DLOs to complete greater number of deals than their non-DLO counterparts.  
 DLOs would be involved in a greater frequency of focus acquisitions than non-DLOs. 
 The premiums paid by DLOs for foreign targets are likely to be higher than those paid 
by non-DLOs as the former is involved in higher quality (i.e., greater synergy) 
acquisitions. would be on average higher for firms with improved quality of deals, 
wherein the quality is pertinent to strategic focus (synergy). 
Table 14 presents results of difference-in-difference analysis of acquisition deal 
completion. During the sample period, DLOs have 4,583 deals and the control group has 1,991 
deals. Total number of deals include completed, withdrawn and terminated acquisition deals. 
DLOs engage in significantly higher number of acquisitions than their counterparts.  
The completion ratio is the number of completed acquisitions as a percentage of total 
number of acquisitions. The results show that DLOs complete a larger number of foreign 
acquisitions at the 1% significance level), domestic acquisitions (significant at the 5% level) and 
focused acquisitions (at the significance level of 1%).   
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Table 14. Difference-in-difference analysis of Acquisition Completion and Premium. 
The columns (1) – (4) present analysis of completion ratios, where the dependent variables measured as 
a percentage of total number of acquisition deals and are Completion Foreign Acquisitions (FA), 
Completion Domestic Acquisitions (DA), Completion Focused Foreign Acquisitions (FA), and 
Completion Focused Domestic Acquisitions (DA). In addition, columns (5) though (7) present analyses 
of acquisition premium, where the dependent variables are premium with respect to the DLOs' average 
stock price 7 days prior to the acquisition announcement denoted as Premium 7d Px along with 
disaggregating premium into completion and origin as follows: Premium 7d Px Completed Domestic 
Acquisitions (DA), Premium 7d Px Completed Foreign Acquisitions (FA), Premium 7d Px Focused 
Acquisitions (Acq). The measures division into a focused is based on equivalence of a DLOs’ and an 
acquirer’s three-digits SIC code. The control firms are firms matched with treated firms in the same 
industry and year using propensity scores (nearest neighbor) on size, distinct number of foreign 
subsidiaries and distinct number of subsidiaries in the tax haven country.  Industry classification based 
on the Fama and French (1997) 49 industries. DLOs is a dummy variable, which takes value of one if a 
firm belongs to DLOs group and zero otherwise. DLOs*Post is an interaction term between DLOs and 
Post. Post is a dummy variable, which indicates the three-year window [+1, +3] after DLOs activism. 
Post is excluded from the model because it was subsumed by year fixed effects.  The model also controls 
for market-to-book ratio (MTB), size computed as log transformation of one plus total assets and 
institutional ownership (IO). To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix B. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis 
(calculated based on robust standard errors). Upper-asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All specification include year and industry fixed effects.     
 
Completi
on FA 
(%) 
Completio
n DA (%) 
Completion 
Focused FA 
(%) 
Completion 
Focused DA 
Premium 
7d Px 
Complete
d DA 
Premium 
7d Px 
Complete
d FA 
Premium 
7d Px 
Focused 
Acq. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DLOs
*Post 3.637*** 4.028** 0.502*** 1.924*** 1.046*** 0.190** 0.339** 
 (2.976) (2.399) (2.584) (2.798) (3.579) (2.394) (2.545) 
DLOs 0.045 1.862 0.057 -0.939* -0.240 -0.040 -0.052 
 (0.054) (1.389) (0.578) (-1.828) (-1.331) (-0.986) (-0.643) 
Size 1.915*** 2.528*** 0.065** 0.578*** 0.392*** 0.076*** 0.136*** 
 (9.603) (8.284) (2.255) (4.691) (7.107) (5.571) (5.248) 
MTB -0.066 -0.061 -0.008 0.007 0.024** -0.000 0.009 
 (-0.927) (-0.639) (-0.848) (0.142) (2.122) (-0.157) (1.565) 
IO 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.001 0.009* -0.003 -0.001** -0.001 
 (3.703) (3.029) (0.763) (1.807) (-1.583) (-2.130) (-0.867) 
N 6220 6220 6220 6220 6220 6220 6220 
adj. 
R-sq 0.078 0.063 0.010 0.037 0.032 0.015 0.024 
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In terms of merger premium, Table 14 shows that the DLO group pays significantly higher 
premium to targets than the non-DLO group. The higher premium persists when the acquisitions 
are broken down by domestic acquisitions, foreign acquisitions, and focused acquisitions. 7 
IV. 5. Performance: – DLO Firms vs. Control Firms 
IV. 5.1. Association between innovation efficiency and performance 
Given the significantly better innovation efficiency of the dual group, it is expected that 
this group will outperform the non-dual group. We employ the Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-
sectional regression in which the dependent variables are ROA and M/B in year t+1 and 
explanatory variables are geometric growth of patent innovation efficiency (GIE Pat), citation 
innovation efficiency (GIE Cite), scope innovation efficiency (GIE Scope) and geometric growth 
of total number of patent as well as exploratory number of patents.  
Table 15, Panel A shows that associations between innovation efficiency measures and 
performance measures are positive. With respect to operating performance, 1% increase in 
geometric growth of the patent efficiency will result in an increase of ROA by 2.558 (at the 5% 
significance level), and 1% increase in the cite and scope efficiency would bring about an increase 
in ROA by 0.783 (at the 5% significance level) and 1.078 (at the 5% significance level) 
respectively. Similarly, one percent increase of targets’ geometric growth of patent and exploration 
ratio would augment M/B by 0.164 (at the 1% significance level) and 3.847 (at the 5% significance 
level) respectively.    
                                                          
7 Our results reported in columns (5) through (8) are qualitatively same using premia with respect to the target's average stock 
price 90 days prior to the acquisition announcement.   
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Table 15. Panel A: Post-dual Performance of DLOs and Innovation Efficiency: DLOs Firms. 
This table reports estimated average innovative efficiency and post activism performance. The Tables consist of two panels, DLOs firms (Panel A) and Control 
firm (Panel B). The average slopes estimated following Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variables are ROA and M/B in 
year t+1 and explanatory variables are geometric growth of patent innovation efficiency (GIE Pat), citation innovation efficiency (GIE Cite), scope innovation 
efficiency (GIE Scope) and geometric growth of total number of patent as well as exploratory number of patents. The explanatory variables expressed in 
percentages.  The explanatory and control variables are measured in year t from 2007 to 2014 and include post activism period. ΔROA is the change in ROA 
between year t and year t – 1. MTB is market to book assets. CapEx (capital expenditure) and R&D (expenditure on research and development) divided by 
lagged total assets. Industry dummy is based on the Fama and French (1997) 49 industries classification. Average R-squred is the time-series average of the R-
squared from the annual cross-sectional regressions. To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables 
are defined at Appendix B. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis (based on adjusted standard errors for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations following 
Newey and West, 1987). Upper-asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.       
  
ROA M/B ROA M/B ROA M/B ROA M/B ROA M/B 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
GIE Pat (%) 2.558** 102.515         
 (3.608) (1.001)         
GIE Cite (%)   0.783** 52.564       
   (2.902) (1.859)       
GIE Scope (%)     1.078** 102.988     
     (2.881) (1.342)     
GPat (%)       0.005* 0.164***   
       (2.515) (4.647)   
GExplore (%)         0.232 3.847** 
         (1.790) (3.253) 
∆ROA 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  
 (1.280)  (1.216)  (1.259)  (1.211)  (0.993)  
M/B 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.172)  (0.154)  (0.160)  (0.079)  (0.195)  
R&D -0.193 0.735 -0.192 0.974 -0.189 0.882 -0.242 -0.935 -0.220 0.029 
 (-0.901) (0.204) (-0.892) (0.294) (-0.883) (0.257) (-1.218) (-0.275) (-1.206) (0.008) 
CAPX 0.111 -2.444 0.111 -2.309 0.110 -2.276 0.120* -2.081 0.125* -2.018 
 (1.894) (-0.917) (1.896) (-0.862) (1.868) (-0.849) (2.200) (-0.756) (2.288) (-0.749) 
IO -0.000** -0.009 -0.000** -0.008 -0.000** -0.008 -0.000** -0.007 -0.000** -0.008 
 (-2.620) (-0.612) (-2.645) (-0.588) (-2.630) (-0.565) (-2.760) (-0.521) (-3.120) (-0.596) 
∆TA -0.080* 1.018 -0.081* 0.904 -0.080* 0.871 -0.084** 1.124 -0.082** 0.997 
 (-2.433) (0.434) (-2.369) (0.383) (-2.383) (0.366) (-3.056) (0.478) (-3.253) (0.432) 
∆ROE  -0.021  -0.025  -0.021  -0.021  -0.020 
  (-0.343)  (-0.430)  (-0.346)  (-0.347)  (-0.323) 
Average R-sq 0.434 0.383 0.435 0.383 0.433 0.383 0.447 0.382 0.452 0.380 
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Table 15. Panel B: Post-dual Performance and Innovation Efficiency: Control Firms. This table reports estimated average innovative efficiency and post activism 
performance. The average slopes estimated following Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variables are ROA and M/B in year t+1 and 
explanatory variables are geometric growth of patent innovation efficiency (GIE Pat), citation innovation efficiency (GIE Cite), scope innovation efficiency (GIE Scope) 
and geometric growth of total number of patent as well as exploratory number of patents. The explanatory variables expressed in percentages. The explanatory and control 
variables are measured in year t from 2007 to 2014 and include post activism period. ΔROA is the change in ROA between year t and year t – 1. MTB is market to book 
assets. CapEx (capital expenditure) and R&D (expenditure on research and development) divided by lagged total assets. Industry dummy is based on the Fama and French 
(1997) 49 industries classification. Average R-squred is the time-series average of the R-squared from the annual cross-sectional regressions. To dilute the influence of 
outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix B. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis (based on adjusted 
standard errors for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations following Newey and West, 1987). Upper-asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively.       
  
ROA M/B ROA M/B ROA M/B ROA M/B ROA M/B 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
GIE Pat (%) -2.939 -189.912         
 (-1.340) (-0.941)         
GIE Cite (%)   1.868* -110.351*       
   (2.054) (-2.563)       
GIE Scope (%)     2.039 -216.583     
     (1.186) (-1.943)     
GPat (%)       -0.015 -0.498   
       (-0.908) (-1.174)   
GExplore (%)         -0.450 11.969 
         (-1.320) (0.672) 
∆ROA -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
 (-0.239)  (-0.233)  (-0.275)  (-0.436)  (-0.198)  
M/B 0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  
 (0.567)  (0.648)  (0.674)  (0.686)  (0.667)  
R&D -1.434*** 18.180*** -1.469*** 19.213*** -1.497*** 19.805*** -1.520*** 17.786*** -1.431*** 18.243*** 
 (-16.083) (8.762) (-17.584) (9.477) (-18.626) (7.673) (-9.583) (10.207) (-16.182) (12.080) 
CAPX 0.226** 0.832 0.220** 1.265 0.221** 0.881 0.201*** 1.470 0.248** 2.633 
 (2.965) (0.445) (2.825) (0.708) (2.852) (0.477) (4.503) (0.792) (2.950) (1.136) 
IO 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.006* 0.001 0.007* 
 (1.866) (0.902) (1.920) (1.171) (1.918) (1.027) (1.871) (2.090) (1.853) (2.017) 
∆TA -0.012 -1.286 -0.010 -1.370 -0.012 -1.225 -0.012 -1.308 -0.013 -1.423 
 (-0.415) (-0.701) (-0.329) (-0.729) (-0.413) (-0.660) (-0.416) (-0.704) (-0.438) (-0.790) 
∆ROE  0.049  0.045  0.049  0.048  0.066 
  (1.090)  (0.949)  (1.064)  (1.070)  (1.163) 
Average R-sq 0.614 0.465 0.614 0.465 0.616 0.477 0.615 0.453 0.610 0.454 
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Panel B of Table 15 reports the time series average estimates for control firms in the post-
dual period. Panel B shows that only geometric growth of citation efficiency is significantly related 
to ROA and M/B. However, its effect on ROA is positive (e.g., 1% increase in geometric growth 
of citation efficiency is associated with an increase in ROA of control firms by 1.868 (significant 
at the 10% level), while its effect on M/B (significantly negative at the 10% level).  
In summing up the results of Table 15, the performance of DLO firms is superior to that of 
control firms in the post-dual period and relation between innovation and both performance 
measures are positive. The association between innovation and performance for the control firms 
is mixed---a positive relation with ROA but negative relation with M/B. As reported in Table 6 
above, although DLO firms outperform control firms in the pre-dual period in terms of ROA, their 
market performance (M/B) is not significantly different from the control group. We attribute this 
discrepancy to market’s underreaction to the information content of innovation efficiency (see, 
Hirshleifer et al. 2013). It appears the initial underreaction has subsequently given way to positive 
reaction.  
IV. 5.2.  Monthly returns in the post-dual period 
To assess whether innovation efficiency along with other innovation measures predict 
return, we estimate the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression. The dependent variable is monthly 
excess return (return with dividends – monthly risk-free rate) in year t+1 and expressed in 
percentages.  Explanatory variables are geometric growth of patent innovation efficiency (GIE 
Pat), citation innovation efficiency (GIE Cite), scope innovation efficiency (GIE Scope) and 
geometric growth of total number of patent as well as exploratory number of patents.  
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Table 16:  (Panel A): Post-dual Excess Return and DLOs’ Innovation Efficiency. This table reports estimated average innovative efficiency and post activism excess 
monthly return. The Tables consist of two panels, DLOs firms (Panel A) and Control firms (Panel B). The average slopes estimated following Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-
sectional regressions. The dependent variable is monthly excess return (return with dividends – monthly risk-free rate) in year t+1 and expressed in percentages.  Explanatory 
variables are geometric growth of patent innovation efficiency (GIE Pat), citation innovation efficiency (GIE Cite), scope innovation efficiency (GIE Scope) and geometric 
growth of total number of patent as well as exploratory number of patents.  The explanatory and control variables are measured in year t from 2007 to 2014 and include post 
activism period. ΔROA is the change in ROA between year t and year t – 1. MTB is market to book assets. CapEx (capital expenditure) and R&D (expenditure on research and 
development) divided by lagged total assets. Volume is the average daily dollar trading volume from the preceding year. CRet is cumulative average return over the past 12 
months skipping the recent month.  Industry dummy is based on the Fama and French (1997) 49 industries classification. Average R-squred is the time-series average of the R-
squared from the annual cross-sectional regressions. To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at 
Appendix B. T-statistics (based on adjusted standard errors for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations following Newey and West, 1987) are reported in parenthesis. Upper-
asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GIE Pat 2.563***     
 (5.218)     
GIE Cite  0.956***    
  (2.839)    
GIE Scope   2.692***   
   (2.762)   
GPat    0.003**  
    (2.253)  
GExplore     0.136** 
     (2.527) 
Log(1+ME) -0.539** -0.506* -0.507* -0.599** -0.590** 
 (-2.060) (-1.960) (-1.947) (-2.210) (-2.159) 
Volume 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (4.072) (3.877) (3.963) (3.942) (3.894) 
M/B 0.092** 0.090** 0.092** 0.099** 0.101** 
 (2.435) (2.419) (2.402) (2.583) (2.567) 
∆ROE -0.182** -0.189** -0.190** -0.189** -0.187** 
 (-2.162) (-2.233) (-2.269) (-2.157) (-2.181) 
R&D -9.858** -8.455* -8.959* -11.721** -11.034** 
 (-2.141) (-1.830) (-1.924) (-2.274) (-2.211) 
CAPX -11.940* -12.676* -12.248* -14.581** -14.031** 
 (-1.849) (-1.954) (-1.895) (-2.143) (-2.085) 
IO 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 
 (3.606) (4.476) (4.229) (4.440) (4.168) 
CRet 3.620*** 3.663*** 3.669*** 3.670*** 3.700*** 
 (4.003) (4.008) (3.969) (3.910) (3.975) 
∆TA -1.069 -1.381 -1.417 -1.215 -0.783 
 (-0.684) (-0.890) (-0.911) (-0.730) (-0.455) 
R-sq 0.430 0.434 0.433 0.437 0.438 
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Table 16 (Panel B): Post-dual Excess Return and Controls’ Innovation Efficiency.  This table reports estimated average innovative efficiency and post activism excess monthly 
return of control firms. The average slopes estimated following Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is monthly excess return (return with 
dividends – monthly risk-free rate) in year t+1 and expressed in percentages.  Explanatory variables are geometric growth of patent innovation efficiency (GIE Pat), citation innovation 
efficiency (GIE Cite), scope innovation efficiency (GIE Scope) and geometric growth of total number of patent as well as exploratory number of patents.  The explanatory and control 
variables are measured in year t from 2007 to 2014 and include post activism period. ΔROA is the change in ROA between year t and year t – 1. MTB is market to book assets. CapEx 
(capital expenditure) and R&D (expenditure on research and development) divided by lagged total assets. Volume is the average daily dollar trading volume from the preceding year. 
CRet is cumulative average return over the past 12 months skipping the recent month.  Industry dummy is based on the Fama and French (1997) 49 industries classification. Average 
R-squred is the time-series average of the R-squared from the annual cross-sectional regressions. To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix B. T-statistics (based on adjusted standard errors for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations following Newey and West, 1987) are 
reported in parenthesis. Upper-asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.        
  (1)    (2) (3)  (4)     (5) 
GIE Pat -2.257     
 (-0.833)     
GIE Cite  -3.661    
  (-0.810)    
GIE Scope   -0.168   
   (-0.066)   
GPat    0.041***  
    (3.171)  
GExplore     1.520 
     (1.498) 
Log(1+ME) -0.463** -0.464** -0.482** -0.559** -0.513** 
 (-2.141) (-2.180) (-2.219) (-2.207) (-2.142) 
Volume 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* -0.000** 
 (2.030) (2.057) (2.114) (1.966) (-1.998) 
M/B 0.270 0.305* 0.307* 0.305 0.580** 
 (1.533) (1.756) (1.786) (1.584) (2.128) 
∆ROE 0.337** 0.337** 0.341** 0.397** 0.341* 
 (2.065) (2.070) (2.110) (2.085) (1.939) 
R&D -36.190*** -37.798*** -39.633*** -35.824** -17.043** 
 (-3.177) (-3.344) (-3.506) (-2.448) (-2.136) 
CAPX 25.848 25.479 25.812 30.166 34.751* 
 (1.597) (1.569) (1.590) (1.593) (1.686) 
IO 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.034** 
 (1.286) (1.126) (1.201) (1.244) (2.413) 
CRet 1.050* 0.979* 1.155* 1.176* 0.910 
 (1.784) (1.755) (1.978) (1.906) (1.459) 
∆TA -1.739 -1.503 -1.412 -2.875** -2.484 
 (-1.150) (-0.956) (-0.936) (-2.089) (-1.655) 
R-sq 0.489 0.488 0.487 0.497 0.497 
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Panel A of Table 16 reports that time series average estimates and t-statistics for DLO 
firms. For example, one unit increase in geometric growth of patent efficiency will increase excess 
return by 2.563% (at the 1% significance level), one unit increase in geometric growth of citations 
will increase excess return by 0.956 (at the 1% significance level ), one unit increase in geometric 
growth of patent scope efficiency will increase excess return by 2.692 (at the 1% significance 
level) , one unit increase in geometric growth of patent number will increase excess return by 0.003 
(at the 5% significant level) and one unit increase in exploration ratio will increase excess return 
by 0.136 (at the 5% significance level ). 
Panel B presents results for the control firms by employing the same model as in Panel A 
above.  The results show that only increase in geometric growth of number of patent is significant 
for control firms with the coefficient of 0.041 (at the 1% significance level). Overall, target firms 
exhibit a consistently positive relation between all measures of innovation and excess returns, with 
efficiency measures having the highest coefficient.  
IV. 5.3. Innovation and stock return-long-term 
This section analyzes whether the DLOs have skills for building strategy based on pre-
innovative performance that would predict superior future performance. First, we assess whether 
innovation efficiency along with other innovation measures predict return, we estimate the Fama-
MacBeth (1973) regression. Our results from pre-period (Table A3) and post-period (Table 16) 
suggest that measures of innovation efficiency and measures of firm exploration strategy convey 
significant information for stock predictability: these results are consistent with Hirshleifer et al. 
2013. Then, we analyze long term strategy of the DLO firms relative to their control counterparts 
in both pre- and post- periods using the abnormal stock returns. In particular, we estimate the four-
factor Fama-French-Carhart model and three-factor Fama-French models as follows: 
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We use calendar-time portfolios of DLO firms and control firms that rebalance monthly 
starting at June of event year and holding for the 36 moths. Following Hirshleifer et al 2013, we 
form portfolios using double sort. We first sort firms into small and big based on the NYSE median 
size break points. We also perform further sort into Low, Medium and High values of IE based on 
75 and 25 percentiles over three years following the event. Finally, we compute the monthly size 
adjusted value-weighted return.    
Table 17, Panel A reports abnormal return prior to dual ownership, while Panel B presents 
post-dual period. Table 17 shows that both excess and risk-adjusted abnormal returns decrease 
monotonically with IE in the pre-period, while in the post-post period this pattern is reverse only 
for the DLOs firms.  
Panel A further shows that DLO firms have significantly lower risk adjusted abnormal 
returns in the pre-dual period. The risk adjusted return monotonically decreases from low IE 
portfolio to high IE portfolio. These results are consistent across both models. We define strategy 
as shorting the low IE portfolio of control firms and simultaneously buying and holding for 36 
months targets’ high IE portfolio. The strategy results in significantly lower returns.  For example, 
using the Carhart four-factor (Fama-French three factor) model the strategy will yield significantly 
-1.174% monthly risk adjusted return ( -0.572%). Furthermore, difference between DLO firms’ 
and control firms’ HL strategies yield significantly abnormal risk adjusted return of -0.609 
(Carhart four-factor model). 
In contrast, Panel B shows that the targets’ high IE portfolio has significantly positive risk 
adjusted monthly abnormal returns of 0.491% (Carhart four-factor model) and 0.489% (Fama-
French three-factor model) following DLOs ownership. 
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Table 17. Panel A: Pre-Dual Innovative Efficiency (IE) and Risk Factor Models. This table illustrates the capability of IE to predict the 
risk adjusted return. We first sort firms into small (S) and big (B) based on the NYSE median size break points. We also perform further 
sort into Low (L), Medium (M) and High (H) values of IE based on 75 and 25 percentiles over three years following the event in year t. 
Then we hold portfolio over three years starting at the end of June of year t-3 (Panel A, three-year pre-event window) and t+1(Panel B, 
three-year post-event window) and compute the monthly size adjusted value-weighted return for the both periods. We adjust the monthly 
value-weighted return as taking average of Big (B) and Small (S) within each of IE group (e.g. (S/L+B/L)/2, (S/M+B/M)/2, (S/H+B/H)/2). 
This table reports average excess return (columns 1 and 2) in percent and alpha (α) from Carhart four-factor model (column 4 and 5) and 
alpha (α) from Fama-French three factor model (columns 7 and 8). The excess return is defined as difference between value-weighted size 
adjusted monthly return and the one-month Treasury bill rate. The excess return and alpha are expressed in percentages. We use the following 
factors: MOM, the momentum factor of Carhart (1997); MKT, HML, SMB factors of Fama and French (1993); IE is computed following 
Hirshleifer et al. (2013).  Robust t-statistics, computed following Newey and West (1987) using six legs, are presented in parentheses.  
  Excess Return   Carhart four-factor model Fama-French three factor model 
   
DLOs-
Control 
  
DLOs-
Control 
  
DLOs-Control 
 DLOs  Control 
DLOs Control DLOs  Control 
 (α)  (α) (α) (α) 
   (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  
Low 1.753*** 1.883*** -0.129 0.485*** 0.462*** 0.024 0.487*** 0.464*** 0.022 
 (18.001) (19.966) (-0.955) (3.898) (4.978) (0.201) (3.914) (5.034) (0.189) 
Medium 1.055*** 1.438*** -0.383** -0.200 -0.120 -0.079 -0.199 -0.122 -0.077 
 (9.044) (14.486) (-2.501) (-1.067) (-1.211) (-0.360) (-1.064) (-1.223) (-0.350) 
High 0.278** 0.936*** -0.658*** -0.689*** -0.103 -0.586* -0.108 -1.182*** -0.588* 
 (2.246) (6.345) (-3.438) (-3.306) (-0.489) (-1.887) (-0.508) (-4.366) (-1.887) 
H-L -1.475*** -0.993*** -0.482** -1.174*** -0.565** -0.609* -0.572** 0.022 -0.610* 
 (-14.201) (-9.705) (-3.296) (-4.379) (-2.441) (-1.726) (-2.461) (0.189) (-1.722) 
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Table 17. Panel B: Post-Dual Innovative Efficiency (IE) and Risk Factor Models. The excess return, alpha and loading factors 
are expressed in percentages. This panel reports excess return and risk-adjusted return form the improve IE.    Heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. IE is computed following Hirshleifer et al. (2013). Robust t-statistics, computed 
following Newey and West (1987) using six legs, are presented in parentheses. 
  Excess Return   Carhart four-factor model Fama-French three factor model 
   
DLOs-
Control 
  
DLOs-
Control 
  
DLOs-
Control  DLOs  Control 
DLOs Control DLOs  Control 
 (α)  (α) (α) (α) 
   (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  
Low 1.417*** 1.607*** -0.191 -0.325*** -0.379*** 0.054 -0.329*** -0.379*** 0.050 
 (11.744) (15.680) (-1.010) (-3.189) (-4.925) (0.726) (-3.023) (-4.911) (0.632) 
Medium 1.109*** 1.481*** -0.371** -0.237** -0.103 -0.134 -0.236** -0.105 -0.131 
 (10.550) (13.348) (-2.317) (-2.037) (-1.118) (-0.925) (-2.029) (-1.121) (-0.900) 
High 2.201*** .956*** 1.245*** 0.491** -0.906*** 1.397*** 0.489** -0.908*** 1.397*** 
 (15.039) (6.325) (5.135) (2.496) (-4.527) (5.244) (2.471) (-4.521) (5.254) 
H-L 0.754*** -0.544*** 1.298*** 0.816*** -0.527** 1.343*** 0.818*** -0.529** 1.347*** 
 (8.6951) (-4.646) (8.909) (3.627) (-2.116) (4.648) (3.639) (-2.122) (4.660) 
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The difference between HL strategy of Targets’ portfolio and Controls’ portfolio in the 
post-period yields significantly positive risk adjusted return of 1.343% (Carhart four-factor model) 
and 1.347% (Fama-French three-factor model). Overall our results presented in Table 17 
qualitatively similar to results from portfolio in exploration strategy (Table A4). 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Most US MNCs maintain a large amount of cash holdings abroad to avoid repatriation tax. 
According to Harford, Wang & Zhang (2017), the maintenance of such high cash balances 
overseas leads to inefficiencies in the internal capital markets which in turn cause distortions in 
the investment decisions of these firms (i.e., domestic underinvestment and foreign 
overinvestments).  Hedge funds owns common shares in many of these MNCs but invests in both 
stocks and bonds in only some of them.  
What motivates hedge funds to take dual positions and how do they go about targeting 
these firms? Harford, Wang & Zhang (2017) suggest that the higher the repatriation tax, borrowing 
costs and agency problems, the higher are the investment distortions.  Thus, we propose that hedge 
funds take dual positions in those firms that are exposed to these problems and, therefore, present 
greater potential for success in the long term.  
In this paper, we demonstrate that dual owners target those MNCs that have higher 
repatriation tax costs than the rest (i.e., firms with higher proportion of income tied to foreign 
income that are generated from higher number of subsidiaries in the tax haven countries. The 
managers of dual firms are more entrenched as they have more restrictive anti-takeover provisions. 
Hedge funds invest in bonds of these firms to provide external funding in order for these funds to 
improve their efficiency in domestic investments. Upon gaining dual ownership, hedge funds 
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engage in wresting control away from the existing management by reducing insider trading, 
engaging in proxy contests and fighting anti-takeover provision. These measures are associated 
with improved capital market resulting in enhanced efficiency in investments, especially 
investments in innovation. Finally, to address the agency problems related to foreign cash 
holdings, hedge funds engage dual-owned firms into acquiring foreign firms that provide synergy.   
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Chapter 2 
Innovation Strategies & IPO Underpricing 
I. Introduction  
The IPO pricing is largely determined by the relative bargaining power of the issuer and 
underwriter, or their ability to persuade the other side to set an offer price on their terms. Would 
innovative issuers have a higher bargaining power if their past innovation strategies could signal 
their future success?  This question is important, since a majority of the recent US initial public 
offerings (IPOs) are technological firms, which face a high, positive first day return or 
underpricing phenomenon. Moreover, patent portfolio may signal a firm’s future success when a 
firm is patenting their products and not infringing intellectual rights of its competitors.   
In the equilibrium, relative bargaining power of underwriters and issuers determines the 
size of IPO underpricing.8 If the outcome of an IPO is more certain to underwriters, then they may 
demand a lower portion of the total proceeds to offset their risk. Thus, we posit that issuers have 
bargaining power when they can affect the competitive environment of underwriters, and influence 
underwriters’ ability to achieve profitability. If powerful issuers can negotiate a higher offer price, 
the issuer is indifferent to non-price dimensions of the IPO process. The issuers may switch an 
underwriter to compensate their low bargaining power with analyst coverage.9 All of this 
contributes to the underwriters’ costs. A powerful issuer can increase profit potential for 
                                                          
8 In the Nash equilibrium, both underwriter and issuer maximize their objective function, but neither underwriter nor 
issuer can increase their return by neglecting each player maximization faction. The relative barging power of both 
underwriter and issuer determines the share of the total proceeds for each player (Hu and Ritter, 2007). 
9 Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001) find little evidence of switching underwriters due to dissatisfaction and suggest 
two reasons why issuers may switch underwriters. First, issuers upgrade to higher reputation underwriters. Second, 
issuers strategically buy additional and influential coverage from the lead underwriter.   
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underwriters. The underwriter offering stock of a powerful innovative issuer may set public 
offering price higher than on stocks of issuers with relatively low power. On the other hand, a 
weak issuer, one who is at the mercy of the underwriter in terms of cost and riskiness of innovative 
portfolio, makes the underwriter less competitive, and decreases potential profit for the 
underwriter.   
We show that choosing the explorative Pre-IPO innovation strategy empowers an 
innovative issuer in negotiation for a higher offer price.  First, we show that innovation power 
significantly increases price adjustment and reduces IPO underpricing. The results suggest that 
firms with a greater innovation power have a greater bargaining position relative to firms with a 
lower innovation power and that those firms complete the IPO process faster with larger size of 
stocks offered relative to the date of the initial offer.  
Furthermore, we find that the firms with higher explorative inventions in their portfolio 
experience a higher degree of bargain power. The bargaining power of those firms is manifested 
in a higher price revision, greater adjustment to the size of final offer, and smaller amount of money 
left on the table. Our finding is in line with the existing IPO literature that suggests that firms with 
an explorative strategy would more likely exercise their option to withdraw and would hire 
multiple bookrunners. In contrast, the opposite is true for the firms with higher exploitative 
inventions. 
Finally, our study shows that following the IPO, analysts are bearish on the explorative 
portfolios for an issuer with the positive price adjustment, while bullish on the exploitative 
portfolios for firms with the negative price adjustments. We find that innovation power does not 
significantly impact the deviation of analyst prediction of the price to earnings ratio (P/E), while 
we find a significant negative relation for the explorative portfolios, and a significant positive 
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relation for the exploitative. This finding suggests that the analyst lust hypothesis is consistent with 
exploitative strategies. Our finding suggests that analyst coverage boosts the market price of firms 
with exploitative strategies. 
Our paper uses two measures of pre-IPO innovation strategies, which may differentiate 
between explorative and exploitative issuer bargain power. First, we introduce the measure of 
innovation power, which is based on the value of innovation relative to the whole technological 
space. We ascertain the value of innovation in terms of the potential to stimulate further 
innovations and patents according to the respective technological classes. We quantify issuers’ 
innovation power based on the number of forward citations, which reference the patents belonging 
to the firm’s patent portfolio. The innovation power is constructed according to technological 
classes and with respect to competitors in the same technological space.  
  An illustration of an issuer with high bargaining power is Zynga and Pandora.  
Corresponding to our measure of innovation power, both Zynga and Pandora have high innovation 
power, which belongs to the firms in the top five percentile of innovation power in our sample. 
Both Zynga and Pandora have a positive offer price revision above the midpoint offer price, and a 
small first day return (less than 9%). A successful business model secured with a portfolio of 
patents may provide an issuer with a choice of an underwriter, as well as the power to negotiate a 
higher offer price. As Pandora’s decacorn competitor, Spotify would not choose to directly list its 
offer on the New York Stock Exchange, if it would not have a relative advantage, such as a more 
exclusive streaming platform.       
We construct our second measure following existing innovation literature (e.g. Levinthal 
and March, 1993; Manso, 2011; Smith and Tushman, 2005; Uotila, Maula, Keil, and Zahra, 2009) 
in categorizing issuing firms based on the strategic orientation in terms of the exploitative versus 
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the explorative nature of a patent portfolio10. Exploitative firms are in possession of patent(s) that 
rely on prior innovations, developments, and established platforms in the same technological class. 
Such firms are less risky (March, 1991; Henderson, 1993; Levinthal and March, 1993). In contrast, 
the explorative type of issuer relies on developments across technological classes and requires 
more resources to develop and implement a new technology or invention.   
Explorative innovation involves new knowledge, advanced knowledge, and/or existing 
knowledge different from the inventor’s, which stem from the firm’s current patent portfolio.  
Therefore, such issuers are riskier than the exploitative issuers (Ahuja et al., 2001). To quantify 
the effect of explorative versus exploitative margins of an issuer’s innovation portfolio, we rely on 
the quantity and diversity of patent technological classes cited in the issuer’s patent portfolio. In 
contrast to the innovation power, we use a number of backward patent citations across 
technological classes, which appear in an issuer’s patents, to quantify the exploratory margin of 
the firm’s innovation portfolio. Similarly, we use a number of backward patent citations within the 
issuer’s technological class which appears in the firm’s patents to quantify the exploitative margin 
of the firm’s innovation patent portfolio. A higher portion of exploitative patents in the portfolio 
would signal a firm’s ability to improve current products. In contrast, the higher proportion of 
explorative patents in the portfolio would signal a firm’s ability to develop new products.  
In this paper, we posit that the pure exploitative strategy positively relates to issuer 
valuations while pure explorative strategy would be negatively related to valuation due to a higher 
degree of uncertainty.  According to March (1991) and Uotila et al (2009), exploration improves 
a firm’s ability to adapt to environmental changes, meanwhile increasing the firm’s uncertainty, 
                                                          
10 Throughout the paper we interchangeably use terms “firm with exploratory nature of patent portfolio” and 
“explorative firm”; “firm with exploitative nature of patent portfolio” and “exploitative firm”.  
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and sacrificing short-term firm performance. That is why we explore a firm’s innovative portfolio 
as a mix of explorative and exploitative innovation. Thus, we expect that a firm with a strategy 
more focused on exploration will provide higher bargaining power since it will signal the firm’s 
future growth.  
Our study differs from the existing literature. First, we explore pre-IPO innovation strategy 
and its impact on IPO price formation, while other studies either explore post-IPO innovation 
strategies (e.g. Aggarwal and Hsu, 2013; Bernstein, 2015) or explore strategies of private firms 
relative to public firms (e.g. Gao, Hsu and Li, 2018, who exclude firms which went public during 
their sample period to control for firm intention to go public).   Second, our study focuses on the 
issuers’ side of the negotiation process; in contrast a large body of research addresses the agency 
problems during the IPO process as well as underpricing due to the bargaining power of the 
underwriters 11.   
 
II. Hypothesis Development 
As in any principal-agent problem, the underwriter (the agent) acts in his or her best 
interests unless the issuing firm (the principle) has an instrument which allows it to control or 
motivate the underwriter to act according to the interests of the issuing firm. Unless the issuing 
firm exercises its bargaining power with the underwriter, it may have limited control over the 
negotiation process in general and in determining the initial price in particular. Previous studies 
                                                          
11 Baron (1979, 1982), Biais et al. (2002), Loughran and Ritter (2002), and others demonstrate agency conflict between 
underwriters and issuers.  Based on models with asymmetric information Ritter and Welsh (2002) and Ritter (2011)  
argue that market structure incentivizes the underwriters to underprice. Krigman et al. (1999) demonstrate that 
underwriters misprice the security intentionally because they face no direct penalties. Reuter (2006) provides evidence 
that lead underwriters are able to “capture dollars left on the table.” Chen and Ritter (2000) show that underwriters 
directly benefit from IPO in the form of spreads.  
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demonstrate that the issuing firms are able to influence IPO pricing through options, such as 
withdrawing in pre-IPO market (Busaba et al., 2001), switching to more reputable underwriters 
(Krigman, Shaw, and Womack, 1999; Carter, 1992; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2005), initiating 
price revisions (Ince, 2014), granting pre-IPO insider ownership stakes (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 
2003), and enhancing visibility and enlisting multiple lead underwriters (Jeon et al., 2015). In the 
same vein, Hu and Ritter, 2007, argue that having multiple bookrunners gives the issuers relative 
advantage in negotiations.   
The Bargaining Hypothesis theorizes that an issuer and an underwriter both have different 
motives in the issue pricings, and the offer price is an outcome of the negotiation between both 
parties.  Literature on issuer bargaining power posits the positive relation between the bargaining 
power and the offer price. For instance, Loughran and Ritter (2002) postulate the prospect theory 
based model, which can be transformed into a bargaining model, where underwriters have an 
appetite for a lower offer price, while issuing firms crave a higher offer price.  The theory argues 
that during preselling period issuing firms negotiate more aggressively when demand is 
unexpectedly weak.  In the same vein, costly negotiation hypothesis, proposed by Harris (1991), 
suggests that the frequency of rounded prices increases in both the stock price and uncertainty 
concerning an issue valuation. Bradley et al. (2004) complement the former study and find only 
two consistent effects, the integer effect and the partial price adjustment effect. 
The above hypothesis suggests that the bargaining power is positively related to an offer 
price revision when issuers have the relative advantage in negotiation. We posit that an issuer’s 
innovation strategy is a channel of persuading underwriters about a value of  the firm’s business 
model, its prospects of growth, and ability to remain competitive. In particular, we expect that 
more explorative innovation will signal the prospective firm growth while more exploitative 
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inventions will project more certain payoff.   The IPO literature also suggests that the offer price 
adjustment is inversely related to underpricing (e.g. Hanley, 1993).  
Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
H1. Issuing firms with stronger innovation power or stronger explorative (exploitative) 
innovation strategy should result in larger (smaller) positive offer price adjustment and should 
result in larger (smaller) underpricing.    
The underwriters would be more willing to adjust the offer price upward if the explorative 
strategy of an issuer signals substantial demand on the issue. The issuers with more explorative 
strategies may bargain a higher offer price when underwriters anticipate stronger demand from 
investors – a guarantee to compensate for a risk. Sherman (1992) shows that the investors’ demand 
will be low when an issuer’s project will not be profitable. Thus, this issue must be underpriced 
because to sustain investors’ demand on this issue the investors must be compensated for the cost 
of acquiring information.     
H2. Issuing firms with stronger innovation power or stronger explorative (exploitative) 
innovation strategy can lead to an increase (decrease) in the amount of stock demanded.   
Another strand of literature connects the registration period to bargaining power. For 
instance, Barcaskey (2005) shows that stronger negotiations by an issuing firm lead to a longer 
registration period due to re-affirmation of investors demand at the new price.  Çolak & Günay, 
(2011) formulate a game theoretic model to demonstrate why some top-notch firms may 
strategically postpone their initial public offering.  The model suggests that the top-notch issuers 
have substantially higher median delayed days since the beginning of the IPO cycle than the lower 
quality issuers.  
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The optimal timing of the IPO relies upon both valuation levels and uncertainty of the 
option-like features of going public (Busaba, 2006). Pastor and Veronesi (2005) demonstrate that 
the novel innovations are symbolized by high uncertainty about their future yield, and that the 
time-varying nature of this uncertainty can also cause the observed stock price patterns. Those 
works are supported by Bouis, (2009), who shows that issuers with the high stock market valuation 
go public faster.  Thus, we expect that a firm with the more explorative innovation portfolio 
negotiates the higher offer price longer due to higher uncertainty. Thus, we hypothesize the 
following: 
H3.  Innovative issuers with a more explorative innovation strategy will negotiate a higher 
offer price slower than the issuers with a more exploitative innovation strategy. 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003)’s realignment of the incentives hypothesis also can be 
redesigned in terms of the bargaining theory. This study suggests that the issuers with greater 
uncertainty when receiving a negative feedback during book building would be likely to withdraw 
and those firms are very probable to benefit from information acquisition during bookbuilding 
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). Moreover, issuers’ option to withdraw from the IPO process 
fortifies their bargain power (Busaba, Benveniste and Guo 2001).  Thus, we posit the following 
hypothesis:  
 H4. Innovative issuer with higher explorative (exploitative) innovation strategy is more 
(less) likely to withdraw from the IPO process.  
Next, we hypothesize that the explorative innovation strategy of issuers is positively related 
to multiple bookrunners.  In particular, the bargaining hypothesis suggests that multiple book 
runners give issuers power in negotiation (Hu and Ritter, 2007). This power is explained by 
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competition among underwriters, who compete for mandate. The competition leads to greater 
analyst coverage and greater underwriter effort and lower cost.  
H5. Innovative issuers with higher explorative innovation are more likely to hire multiple 
book runners while issuers with more exploitative innovation are less likely to hire more than one 
bookrunner. 
Next, we link an underwriter’s ability to predict successful IPO issues to innovation 
strategy. Liu and Ritter (2011) modeled the supply side of IPO underwriting, where underwriter 
bargaining power arises from the issuing firm’s need in research coverage by influential analysts. 
The authors also argue that underwriter power stems from these analysts. The innovation strategy 
can raise an issuer’s bargaining power relative to an underwriter’s by facilitating prediction of 
future operation performance and allowing underwriters to assess potential risk and demand on 
issuer stock, thus limiting underwriter’s costs of non-price dimensions. Alternatively, the 
innovation strategy might lower an issuer’s bargaining power relative to an underwriter’s by 
boosting the underwriter’s costs due to higher risk or relative lower demand on issuer stock.  
Finally, we hypothesize that an issuer with more power over underwriters will not place 
emphasis on analyst coverage in the post-IPO period to boost its stock price. Loughran and Ritter 
(2004) argue that issuers emphasize on hiring underwriters with influential analysts and with 
excessive underpricing reputation. Literature on IPO underpricing illustrates that the bullish 
analyst recommendations can be significant for the insiders desiring to sell their stocks in the open 
market following post-IPO closure of the lock-up period (e.g. Chen and Ritter (2000) and 
Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002)). In addition, in the post IPO period the issuing firms 
compensate for influential analysts by being willing to leave money on the table (Bradley, Jordan, 
and Ritter (2003); Cliff and Denis (2003)). Thus, we hypothesize the following:   
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H6. Innovative issuers with higher explorative (exploitative) innovation strategy will 
experience a lower (higher) number of bullish analyst recommendations and a lower (higher) 
deviation of the forecasted P/E from the actual P/E for the same period. 
 
III. Methodology and Data 
3.1. Variable Construction 
To derive IPO-related variables, such as underpricing, price revision, proceeds, and venture 
capital, the number of bookrunners is derived using data from the SDC Platinum dataset while 
innovation measures, such as the number of patents, innovation power, and explorative patent 
ratio, are derived using data from the USPTO dataset. Appendix C provides definitions of the 
variables. A more detailed description of innovation measures such as number of patents, 
explorative patent ratio, explorative firms, and innovation power is provided below. 
Number of Patents. 
 The number of patents is the total number of patent counts during the pre-IPO period.   
Explorative Patent Ratio.  
To distinguish between explorative and exploitative firms we first measure the share of 
knowledge used from outside of the firm’s technological class and not utilized from existing 
knowledge within the firm. The share of knowledge is the percentage of backward citations made 
by the given patent class i to patent class j. The total number of patents cited at the IPC 4-digit 
patent technological class is contained in the patents cited by the given patent i.  
A patent i is categorized as “exploratory” if the percentage of citations made, which 
corresponds to the outside of firm i’s existing expertise, is greater than the median value of the 
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existing expertise of a corresponding technological class. The average median values of expertise 
outside of a corresponding cited patent technological class is 79%. 
Innovation Power 
Theory that competition stimulates innovations and that a firm’s technological advantage 
can effectively counteract monopolistic power dates back to the work of Schumpeter (1934). Evans 
and Schmalensee (2002) argue that technological firms pursue Schumpeterian type of competition 
12 in the marketplace by competing through innovation rather than through prices. We argue that 
having more valuable technology relative to its peers gives the issuing firm negotiation power 
during the IPO underwriting process. To measure the relative value of the firm’s innovation 
portfolio, we assume that the number of citations referring to the firm’s patent(s) can serve as the 
proxy for the value of the firm’s innovation portfolio. The greater the number of citations of the 
firm’s patents, the greater the value of the firm’s innovation portfolio (Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall et 
al., 2005).  
To measure the value of a firm’s innovation portfolio, we construct a continuous measure 
of the deviation of a firm’s innovation portfolio composition from its corresponding technological 
space. A firm’s patent portfolio is constructed to represent its decomposition into eleven value 
categories (bins) across 35 technological classes based on the distribution of the latest seven years 
of forward citations.  We define technological space as the universe of all firms which innovate 
(have at least one patent) in a corresponding technological class (IPC class). A matrix element 
contains the number of the latest seven years of forward citations that is assigned based on its 
                                                          
12   Schumpeterian competition is a continuous destructive process driven by innovation, which leads to greater 
economic growth than steadier traditional alternatives (Hovenkamp, 2008). Furthermore Nicholas (2003), suggests 
that innovation market power may prevail over industry through creative destruction and market power stems from 
rapid technological evolution. 
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distribution in the corresponding technological class.   Thus, we compare each firm’s portfolio in 
terms of an eleven by thirty-five matrix (eleven value bins by thirty-five technological classes) to 
the corresponding matrix of the whole technological space. 
   Previous studies such as Hoberg, Phillips & Prabhala, 2014; Bena and Li 2014; Jaffe, 
1989, etc., apply separation or uncentered correlation to measure distance between a pair of two 
firms, i and j. Following established methodology, we calculate an issuer’s innovation power as 
simply the dot product between its own innovation portfolio (𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) and the whole 
corresponding space (𝑇𝐼𝑗,𝑘,𝑡) as follows: 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗 ≡ ⟨𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑘,𝑡.
𝑇𝐼𝑗,𝑘,𝑡
||𝑇𝐼𝑗,𝑘,𝑡||
⟩,                 (2) 
 
where  TIi,k,t    denotes a vector of length v by k, where v denotes eleven value bins of firm 
i’s patent portfolio that belongs to class k at time t. In contrast, TIj,k,t    denotes a vector of length v 
by k, where v is the eleven value bins of corresponding technological space of firm i’s class k and 
time t. TIi,k,t    measures a firm’s composition level of its patent portfolio value, while 
TIj,k,t    measures the composition of the patent portfolio value at the technological space level. We 
construct the eleven value bins of the TIi,k,t and TIj,k,t  by categorizing a firms patent portfolio into 
eleven groups based on the distribution of the total number of citations during the seven preceding 
years in each of 35 technological classes as follows: category one (breakthrough invention) 
includes self-citations and citations that belong in the 99th percentile of citation distribution; 
category two (important invention) includes firms with a number of citations that falls between 
95% and 98% of citation distribution; category three includes firms with citations that fall between 
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90% and 94% of citation distribution; category four includes firms with a number of citations that 
falls between 85% and 89% of citation distribution; category five includes firms with a number of 
citations that falls between  80% and 84% of citation distribution; category six includes firms with 
a number of citations that falls between 75% and 79% of citation distribution; category seven 
includes firms with a number of citations that falls between 70% and 74% of citation distribution; 
category eight includes firms with a number of citations that falls between 65% and 69% of citation 
distribution; category nine includes firms with a number of citations that falls between  60% and 
64% of citation distribution; category ten includes firms with a number of citations that falls 
between 50% and 59% of citation distribution; and category eleven (low value) includes firms 
with a number of citations falls below 49% of citation distribution. The number of self-citations is 
included in the first bucket since self-citations are more valuable than citations from exterior 
citations (Hall et al., 2005).    
Innovation Poweri,t is a continuous value larger than zero. The higher the value of a firm’s 
innovation power, the closer a firm’s value of its patent portfolio to the value of all patents in the 
corresponding technological space. It has the minimum value of zero for firms whose value of 
their patent portfolios is uncorrelated to the corresponding technological space.  A firm with a 
value closer to the value of the whole corresponding technological space poses a greater degree of 
innovation power, because its patent portfolio has a greater number of citations relative to its peers 
in corresponding technological space.  The position of each firm i in year t is determined by whole 
technological space.   
3.2. Data Sources 
Our sample includes the US companies that went public from January 1986 to December 
2012. We use various sources to compile our final sample. Initial Public Offering (IPO) data is 
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from the Security Data Company New Issues database (SDC). Our patent data is from the USPTO, 
which provides information on the number of granted patents, dates of initial application and 
granting, as well as details on the patents itself and the applicants.  Patent categories are based on 
the International Patent Classification (IPC). Finally, we obtained total assets from Compustat and 
daily securities prices are from the daily CRSP dataset.  Missing values of closing prices at the end 
of the first trading day and midpoint price ranges are replaced with corresponding values from 
either CRSP or Bloomberg13.  
Following Ritter and Welch (2002) we impose standard filters and exclude IPOs with an 
offer price below $5.00 per share, unit offers, real estate investment trusts (REITs), closed-end-
funds, banks, savings and loan associations (S&Ls) and special purpose acquisition companies 
(SPACs). We also require companies to have non-missing information on total assets and exclude 
financial firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999. To be included in our sample and be 
categorized as an innovative firm, a firm should have at least one granted patent anytime between 
the founding date14 and December of 2012.  For a robustness check we use measures from Kogan 
et al (2017). These measures are constructed in terms of dollar amounts and are available for the 
period from 1926 to 2010.  
Our final sample of innovative firms consists of 1,097 unique innovative firms. Table 1 
demonstrates that at the time of IPO innovative firms are on average 8.44 years old, have on 
average 1.2 bookrunners, and 4.12 cumulative number of patents. On average IPOs of innovative 
                                                          
13 Bloomberg’s global equity offerings database covers of about 43,000 IPOs and over 43,000 additional offerings. It 
also covers more than 500 financial advisors and 500 legal advisors. 
14 The founding year is the year a company was founded. Data on founding dates was obtained from J. Ritter web 
page. 
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firms in our sample exhibit first-day underpricing of 26.40%.  Average innovation power of these 
firms is 2.54.  
 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics. This table summarizes dependent and explanatory variables. The 
dependent variables are first day return (underpricing) and price revision. The explanatory 
variables are Innovation Power, ExR and ExT ratios.  Where ExT (ExR) ratio is the variable that 
measures the proportion of the cumulative number of Exploitative (Explorative) patents in the 
total cumulative number of a firm’s patents at the time of IPO (Patents). Innovation Power is a 
continuous variable greater than zero, which measures an issuer’s eleven innovation value 
portfolios to all peers in its technological space.  The venture capital variable is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the IPO is backed by venture capital, otherwise it is zero 
(Venture capital). Age at IPO is log transformation of one plus the number of years since the 
founding date of the firm (Log(1+Age)) and log transformation of one plus total assets in 
millions of USD (Log(1+Assets)). Log transformation of one plus proceeds (Log(1+Proceeds)) 
defined as the number of shares offered times the share price scaled by total assets in millions 
of USD. The number of bookrunners is the number of managers responsible for the bookrunner's 
role (No. of bookrunners). Cumulative expanses on research and development in USD scaled by 
total assets (R&D). Sales in USD scaled by total assets.  The positive first day return variable is 
an indicatory variable taking the value of one if the first day return is positive, otherwise it is 
zero (Positive 1d Return). To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. 
  N Mean StdDev p25 Median p75 
Underpricing 1097 0.264 0.466 0.008 0.115 0.322 
Price Revision 851 0.007 0.198 -0.111 0.000 0.128 
Patents 1097 4.119 3.607 2.000 3.000 5.000 
Patents ExR     1097 1.780 3.213 0.000 0.000 2.000 
Patents ExT    1097 2.827 4.778 0.000 1.000 4.000 
Innovation Power 1097 2.537 4.249 0.228 0.810 2.229 
ExT   1097 0.554 0.479 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ExT Dollar   921 0.567 0.481 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ExR   1097 0.446 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ExR Dollar   921 0.433 0.481 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Venture capital 1097 0.667 0.471 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Log(1+Age) 1097 2.245 0.843 1.792 2.079 2.639 
Log(1+Proceeds) 1097 0.509 0.239 0.349 0.492 0.623 
No. of bookrunners 1097 1.199 0.539 1.000 1.000 1.000 
R&D 1097 0.304 0.308 0.091 0.215 0.394 
Sales 1097 0.658 0.611 0.146 0.538 0.992 
Positive 1d Return 1097 0.771 0.420 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Top Tier 1097 0.589 0.492 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Log(1+Assets) 1097 4.454 1.357 3.630 4.305 5.106 
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Appendix D presents the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients for our innovation 
measures.  It demonstrates that the correlation between the ExR ratio and the ExR Dollar ratio is 
98.4% and correlation between the ExT ratio and ExT Dollar ratio is also at the level of 98.4%. 
The high correlations suggest that ExR ratio (ExT ratio) is a good proxy for ExR Dollar (ExT 
Dollar) ratio. In contrast, Innovation power is weakly correlated with the ExR ratio with the 
coefficient of -0.096% and p-value at the level 0.752.  
 
IV. Empirical Results  
4.1. Innovation strategy and underpricing 
The IPO literature (e.g. Hanley, 1993 and Kutsuna, Smith and Smith ,2009) documents 
positive relation between the revision in the offer price to the positive first day return. Thus, to 
account for jumps in first-day price due to revision of the offer price upward, we include price 
revision into the underpricing equation (Table 2).  
In the Columns 4 - 9 of Table 2, we find that the coefficient estimates on the ExR (ExT) 
ratio, is statistically significant. ExR(ExT) ratio, which measures composition of the innovation 
portfolio within the firm boundary.  Given the sign of these coefficient estimates, the increase in 
ExR ratio decreases underpricing, while the increase in ExT ratio increases underpricing.   These 
findings are robust using ExR and ExT ratios measured using Kogan’s et al (2015) dollar value of 
innovation. We cluster all standard errors from all models at the industry level15.   
                                                          
15 We use Fama French 10 industries for all our analysis following Bernstein, (2015). Moreover, our results are 
consistent using more disaggregate industry levels (e.g. FF12, FF17 and FF38). 
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The underpricing (first-day return) consists of two components such as the final offer price 
and the first-day closing price. The latter can be affected by either offer price revisions (e.g. when 
prices are adjusted upwards and information is revealed through high demand for the issue, then 
the first-day price will exceed the offer price) or by market assessment of uncertainty. This 
suggests that there is an optimal mix of innovations, which can result in the efficient first-day 
closing price. Diversification of the innovation portfolio decreases the issuer’s level of 
underpricing. March (1991) and Uotila et al (2009) point out that firms need to balance their 
exploration and exploitation activities.   
What type of innovation strategy would lead to minimum and maximum underpricing?  
What proportion of each innovation strategy would lead to lower underpricing?    To answer those 
questions, we test for an optimal portfolio using U-shaped approach.  First, we add to the preceding 
models both the level term of ExR (ExT) ratio and the squared terms of ExR (ExT) ratio, implying 
that the optimal blend of exploration and exploitation exists.   Then we apply methodology of Lind 
and Mehlum (2010) to test for U-shape relation between underpricing and ExR(ExT) ratio. The 
test results are reported in the Panel C of Table 2. The test revealed a significant inverted U-shape 
relation. 
Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) approach allow us to assess whether the extreme point is within 
the upper and lower bounds by estimating confidence intervals at the extreme points. Confidence 
intervals within the bounds of the low and high levels of ExR (ExT) ratio provide evidence of an 
inverted U-shaped relationship. The estimated extreme point (using specification with industry and 
year fixed effects) is 0.434 (0.590), which is within the upper and lower bounds of ExR (ExT) 
[0.384(0.384); -0.501(-0.267)], providing strong support for an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between ExR (ExT) and underpricing.  
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Table 2: (Panel A): Innovation Strategy and Underpricing.  This table reports the relationship between IPO underpricing (first-day returns) and various measures of issuer 
innovativeness. The dependent variable is underpricing. The explanatory variables are Innovation Power, ExR and ExT ratios.  Where ExR (ExT) ratio is the variable that the 
measures proportion of the cumulative number of Explorative (Exploitative) patents in the total cumulative number of a firm’s patents at the time of IPO. Innovation Power is a 
continuous variable greater than 0, which measures an issuer’s eleven innovation value portfolios to all peers in its technological space. The venture capital variable is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the IPO is backed by venture capital, otherwise it is zero (Venture capital). Age at IPO is log transformation of one plus the number of years since 
the founding date of the firm (Log(1+Age)) and log transformation of one plus total assets in millions of USD (Log(1+Assets)). Log transformation of one plus proceeds 
(Log(1+Proceeds)) defined as the number of shares offered times the share price scaled by total assets in millions of USD. No. of bookrunners is the number of bookrunners responsible 
for the bookrunner’s role. Cumulative expanses on research and development in USD scaled by total assets (R&D). Sales in USD scaled by total assets.  The positive first day return 
variable is an indicatory variable taking the value of one if the first day return is positive, otherwise it is zero (Positive 1d Return). The Price Revision is the price revision from the 
midpoint of the initial filing range to the offer price, relative to the midpoint price.  To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All 
variables are defined at Appendix C. T-statistics in parenthesis are calculated on industry clustered standard errors. Upper-asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Innovation Power 0.002 -0.005*** -0.004***       
 (1.351) (-4.783) (-3.467)       
ExR      -0.050*** -0.055*** -0.052***    
    (-4.279) (-4.979) (-4.463)    
ExT         0.050*** 0.055*** 0.052*** 
       (4.279) (4.979) (4.463) 
Venture capital 0.032 0.029 0.028 0.034 0.031* 0.031 0.034 0.031* 0.031 
 (1.103) (1.493) (1.022) (1.195) (1.847) (1.194) (1.195) (1.847) (1.194) 
Log(1+Age) -0.021* -0.028** -0.023** -0.020* -0.029** -0.023** -0.020* -0.029** -0.023** 
 (-1.967) (-3.209) (-2.524) (-1.849) (-3.073) (-2.365) (-1.849) (-3.073) (-2.365) 
Log(1+Proceeds) 0.161* 0.050 0.063 0.163* 0.052 0.065 0.163* 0.052 0.065 
 (2.097) (1.116) (1.526) (2.215) (1.301) (1.755) (2.215) (1.301) (1.755) 
No. of bookrunners -0.072* 0.014 0.021 -0.075* 0.003 0.011 -0.075* 0.003 0.011 
 (-1.887) (0.328) (0.486) (-1.969) (0.066) (0.253) (-1.969) (0.066) (0.253) 
R&D 0.023 -0.038 -0.004 0.030 -0.046 -0.009 0.030 -0.046 -0.009 
 (0.790) (-1.256) (-0.146) (0.957) (-1.385) (-0.308) (0.957) (-1.385) (-0.308) 
Sales -0.089* -0.009 -0.043 -0.092* -0.012 -0.046 -0.092* -0.012 -0.046 
 (-2.096) (-0.256) (-1.524) (-2.127) (-0.325) (-1.609) (-2.127) (-0.325) (-1.609) 
Log(1+Assets) 0.051** 0.023 0.020 0.054** 0.022 0.020 0.054** 0.022 0.020 
 (2.756) (1.450) (1.204) (2.851) (1.462) (1.223) (2.851) (1.462) (1.223) 
Top Tier 0.023 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 
 (0.611) (0.675) (0.668) (0.661) (0.823) (0.775) (0.661) (0.823) (0.775) 
Price Revision 0.731*** 0.762*** 0.724*** 0.730*** 0.744*** 0.709*** 0.730*** 0.744*** 0.709*** 
 (3.508) (3.578) (3.304) (3.465) (3.490) (3.252) (3.465) (3.490) (3.252) 
N 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 
adj. R-sq 0.238 0.297 0.305 0.241 0.299 0.308 0.241 0.299 0.308 
Industry FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
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Table 2 (Panel B): Innovation Strategy and Underpricing. This table reports the relationship between IPO underpricing (first-day returns) and 
various measures of issuer innovativeness using the dollar value of patents from Kogan et al (2015). The dependent variable is underpricing. The 
explanatory variables are ExR Dollar and ExT Dollar ratios. The Positive Adjustment is an indicator variable, which takes a value of one if an 
issuer experiences positive price adjustment and zero otherwise. To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix C.  T-statistics in parenthesis are calculated on industry clustered standard errors.  Upper-
asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ExR Dollar   -0.067*** -0.072*** -0.069***    
 (-3.992) (-4.298) (-3.721)    
ExT Dollar      0.067*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 
    (3.992) (4.298) (3.721) 
Venture capital 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.021 
 (0.794) (0.930) (0.697) (0.794) (0.930) (0.697) 
Log(1+Age ) -0.033* -0.039** -0.033* -0.033* -0.039** -0.033* 
 (-2.056) (-2.731) (-2.084) (-2.056) (-2.731) (-2.084) 
Log(1+Proceeds) 0.165 0.043 0.059 0.165 0.043 0.059 
 (1.683) (0.690) (1.013) (1.683) (0.690) (1.013) 
No. of bookrunners -0.053 -0.016 -0.001 -0.053 -0.016 -0.001 
 (-1.194) (-0.228) (-0.020) (-1.194) (-0.228) (-0.020) 
R&D 0.052 -0.042 0.000 0.052 -0.042 0.000 
 (1.490) (-1.091) (0.008) (1.490) (-1.091) (0.008) 
Sales -0.100* -0.016 -0.053 -0.100* -0.016 -0.053 
 (-2.225) (-0.439) (-1.742) (-2.225) (-0.439) (-1.742) 
Log(1+Assets) 0.053* 0.019 0.018 0.053* 0.019 0.018 
 (2.249) (0.930) (0.814) (2.249) (0.930) (0.814) 
Top Tier 0.026 0.021 0.021 0.026 0.021 0.021 
 (0.659) (0.764) (0.733) (0.659) (0.764) (0.733) 
Price Revision 0.760*** 0.773*** 0.736*** 0.760*** 0.773*** 0.736*** 
 (4.088) (3.958) (3.715) (4.088) (3.958) (3.715) 
N 742 742 742 742 742 742 
adj. R-sq 0.248 0.305 0.313 0.248 0.305 0.313 
Industry FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
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Panel C. Test of U-shape relation between Underpricing and Explorative (Exploitative) ratios. This panel reports upper and lower slopes 
and t statistics using Lind & Mehlum, (2010) U-test. The coefficients for U-test were obtained from the linear model models specified in the 
panel A and panel B but with inclusion in each specification an addition variable such as the square term of ExR (ExT) ratio. We also test U-
shape relation using Kogan’s et al (2015) dollar value of patents such as ExR Dollar and ExT Dollar ratios. 
  
ExR   ExR Dollar     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Extreme  0.429 0.425 0.436 0.434 0.445 0.442 0.445 0.443 
Slope Lower Bound   0.362 0.322 0.419 0.384 0.597 0.524 0.591 0.539 
Slope Upper Bound  -0.482 -0.436 -0.542 -0.501 -0.745 -0.660 -0.735 -0.678 
t-statistics 3.000 2.110 3.940 2.750 2.340 1.810 2.670 2.030 
p-value  0.008 0.032 0.002 0.011 0.022 0.052 0.013 0.036 
  
ExT   ExT Dollar     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Extreme  0.599 0.607 0.586 0.590 0.571 0.575 0.570 0.574 
Slope Lower Bound   0.362 0.322 0.419 0.384 0.597 0.524 0.591 0.539 
Slope Upper Bound  -0.242 -0.209 -0.296 -0.267 -0.448 -0.387 -0.446 -0.400 
t-statistics 2.650 1.720 3.910 2.530 1.990 1.510 2.290 1.720 
p-value  0.013 0.060 0.002 0.016 0.039 0.083 0.024 0.060 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
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Should be noted that the lower bound for both ExR and ExT are the same at all 
specifications, while the upper bound is about twice lower for ExR suggesting that the addition of 
explorative innovation decreases underpricing. The same approach revealed (unreported) that the 
pure explorative patent portfolio has a U-shape relation with underpricing while the pure 
exploitative patent portfolio has an inverted U-shape relation. Overall, the ExR (ExT) ratio level 
at which underpricing reaches the maximum is 43%(59%). These results confirm that a higher 
proportion of ExR ratio in an innovation portfolio leads to less effort of an issuer to curb 
underpricing.  
Our second variable of interest is innovation power, which defines a firm’s position in the 
technological space relative to its peers. The higher the index, the greater the uniqueness of the 
firm’s innovation portfolio which essentially is determined by the distribution of the firm is 
forward citation in its technological class16. The difference between Innovation Power and ExR 
ratio is in that the former measures the position of a firm among its peers, which is outside of the 
firm’s boundary.  From our regression analysis in Columns 1 - 3 of Table 2 Panel A, we find that 
as Innovation Power increases, firms experience less underpricing. Such positive relation is 
statistically significant at 1% in two out of the three specifications. When the market is efficient, 
less underpricing implies an offering price that is closer to the market valuation (i.e. first-day 
closing price).   We interpret that as Innovation Power creating strong bargaining power for the 
issuers. As summarized in Ritter and Welch (2002), the issuers and underwriters bargain over the 
offering price. Because of the advantageous position of knowledge, the powerful issuer has more 
flexibility of revealing information to the underwriters. In such cases, the negotiation between the 
issuer and the underwriters goes in favor of the issuer.  
                                                          
16 For more details on variable construction, please refer to Section 2. 
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Thus, our evidence on underpricing suggests that the underpricing is a by-product of the 
negotiation. The market significantly reacts to various stages of negotiations, which facilitate 
information transfer with further reflection in underpricing (Giammarino and Lewis, 1988).  
However, underpricing can mean a lot more than bargaining power. Thus, we   extend our analysis 
to other aspects of IPO in order to strengthen the argument of bargaining power. 
 4.2.  Innovation strategy and price revision 
Another angle of the effect of innovation portfolio on the offering price is to examine price 
revision.  Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Hanley (1993) documented a positive relation between a 
price revision in the pre-issue period and the underpricing. They argue that the final offer price 
only partially accommodates new private information from the demand, with the rest of the 
adjustment coming in the form of underpricing. Unlike those earlier papers, Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003) address the question of price revision from the perspective of the agency problem 
between issuers and underwriters. They interpret such partial adjustment as price range being an 
unconditional expectation of the issuers’ true value, and the offer price being the conditional 
estimate of the true value that is conditional on a variety of the firms’ characteristics and insiders’ 
incentives to bargain over the IPO offering price. In our context, controlling for all other 
characteristics, the degree that issuers can bargain against underwriters depends on the issuers’ 
innovation portfolio.   Our results on price revision are reported in Table 3. 
Similar to our discussions in Table 2, we look at both the issuers’ Innovation Power that 
depends on the relativeness to the peers and their ExR ratio that is within the firm’s boundary. 
From Table 3, Columns 1 - 3, we find out that increases in Innovation Power are positively related 
to a price revision.
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Table 3 (Panel A). Innovation Strategy and Price Revision.  The dependent variable in regression is the price revision from the midpoint of the initial filing range to the offer price, relative 
to the midpoint price.  We predict a positive relation between price revisions and the measures of innovativeness of an issuer.   The explanatory variables are Innovation Power, ExR and ExT 
ratios.  Where ExR (ExT) ratio is the variable that measures the proportion of the cumulative number of Explorative (Exploitative) patents in the total cumulative number of a firm’s patents at 
the time of IPO.  Innovation Power is a continuous variable greater than 0, which measures an issuer’s eleven innovation value portfolios to all peers in its technological space. The venture 
capital variable is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the IPO is backed by venture capital, otherwise it is zero (Venture capital). Age at IPO is log transformation of one plus the 
number of years since the founding date of the firm (Log(1+Age)) and log transformation of one plus total assets in millions of USD (Log(1+Assets)). Log transformation of one plus proceeds 
(Log(1+Proceeds)) defined as the number of shares offered times the share price scaled by total assets in millions of USD. No. of bookrunners is the number of bookrunners responsible for 
the bookrunner’s role. Cumulative expanses on research and development in USD scaled by total assets (R&D). Sales in USD scaled by total assets.  The positive first day return variable is an 
indicatory variable taking the value of one if the first day return is positive, otherwise it is zero (Positive 1d Return). The Positive Adjustment is an indicator variable, which takes value of one 
if an issuer experiences positive price adjustment and zero otherwise. To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at 
Appendix C.  T-statistics in parenthesis are calculated on industry clustered standard errors. Upper-asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Innovation Power 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***       
 (5.090) (5.073) (4.285)       
ExT      -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.019***    
    (-4.093) (-3.984) (-4.536)    
ExR         0.018*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 
       (4.093) (3.984) (4.536) 
Venture capital 0.031 0.021 0.017 0.032 0.021 0.017 0.032 0.021 0.017 
 (1.419) (0.965) (1.043) (1.487) (1.000) (1.063) (1.487) (1.000) (1.063) 
Log(1+Age) -0.026** -0.021** -0.022* -0.025** -0.021** -0.021* -0.025** -0.021** -0.021* 
 (-2.787) (-2.264) (-1.951) (-2.816) (-2.297) (-1.929) (-2.816) (-2.297) (-1.929) 
Log(1+Proceeds) 0.246*** 0.247*** 0.249*** 0.246*** 0.247*** 0.249*** 0.246*** 0.247*** 0.249*** 
 (7.225) (7.459) (6.712) (6.667) (6.912) (6.355) (6.667) (6.912) (6.355) 
No. of bookrunners -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.056** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.055** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.055** 
 (-4.741) (-5.218) (-2.490) (-4.684) (-5.168) (-2.392) (-4.684) (-5.168) (-2.392) 
R&D -0.199*** -0.193*** -0.175*** -0.190*** -0.185*** -0.168*** -0.190*** -0.185*** -0.168*** 
 (-7.865) (-7.633) (-6.681) (-7.904) (-7.671) (-6.611) (-7.904) (-7.671) (-6.611) 
Sales -0.006 -0.019 -0.022 -0.007 -0.019 -0.023 -0.007 -0.019 -0.023 
 (-0.389) (-0.989) (-1.195) (-0.472) (-1.018) (-1.252) (-0.472) (-1.018) (-1.252) 
Positive 1d Return 0.104*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.106*** 
 (3.378) (3.364) (4.016) (3.428) (3.416) (4.091) (3.428) (3.416) (4.091) 
Log(1+Assets) 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 
 (4.589) (4.610) (3.884) (4.572) (4.603) (3.965) (4.572) (4.603) (3.965) 
Top Tier 0.017 0.016 0.009 0.016 0.016 0.008 0.016 0.016 0.008 
 (1.254) (1.172) (0.762) (1.093) (1.018) (0.573) (1.093) (1.018) (0.573) 
Walk-Up 0.009 -0.008 -0.066 0.021 0.005 -0.052 0.021 0.005 -0.052 
 (0.500) (-0.513) (-1.589) (1.056) (0.260) (-1.167) (1.056) (0.260) (-1.167) 
N 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 
adj. R-sq 0.218 0.227 0.241 0.213 0.221 0.234 0.213 0.221 0.234 
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
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Table 3 (Panel B). Innovation Strategy and Price Revision.  This table uses dollar value of patents from Kogan et al (2015). The dependent variable 
is price revision. The explanatory variables are ExR Dollar and ExT Dollar ratios. The Positive Adjustment is an indicator variable, which takes a value 
of one if an issuer experiences positive price adjustment and zero otherwise. To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix C.  T-statistics in parenthesis are calculated on industry clustered standard errors. Upper-asterisks 
such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ExT Dollar   -0.013** -0.010** -0.011**    
 (-2.886) (-2.456) (-2.870)    
ExR Dollar      0.013** 0.010** 0.011** 
    (2.886) (2.456) (2.870) 
Venture capital 0.028* 0.019 0.015 0.028* 0.019 0.015 
 (1.836) (1.212) (1.301) (1.836) (1.212) (1.301) 
Log(1+Age) -0.025* -0.023 -0.022 -0.025* -0.023 -0.022 
 (-2.099) (-1.816) (-1.582) (-2.099) (-1.816) (-1.582) 
Log(1+Proceeds) 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.258*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.258*** 
 (5.476) (5.423) (5.488) (5.476) (5.423) (5.488) 
No. of bookrunners -0.029** -0.027** -0.019* -0.029** -0.027** -0.019* 
 (-2.334) (-2.548) (-1.842) (-2.334) (-2.548) (-1.842) 
R&D -0.184*** -0.179*** -0.156*** -0.184*** -0.179*** -0.156*** 
 (-8.789) (-8.410) (-7.518) (-8.789) (-8.410) (-7.518) 
Sales -0.006 -0.019 -0.026 -0.006 -0.019 -0.026 
 (-0.428) (-1.028) (-1.380) (-0.428) (-1.028) (-1.380) 
Positive 1d Return 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.113*** 
 (5.089) (5.273) (5.790) (5.089) (5.273) (5.790) 
Log(1+Assets) 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 
 (4.003) (4.011) (3.590) (4.003) (4.011) (3.590) 
Top Tier 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.004 
 (0.412) (0.419) (0.254) (0.412) (0.419) (0.254) 
Walk-Up 0.016 0.002 -0.069 0.016 0.002 -0.069 
 (0.972) (0.088) (-1.453) (0.972) (0.088) (-1.453) 
N 742 742 742 742 742 742 
adj. R-sq 0.226 0.231 0.244 0.226 0.231 0.244 
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes 
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Table 4. Innovation Strategy and Change in Offer Size.  This table reports the relationship between change in offer size and various measures of issuer innovativeness. 
The dependent variable is the change between the size of the offer at the first trading day and initial off offer size (offer size at the begging of the IPO process) with further 
scaling the change by total assets. The explanatory variables are Innovation Power, ExR and ExT ratios.  Where ExR (ExT) ratio is the variable that measures the proportion 
of the cumulative number of Explorative (Exploitative) patents in the total cumulative number of a firm patents at the time of IPO. Innovation Power is a continuous 
variable greater than 0, which measures an issuer’s eleven innovation value portfolios to all peers in its technological space. The venture capital variable is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the IPO is backed by venture capital, otherwise it is zero (Venture capital). Age at IPO is log transformation of one plus the number of 
years since the founding date of the firm (Log(1+Age)) and log transformation of one plus total assets in millions of USD (Log(1+Assets)). Log transformation of one 
plus proceeds (Log(1+Proceeds)) defined as the number of shares offered times the share price scaled by total assets in millions of USD. No. of bookrunners is the number 
of bookrunners responsible for the bookrunner’s role. Sales in USD scaled by total assets.  Price Revision is a difference between the final offer price and the mid-price 
of the original file range with further division of the difference by the mid-price of original file range. To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix C. T-statistics in parenthesis are calculated on industry clustered standard errors. Upper-asterisks such as 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Innovation Power  0.013*** 0.008*** 0.010***       
 (6.687) (9.674) (5.600)       
ExR      0.080** 0.098*** 0.090**    
    (2.333) (3.431) (3.044)    
ExT         -0.080** -0.098*** -0.090** 
       (-2.333) (-3.431) (-3.044) 
Price Revision 0.579*** 0.656*** 0.596*** 0.615*** 0.678*** 0.624*** 0.615*** 0.678*** 0.624*** 
 (4.982) (5.336) (5.796) (5.364) (5.597) (6.179) (5.364) (5.597) (6.179) 
No. of bookrunners 0.079** 0.148** 0.133** 0.096*** 0.164** 0.150** 0.096*** 0.164** 0.150** 
 (2.677) (2.856) (2.917) (3.758) (3.050) (3.191) (3.758) (3.050) (3.191) 
Log(1+Age) 0.168*** 0.170*** 0.159*** 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.161*** 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.161*** 
 (6.706) (10.393) (9.050) (6.322) (9.829) (8.348) (6.322) (9.829) (8.348) 
Sales 0.034 0.103 0.050 0.035 0.108 0.056 0.035 0.108 0.056 
 (0.496) (1.276) (0.590) (0.518) (1.331) (0.661) (0.518) (1.331) (0.661) 
Venture capital 0.110 0.049 0.119 0.106 0.046 0.113 0.106 0.046 0.113 
 (1.200) (0.627) (1.257) (1.174) (0.590) (1.233) (1.174) (0.590) (1.233) 
Top Tier 0.150*** 0.165*** 0.163*** 0.142*** 0.158*** 0.156*** 0.142*** 0.158*** 0.156*** 
 (3.566) (4.949) (5.073) (3.698) (5.161) (5.366) (3.698) (5.161) (5.366) 
N 874 874 874 874 874 874 874 874 874 
adj. R-sq 0.138 0.137 0.155 0.136 0.140 0.156 0.136 0.140 0.156 
Industry FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
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 That means that the uniqueness of the issuers in the technological space enables them to 
bargain more aggressively over the offer price, which is consistent with Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2003). In addition to Innovation Power, we implement the same models that include the level 
term of ExR ratio and the level term of ExT ratio in Columns 4 - 6. ExR ratio is significantly and 
positively related to a price revision, while ExT ratio is significantly and inversely related.   Across 
all models, the positive relation between ExR ratio (Innovation Power) and price revision is well 
sustained. We therefore conclude that an increase in exploration will magnify issuers’ bargaining 
power over the offering price, while an increase in ExT ratio will lessen an issuer’s bargaining 
power.  
Benveniste et al., (2003) show that the cost of information production or compensation for 
revealing private information in terms of underpricing affects revisions in offer price, and who 
include average underpricng to control for such effect. In the same vein, Loughran and Ritter 
(2002) suggest that the skewness of the amount of money left on the table among IPOs with upward 
price revision should be a high concern only for some issuers. These issuers may wish to 
deliberately leave money on the table in IPO. Thus, we include a dummy variable that takes value 
of one if an IPO has a positive first day return and zero when an IPO has negative or zero first day 
return. 
If the explorative strategy of an issuer could signal substantial demand on the issue, the 
underwriters would be more willing to adjust the offer price upward. Next, we analyze relation of 
pre-IPO innovation strategy to the adjustment of demand on the issue. We expect that the issuers 
with more explorative strategies will bargain a higher offer price when underwriters anticipate 
stronger demand from investors as a guarantee of a risk compensation.  
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Table 4 analyzes a relation between change in offer size and a firm’s innovation power as 
well as strategy.  The dependent variable is the change between the size of the offer at the first 
trading day and initial offer size (offer size at the begging of the IPO process) with further scaling 
the change by total assets. This analysis confirms our expectation that explorative innovation 
strategy is positively related to the adjustment of offer size at significance level 5% using both 
industry and year firm fixed effects while innovation power is positively related at 1% significance 
level at all specifications. The exploitative innovation at similar significance as the explorative 
ratio, but it is inversely related to the change in issue size.
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Table 5: Innovation Strategy and Likelihood of Withdrawn.  This table reports coefficient estimates from probit models. The dependent variable is equal to one for the 
withdrawn firms, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are Innovation Power, MExR and MExT. Where Innovation Power is a continuous variable greater than 0, 
which measures an issuer’s eleven innovation value portfolios to all peers in its technological space and MExR (MExT) is an indicator variable that takes value one if a firm’s 
ExR (ExT) ratio is greater than industry median value. The venture capital variable is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the IPO is backed by venture capital, 
otherwise it is zero (Venture capital). Total Shares is defined as the expected total shares (in millions) outstanding after the offering. Shares Filed is defined as offering shares 
in millions led with SEC. Ret60 is return over the 60-day period after offering. Log transformation of one plus total assets in millions of USD (Log(1+Assets)). Log 
transformation of one plus proceeds (Log(1+Proceeds)) defined as the number of shares offered times the share price scaled by total assets in millions of USD. Sales in USD 
scaled by total assets.  Price Revision is a difference between the final offer price and the mid-price of original file range with further division the difference by the mid-price 
of original file range. All variables are defined at Appendix C.  All control variables are winsorized at 1% level. T-statistics in parenthesis are calculated on industry clustered 
standard errors. Upper-asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Innovation Power  0.018** 0.015*** 0.010**       
 (2.497) (2.644) (2.534)       
MExR      1.480*** 1.591*** 1.824***    
    (6.816) (3.957) (7.230)    
MExT         -1.480*** -1.591*** -1.824*** 
       (-6.816) (-3.957) (-7.230) 
Top Tier -0.123 -0.186 -0.195 -0.137 -0.220 -0.204 -0.137 -0.220 -0.204 
 (-0.369) (-0.696) (-0.599) (-0.427) (-0.772) (-0.625) (-0.427) (-0.772) (-0.625) 
Venture capital 0.321** 0.451*** 0.345* 0.329** 0.455*** 0.344* 0.329** 0.455*** 0.344* 
 (2.309) (2.772) (1.897) (2.347) (3.157) (1.913) (2.347) (3.157) (1.913) 
Log(1+Total Shares) -0.058 -0.710*** -0.718** -0.022 -0.692*** -0.712** -0.022 -0.692*** -0.712** 
 (-0.105) (-3.052) (-2.510) (-0.037) (-2.955) (-2.448) (-0.037) (-2.955) (-2.448) 
Log(1+Shares Filed) 0.309 0.327*** 0.293** 0.290 0.332** 0.290* 0.290 0.332** 0.290* 
 (1.275) (2.676) (1.983) (1.129) (2.526) (1.940) (1.129) (2.526) (1.940) 
Ret60 -0.034 -0.029 -0.034* -0.032 -0.024 -0.032* -0.032 -0.024 -0.032* 
 (-1.312) (-1.210) (-1.838) (-1.267) (-1.084) (-1.677) (-1.267) (-1.084) (-1.677) 
Log(1+Assets) -0.056 -0.058 0.009 -0.046 -0.027 0.015 -0.046 -0.027 0.015 
 (-0.337) (-0.380) (0.047) (-0.277) (-0.194) (0.080) (-0.277) (-0.194) (0.080) 
Sales -0.018 -0.084 0.133 -0.017 0.077 0.141 -0.017 0.077 0.141 
 (-0.273) (-0.958) (0.738) (-0.241) (0.664) (0.768) (-0.241) (0.664) (0.768) 
Price Revision -0.463 -0.530 -0.437 -0.430 -0.461 -0.412 -0.430 -0.461 -0.412 
 (-0.666) (-0.883) (-0.630) (-0.606) (-0.760) (-0.603) (-0.606) (-0.760) (-0.603) 
N 785 764 687 785 764 687 785 764 687 
Industry FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
81 
 
Table 5 (Panel B): Innovation Strategy and Likelihood of Withdrawn.  This table reports coefficient estimates from probit models. The dependent variable 
is equal to one for the withdrawn firms, and zero otherwise.  This table reports the relationship between IPO underpricing (first-day returns) and various measures 
of issuer innovativeness using the dollar value of patents from Kogan et al (2015).  The explanatory variables are MExR Dollar and MExT Dollar based on 
measures of Kogan et al (2015). MExR (MExT) Dollar is an indicator variable that takes value one if a firm’s ExR (ExT) Dollar ratio is greater than the industry 
median value. All variables are defined at Appendix C.  All control variables are winsorized at 1% level. T-statistics in parenthesis are calculated on industry 
clustered standard errors. Upper-asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MExR Dollar 2.600*** 3.056*** 2.769*** 3.767***     
 (3.498) (6.816) (3.825) (7.230)     
MExT Dollar     -2.600*** -3.056*** -2.769*** -3.767*** 
     (-3.498) (-6.816) (-3.825) (-7.230) 
Top Tier -0.149 -0.137 -0.218 -0.204 -0.149 -0.137 -0.218 -0.204 
 (-0.511) (-0.427) (-0.766) (-0.625) (-0.511) (-0.427) (-0.766) (-0.625) 
Venture capital 0.437*** 0.329** 0.437*** 0.344* 0.437*** 0.329** 0.437*** 0.344* 
 (3.170) (2.347) (3.040) (1.913) (3.170) (2.347) (3.040) (1.913) 
Log(1+Total Shares) 0.040 -0.022 -0.684*** -0.712** 0.040 -0.022 -0.684*** -0.712** 
 (0.080) (-0.037) (-2.921) (-2.448) (0.080) (-0.037) (-2.921) (-2.448) 
Log(1+Shares Filed) 0.279 0.290 0.316** 0.290* 0.279 0.290 0.316** 0.290* 
 (1.166) (1.129) (2.418) (1.940) (1.166) (1.129) (2.418) (1.940) 
Ret60 -0.025 -0.032 -0.027 -0.032* -0.025 -0.032 -0.027 -0.032* 
 (-1.048) (-1.267) (-1.211) (-1.677) (-1.048) (-1.267) (-1.211) (-1.677) 
Log(1+Assets) -0.104 -0.046 -0.023 0.015 -0.104 -0.046 -0.023 0.015 
 (-0.738) (-0.277) (-0.161) (0.080) (-0.738) (-0.277) (-0.161) (0.080) 
Sales -0.056 -0.017 0.063 0.141 -0.056 -0.017 0.063 0.141 
 (-1.099) (-0.241) (0.579) (0.768) (-1.099) (-0.241) (0.579) (0.768) 
Price Revision -0.405 -0.430 -0.481 -0.412 -0.405 -0.430 -0.481 -0.412 
 (-0.630) (-0.606) (-0.788) (-0.603) (-0.630) (-0.606) (-0.788) (-0.603) 
N 874 785 764 687 874 785 764 687 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
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Table 6. Predicting the time from first filling date to successful IPO.  The time is constructed as the difference between first filling date and date of IPO. The failure in this model is the 
success of IPO. We define the successful issuer as an issuer, who experienced upward price revision.   This table reports coefficient estimates from a hazard model of the time from the first 
filling to the actual date of IPO. The model is based an exponential hazard distribution. In other words, the model is in accelerated failure time, that is, a negative coefficient estimate indicates 
the event (successful IPO) happens more quickly.  The explanatory variables are Innovation Power, ExR and ExT ratios.  Where ExR (ExT) Ratio is variable that measures proportion of the 
cumulative number of Explorative (Exploitative) patents in the total cumulative number of a firm’s patents at the time of IPO.  Innovation Power is a continuous variable greater than 0, which 
measures an issuer’s eleven innovation value portfolios to all peers in its technological space.   The venture capital variable is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the IPO is backed 
by venture capital, otherwise it is zero (Venture capital). Age at IPO is log transformation of one plus the number of years since the founding date of the firm (Log(1+Age)) and log 
transformation of one plus total assets in millions of USD (Log(1+Assets)). Log transformation of one plus proceeds (Log(1+Proceeds)) defined as the number of shares offered times the 
share price scaled by total assets in millions of USD. No. of bookrunners is the number of bookrunners responsible for the bookrunner’s role.  Cumulative expanses on research and development 
in USD scaled by total assets (R&D). Sales in USD scaled by total assets.  The positive first day return variable is an indicatory variable taking the value of one if the first day return is positive, 
otherwise it is zero (Positive 1d Return). To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix C. T-statistics in 
parenthesis are calculated on industry clustered standard errors. Upper-asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Innovation Power -0.017** -0.019**         
 (-2.323) (-2.321)         
ExT     -0.097** -0.089**       
   (-2.413) (-2.543)       
ExR       0.097** 0.089**     
     (2.413) (2.543)     
ExT Dollar         -0.133*** -0.119***   
       (-5.448) (-3.934)   
ExR Dollar           0.133*** 0.119*** 
         (5.448) (3.934) 
Venture capital 0.124 0.063 0.124 0.070 0.124 0.070 0.059 0.016 0.059 0.016 
 (1.354) (0.837) (1.408) (0.936) (1.408) (0.936) (0.655) (0.169) (0.655) (0.169) 
Log(1+Age ) -0.062 -0.068 -0.059 -0.066 -0.059 -0.066 -0.071 -0.087* -0.071 -0.087* 
 (-0.784) (-0.879) (-0.770) (-0.909) (-0.770) (-0.909) (-1.274) (-1.839) (-1.274) (-1.839) 
No. of bookrunners -0.564*** -0.571*** -0.546*** -0.550*** -0.546*** -0.550*** -0.646*** -0.637*** -0.646*** -0.637*** 
 (-3.835) (-3.651) (-3.645) (-3.472) (-3.645) (-3.472) (-3.028) (-2.924) (-3.028) (-2.924) 
R&D -1.141*** -1.322*** -1.197*** -1.375*** -1.197*** -1.375*** -1.080*** -1.254*** -1.080*** -1.254*** 
 (-3.033) (-3.303) (-3.143) (-3.417) (-3.143) (-3.417) (-3.825) (-4.195) (-3.825) (-4.195) 
Sales 0.085 0.084 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.085 0.103 0.085 0.103 
 (0.837) (0.806) (0.699) (0.693) (0.699) (0.693) (0.712) (0.824) (0.712) (0.824) 
Positive 1d Return 1.286*** 1.287*** 1.299*** 1.302*** 1.299*** 1.302*** 1.391*** 1.390*** 1.391*** 1.390*** 
 (17.331) (18.229) (17.593) (18.500) (17.593) (18.500) (12.852) (13.775) (12.852) (13.775) 
Log(1+Assets) 0.033 0.055 0.015 0.032 0.015 0.032 0.036 0.065 0.036 0.065 
 (0.819) (1.067) (0.361) (0.628) (0.361) (0.628) (0.799) (1.085) (0.799) (1.085) 
Top Tier 0.084 0.080 0.092 0.091 0.092 0.091 0.142 0.144 0.142 0.144 
 (0.901) (0.928) (1.033) (1.127) (1.033) (1.127) (1.256) (1.370) (1.256) (1.370) 
No. of subjects  1024 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024 857 857 857 857 
No. of failures  367 367 367 367 367 367 318 318 318 318 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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4.3. Innovation strategy, withdrawal, and the timing of the IPO process  
Lowry and Schwert (2002) address two ways that issuers can influence the IPO process. 
One is the timing between the filing date and the offer date. The other is the ability of the issuer to 
cancel the IPO deal. We first tested which firms are more likely to withdraw IPO. The results are 
reported in Table 5.   
We show that Innovation Power has evident impact on issuers’ likelihood to cancel their 
IPO deals. In other words, the real option that issuers can withdraw from the IPO process becomes 
more valuable as the issuer is more unique in technological space. That is consistent with the 
findings of Busaba et al (2001) that the option to withdraw strengthens the issuers’ bargaining 
power with respect to investors and underwriters. Likewise, we show the higher level of 
exploration leads to the largest likelihood of withdrawing. In contrast, a higher level of exploitation 
decreases the likelihood of withdrawing. 
Interestingly, from Columns 1 – 4 of Table 6 Innovation Power and ExT ratio are 
significantly and negatively related to the speed of IPO completion. In contrast, the ExR ratio is 
significantly and positively related to the time of IPO completion. Innovation power is the relative 
innovation value in terms of the capability to generate new inventions, while exploration is the 
degree of the diversity of knowledge used. Therefore, we conclude that more valuable deals are 
completed faster. In contrast, explorative firms take a longer time to complete deals than 
exploitative firms because invention based on new knowledge may require additional information 
about relative position of the invention in the technological class.  Unlike innovation power, the 
explorative ratio does not take into account relative position of an issuer in the corresponding 
technological class.      
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4.4. Post IPO innovation strategy and withdrawn firms. Difference-in-Differences (DiD) 
framework 
In order to enhance the understanding of the importance of exploration-exploitation 
balance, we are going to assess how the innovation portfolio affects the issuing firms using the 
difference-in-differences framework. Specifically, we explore the time dimension of the three 
years preceding IPO and the three years following IPO, and the innovativeness dimension of the 
firms’ exploration and exploitation before and after IPO. 
Ferreira et al (2012) model the impact of public and private ownership structure on firms’ 
exploration and exploitation projects. They conclude it is optimal to go public when capitalizing 
on current ideas and optimal to go private when exploring new ideas. Since both private and public 
firms need to balance exploration and exploitation in their innovation portfolio, the implication 
based on Ferreira et al (2012) is that firms with a larger portion of exploration in place are more 
likely to go public. They show that when firms go public, their managers tend to choose more 
conventional innovation projects.   We support Ferriera’s prediction using the DiD approach and 
results reported in Table 7. In the DiD approach, we adopt the methodology from Bernstein (2015) 
that incorporates both the firms that successfully went public and the firms that withdrew their IPO 
filing and remain private.  
First, the coefficient estimates on the interaction of “Issuing Firm” and “Post” show that in 
the three years following IPO the firms that went public are pursuing more exploitative strategies. 
That confirms Ferriera et al (2012)’s viewpoint that going public makes firms balance out their 
exploration by more and more exploitation.  Going public is a dramatic turning point in a firm’s 
life.   
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Table 7.  The Difference-in-difference Analysis. For each withdrawn firm of an IPO in year t, we select up to five issuing firms based on a randomization process from 
cohort, which belong to the same industry, same size of assets at time t-1 and close in offer price.  Dependent variables are Innovation Power (columns 1 to 3), Explorative 
ratio (columns 4 to 6) and Exploitative Ratio (columns 7 to 9).  The “Issuing Firm” is indicator variable that takes value one if firm successfully went IPO and zero 
indicates a firm withdrawn from IPO.   Both Issuing and Withdrawn Firms are innovative firms.  The dummy variable “Post” takes place zero if   observations are 
spanning from three years prior to IPO and take place one if observations running to three years after IPO/withdrawal. Control variables are log transformation of one 
plus total assets (Log(1+Assets)), log transformation one plus a firm’s age (Log(1+Age)) at time of IPO, and HHI index. To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix C.  T-statistics in parenthesis are calculated on industry clustered standard errors.  
Upper-asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Innovation 
Power 
Innovation 
Power 
Innovatio
n Power 
ExR   ExR   ExR   ExT   ExT   ExT   
Issuing Firm*Post 2.077*** 1.988*** 2.047*** -0.125** -0.124** -0.123*** 0.125** 0.124** 0.123*** 
 (4.628) (4.915) (5.326) (-3.063) (-3.089) (-4.482) (3.063) (3.089) (4.482) 
Issuing Firm -1.012*** -1.119*** -0.625** -0.137** -0.133** -0.133** 0.137** 0.133** 0.133** 
 (-3.921) (-4.960) (-2.493) (-3.078) (-3.120) (-3.547) (3.078) (3.120) (3.547) 
Post -0.006 0.146 1.232 -0.727*** -0.727*** -0.722*** 0.727*** 0.727*** 0.722*** 
 (-0.008) (0.194) (1.384) (-36.519) (-36.149) (-48.143) (36.519) (36.149) (48.143) 
Log(1+Assets) 0.818*** 0.716*** 0.462 0.019 0.019 0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 
 (5.323) (5.729) (1.717) (1.409) (1.239) (0.890) (-1.409) (-1.239) (-0.890) 
Log(1+Age) 0.125 0.160 0.507 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 (0.551) (0.514) (1.490) (-0.568) (-0.236) (-0.285) (0.568) (0.236) (0.285) 
HHI -4.721** -4.502** -0.892 -0.099 -0.082 -0.083 0.099 0.082 0.083 
 (-3.297) (-2.984) (-0.447) (-1.536) (-1.732) (-1.447) (1.536) (1.732) (1.447) 
 
N 1254 1254 1254 1254 1254 1254 1254 1254 1254 
adj. R-sq 0.042 0.049 0.180 0.614 0.617 0.623 0.614 0.617 0.623 
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Second, negative and significant coefficients on Issuing Firm suggests that on average an 
issuing firm has lower innovation power and explorative ratio than a withdrawn firm. At the same 
time an issuing firm has a higher exploitative ratio. This is consistent with the prediction that a 
withdrawn firm has a higher bargaining power in terms of higher innovation power and exploration 
ratio. 
 Overall, our evidence from the DiD analysis suggests why and how IPO is important to 
firms’ strategic decisions on exploration and exploitation.  It is largely consistent with neoclassical 
theories of firm (Maksimovic and Phillips (2013) and Arikan and Stulz (2016)) that when firms 
have scarce assets (i.e. exploration), acquisition and diversification (i.e. exploitation) are value-
increasing because they allow firms to exploit the valuable assets and the growth opportunities 
provided by those valuable assets.  
4.5.  Innovation portfolio and Multiple Bookrunners 
In this section, we test the prediction that utilizing multiple bookrunners increases issuer 
bargaining power. This prediction’s grounded on Hu and Ritter (2007), who hypothesize that 
having multiple bookrunners increases issuers’ advantage in IPO negotiation. The results are 
presented in Table 8. 
The column 2 of Table 8 shows that the ExT ratio significantly decreases the likelihood of 
multiple bookrunners while the ExR ratio significantly increases the likelihood of multiple 
bookrunners.  Results are robust using ExT and ExR ratios in dollar amounts. The results support 
our claim that increases in the ExR ratio lead to increases in bargaining power, while the opposite 
is true for the ExT ratio.  
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Table 8. Innovation Strategy and Multiple Bookrunners.  This table reports results from logit model, where the 
dependent variable is an indicator variable, which takes a value of one if an issuer hires more than one bookrunner and 
zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are Innovation Power, ExR and ExT ratios.  Where ExR (ExT) ratio is the 
variable that measures the proportion of the cumulative number of Explorative (Exploitative) patents in the total 
cumulative number of a firm patents at the time of IPO.  Innovation Power is a continuous variable greater than 0, which 
measures an issuer’s eleven innovation value portfolios to all peers in its technological space. The venture capital variable 
is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the IPO is backed by venture capital, otherwise it is zero (Venture 
capital). Age at IPO is log transformation of one plus the number of years since the founding date of the firm 
(Log(1+Age)) and log transformation of one plus total assets in millions of USD (Log(1+Assets)). Log transformation 
of one plus proceeds (Log(1+Proceeds)) defined as the number of shares offered times the share price scaled by total 
assets in millions of USD. No. of bookrunners is the number of bookrunners responsible for the bookrunner’s role.  
Cumulative expanses on research and development in USD scaled by total assets (R&D). Sales in USD scaled by total 
assets.  The positive first day return variable is an indicatory variable taking the value of one if the first day return is 
positive, otherwise it is zero (Positive 1d Return). To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix C. T-statistics in parenthesis are calculated on industry 
clustered standard errors. Upper-asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Innovation Power -0.005     
 (-0.116)     
ExT    -0.641***    
  (-3.984)    
ExR     0.641***   
   (3.984)   
ExT Dollar      -0.660***  
    (-3.799)  
ExR Dollar       0.660*** 
     (3.799) 
Venture capital 0.186 0.264 0.264 -0.145 -0.145 
 (0.430) (0.569) (0.569) (-0.293) (-0.293) 
Log(1+Age) -0.129 -0.107 -0.107 -0.335 -0.335 
 (-0.875) (-0.648) (-0.648) (-1.261) (-1.261) 
Log(1+Proceeds) 1.579 1.539* 1.539* 1.420 1.420 
 (1.633) (1.666) (1.666) (1.147) (1.147) 
R&D -0.108 -0.121 -0.121 -0.370** -0.370** 
 (-0.808) (-1.213) (-1.213) (-2.355) (-2.355) 
Sales 0.313 0.288 0.288 0.211 0.211 
 (0.883) (0.784) (0.784) (0.598) (0.598) 
Log(1+Assets) 0.906*** 0.915*** 0.915*** 0.858*** 0.858*** 
 (3.792) (4.538) (4.538) (4.019) (4.019) 
Top Tier -0.456 -0.468 -0.468 -0.349 -0.349 
 (-1.457) (-1.518) (-1.518) (-1.498) (-1.498) 
N 792 792 792 558 558 
4.6.  Innovation portfolio and Analysts’ Coverage 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that analysts’ coverage allows the high-prestige 
investment bankers to attract clients, despite larger underpricing. Most importantly, Liu and Ritter 
(2011) posit that underwriters with influential analysts have bargaining power which provides 
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them with the ability to sustain underpricing in equilibrium.  In this section, we test whether 
issuers’ innovation portfolios signal to analysts.  
Table 9 shows the difference between firms with a bargaining power in terms of analysts’ 
buying and selling recommendations. We define two types of firms with high bargaining power 
(who experienced upward price revision) and otherwise low bargaining firms (with negative price 
adjustments). Table 9 shows that bargaining firms are recommended more on average for sale with 
a higher ExR ratio and Innovation Power.  In contrast, the opposite is evident for low bargaining 
firms with a higher ExT ratio, which are, on average, recommended to buy more stocks.  The 
results are constant over recommendations made within 90 days, 180 days, and 270 days after IPO. 
Our finding is in a line with the literature, which predicts that analysts recommend selling stocks 
of an issuer with more valuable innovation and more explorative strategy.   For instance, If the 
firm experiences poor aftermarket stock performance an underwriter-affiliated analyst protects 
newly public firm in the form of ‘‘booster shots’’ of stronger coverage (James and Karceski, 2006). 
Next, we test whether the issuer’s bargaining power is reflected in analysts’ prediction.  
We posit that when issuers bargain the higher offer price, analysts will not over-forecast.   
Table 10 shows the impact of Innovation Power, ExR ratio and ExT ratio on forecast 
adjustment. Forecast adjustment is actual P/E ratio over forecasted P/E ratio minus one.  According 
to Table 10, ExR ratio is significantly negatively related to analyst forecast.  In the same time, ExT 
ratio is significantly positively related to forecast adjustment.  Thus, when issuers with a high ExR 
ratio negotiated high price during the pre-IPO period, analysts would not over-predict P/E in the 
post period. In contrast, analysts over predict firms with a high ExT ratio in the post IPO period.
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Table 9. Analyst Recommendations and Innovation Strategy.  This table shows the difference in innovation strategy between the 
two types of issuers (with and without Up-Word Price revisions), whose stocks are recommended to sell or buy within 90, 180 and 
270 days. Measures of the innovation strategy are independently sorted into price revision portfolios and analyst recommendation 
portfolios.  The price revision portfolios constructed as allocation of innovation measures into those where issuer experienced positive 
or no price revision. The recommendation portfolios consist of two portfolios Buy and Sell. We classify recommendation as the Buy 
when analyst issued strong buy or buy recommendation and all the rest recommendations are classified as the Sell. Column (8) reports 
difference between portfolios, while column (9) reports p-value of t-test for significance of this difference. Analyst recommendations 
covers the period from 1993 to 2012. The analyst recommendations obtained from I/B/E/S.   
 
Upward Price Revision No Upward Revision 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Sell270 Buy270 Diff p-value Sell270 Buy270 Diff p-value 
Innovation Power 1433.948 462.840 971.108 (0.000) 235.790 268.152 -32.362 (0.33) 
ExT   0.492 0.551 -0.059 (0.002) 0.711 0.550 0.161 (0.00) 
ExT Dollar   0.499 0.551 -0.052 (0.012) 0.857 0.579 0.278 (0.00) 
ExR   0.508 0.449 0.059 (0.002) 0.289 0.450 -0.161 (0.00) 
ExR Dollar   0.501 0.449 0.052 (0.012) 0.143 0.421 -0.278 (0.00) 
# Recommendations 2822       2211       
  Sell180 Buy180 Diff p-value Sell180 Buy180 Diff p-value 
Innovation Power 1483.572 459.814 1023.757 (0.000) 257.255 264.429 -7.174 (0.84) 
ExT   0.484 0.554 -0.070 (0.000) 0.673 0.561 0.112 (0.00) 
ExT Dollar   0.484 0.559 -0.075 (0.000) 0.829 0.591 0.238 (0.00) 
ExR   0.516 0.446 0.070 (0.000) 0.327 0.439 -0.112 (0.00) 
ExR Dollar   0.516 0.441 0.075 (0.000) 0.171 0.409 -0.238 (0.00) 
# Recommendations 2809       2204       
  Sell90 Buy90 Diff p-value Sell90 Buy90 Diff p-value 
Innovation Power 1611.062 459.506 1151.556 (0.000) 290.800 263.267 27.533 (0.48) 
ExT   0.478 0.551 -0.073 (0.000) 0.708 0.559 0.149 (0.00) 
ExT Dollar   0.466 0.558 -0.092 (0.000) 0.921 0.587 0.334 (0.00) 
ExR   0.522 0.449 0.073 (0.000) 0.292 0.441 -0.149 (0.00) 
ExR Dollar   0.534 0.442 0.092 (0.000) 0.079 0.413 -0.334 (0.00) 
# Recommendations 2772       2151       
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Table 10. Analyst P/E Adjustments and Innovation Strategy. This table shows the impact of innovation strategy on the deviation of the Analyst predicted P/E ratio from actual P/E ratio at the 
end of the period (90, 180 and 270 days after IPO).  P/E adjustment (Adj.) is computed as actual P/E ratio over the analysts predicted P/E ratio minus one.  The forecasted and actual P/E for the   
period from 1993 to 2012, obtained from the I/B/E/S. To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix C. T-
statistics in parenthesis are calculated on Analyst clustered standard errors. Upper-asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Adj.90 Adj.180 Adj. 270 Adj.90 Adj.180 Adj. 270 Adj.90 Adj.180 Adj. 270 Adj.90 Adj.180 Adj. 270 Adj.90 Adj.180 Adj. 270 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Innovation 
Power -0.073 -0.003 0.009             
 (-1.155) (-0.114) (0.646)             
ExT      0.995*** 0.678** 0.937***          
    (2.668) (2.192) (2.733)          
ExT Dollar         0.486 0.529 1.152***       
       (1.083) (1.399) (2.908)       
ExR            -0.995*** -0.678** -0.937***    
          (-2.668) (-2.192) (-2.733)    
ExR Dollar               -0.486 -0.529 -1.152*** 
             (-1.083) (-1.399) (-2.908) 
Venture capital 0.834* 0.767 0.383 0.067 0.316 -0.063 0.298 0.520 0.354 0.067 0.316 -0.063 0.298 0.520 0.354 
 (1.786) (1.582) (0.631) (0.131) (0.547) (-0.113) (0.503) (0.838) (0.551) (0.131) (0.547) (-0.113) (0.503) (0.838) (0.551) 
Log(1+Age) 0.139 0.013 0.015 -0.218 -0.151 -0.179 0.155 0.046 -0.008 -0.218 -0.151 -0.179 0.155 0.046 -0.008 
 (0.228) (0.043) (0.040) (-0.386) (-0.492) (-0.484) (0.325) (0.154) (-0.022) (-0.386) (-0.492) (-0.484) (0.325) (0.154) (-0.022) 
No. of 
bookrunners 0.425 -0.073 -0.056 0.642 0.132 0.139 0.101 -0.439 0.005 0.642 0.132 0.139 0.101 -0.439 0.005 
 (0.783) (-0.204) (-0.094) (1.646) (0.368) (0.237) (0.211) (-0.952) (0.005) (1.646) (0.368) (0.237) (0.211) (-0.952) (0.005) 
R&D 1.339 0.467 -0.143 1.225 0.564 -0.011 0.650 0.703 -0.747 1.225 0.564 -0.011 0.650 0.703 -0.747 
 (1.427) (1.208) (-0.276) (1.547) (1.605) (-0.024) (0.849) (1.315) (-1.444) (1.547) (1.605) (-0.024) (0.849) (1.315) (-1.444) 
Sales 0.995 -0.449 0.573 1.060 -0.592 0.481 1.081 -0.605 0.572 1.060 -0.592 0.481 1.081 -0.605 0.572 
 (0.818) (-0.653) (0.740) (1.015) (-0.860) (0.605) (1.196) (-0.964) (0.961) (1.015) (-0.860) (0.605) (1.196) (-0.964) (0.961) 
Positive 1d 
Return 0.518 0.354 0.073 0.012 0.244 -0.102 -0.143 0.232 0.263 0.012 0.244 -0.102 -0.143 0.232 0.263 
 (1.101) (1.144) (0.139) (0.028) (0.774) (-0.217) (-0.374) (0.565) (0.381) (0.028) (0.774) (-0.217) (-0.374) (0.565) (0.381) 
Log(1+Assets) 0.096 0.593** 0.098 -0.008 0.483* 0.031 0.326 0.657** 0.115 -0.008 0.483* 0.031 0.326 0.657** 0.115 
 (0.201) (2.349) (0.309) (-0.020) (1.942) (0.102) (0.803) (2.122) (0.363) (-0.020) (1.942) (0.102) (0.803) (2.122) (0.363) 
N 628 943 1021 628 943 1021 474 745 802 628 943 1021 474 745 802 
adj. R-sq 0.102 0.087 0.005 0.139 0.128 0.060 0.181 0.151 0.133 0.139 0.128 0.060 0.181 0.151 0.133 
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 11. Panel A: Up-Ward Price Revision and Innovation Strategy.  The dependent variable in regression is the upward price revision from the midpoint of the initial filing range 
to the offer price, relative to the midpoint price.  The upward price revision is truncated at zero if the price revision takes a negative value.  We predict a positive relation between price 
revisions and the measures of innovativeness of an issuer. Thus, this table reports estimates from the Tobit model with a lower limit of zero.  The explanatory variables are Innovation 
Power, ExR and ExT ratios.  Where the ExR (ExT) ratio is the variable that measures the proportion of the cumulative number of Explorative (Exploitative) patents in the total cumulative 
number of a firm patents at the time of IPO.   Innovation Power is a continuous variable greater than 0, which measures an issuer’s eleven innovation value portfolios relative to all peers 
in its technological space.  The venture capital variable is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the IPO is backed by venture capital, otherwise it is zero (Venture capital). Age 
at IPO is log transformation of one plus the number of years since the founding date of the firm (Log(1+Age)) and log transformation of one plus total assets in millions of USD 
(Log(1+Assets)). Log transformation of one plus proceeds (Log (1+ Proceeds)) defined as the number of shares offered times the share price scaled by total assets in millions of USD.  
No. of bookrunners is the number of bookrunners responsible for the bookrunner’s role. Cumulative expanses on research and development in USD scaled by total assets (R&D). Sales in 
USD scaled by total assets.  The positive first day return variable is an indicatory variable taking the value of one if the first day return is positive, otherwise it is zero (Positive 1d Return). 
To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix C. T-statistics in parenthesis are calculated on industry 
clustered standard errors. Upper-asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Innovation Power 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006***       
 (7.624) (6.947) (3.890)       
ExT      -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.023***    
    (-4.554) (-3.412) (-5.250)    
ExR         0.020*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 
       (4.554) (3.412) (5.250) 
Venture capital 0.083*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.083*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.083*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 
 (4.210) (3.074) (4.344) (4.349) (3.129) (4.250) (4.349) (3.129) (4.250) 
Log(1+Age) -0.028** -0.023* -0.026** -0.026** -0.022* -0.024* -0.026** -0.022* -0.024* 
 (-2.288) (-1.865) (-2.011) (-2.235) (-1.841) (-1.923) (-2.235) (-1.841) (-1.923) 
Log(1+Proceeds) 0.290*** 0.287*** 0.274*** 0.289*** 0.286*** 0.274*** 0.289*** 0.286*** 0.274*** 
 (6.872) (7.352) (8.195) (6.144) (6.588) (7.293) (6.144) (6.588) (7.293) 
No. of bookrunners -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.074** -0.044*** -0.047*** -0.074** -0.044*** -0.047*** -0.074** 
 (-3.253) (-3.479) (-2.069) (-3.183) (-3.421) (-2.052) (-3.183) (-3.421) (-2.052) 
R&D -0.202*** -0.205*** -0.184*** -0.190*** -0.195*** -0.174*** -0.190*** -0.195*** -0.174*** 
 (-3.466) (-3.668) (-3.221) (-3.409) (-3.623) (-3.214) (-3.409) (-3.623) (-3.214) 
Sales 0.008 -0.004 -0.003 0.007 -0.004 -0.005 0.007 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.412) (-0.145) (-0.134) (0.368) (-0.147) (-0.186) (0.368) (-0.147) (-0.186) 
Positive 1d Return 0.174*** 0.164*** 0.167*** 0.174*** 0.164*** 0.168*** 0.174*** 0.164*** 0.168*** 
 (3.824) (3.713) (4.324) (3.965) (3.852) (4.582) (3.965) (3.852) (4.582) 
Log(1+Assets) 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 
 (7.030) (7.453) (6.430) (6.639) (6.978) (6.216) (6.639) (6.978) (6.216) 
Top Tier 0.029* 0.028* 0.025* 0.029* 0.028 0.024* 0.029* 0.028 0.024* 
 (1.730) (1.683) (1.836) (1.657) (1.618) (1.677) (1.657) (1.618) (1.677) 
Walk-Up 0.009 -0.010 -0.052 0.021 0.003 -0.038 0.021 0.003 -0.038 
 (0.480) (-0.572) (-0.675) (1.016) (0.161) (-0.459) (1.016) (0.161) (-0.459) 
N 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
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Table 11 Panel B: Up-Ward Price Revision and Innovation Strategy. The dependent variable in regression is the upward price revision from the midpoint of the 
initial filing range to the offer price, relative to the midpoint price.  The upward price revision is truncated at zero if the price revision takes negative value.  We predict 
a positive relation between price revisions and the measures of innovativeness of an issuer. Thus, this table reports estimates from the Tobit model with a lower limit of 
zero.  This table uses a dollar value of patents from Kogan et al (2015). The dependent variable is price revision. The explanatory variables are ExR(ExT) Dollar ratio. 
The Positive Adjustment is an indicator variable, which takes a value of one if an issuer experiences positive price adjustment and zero otherwise. To dilute the influence 
of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix C.  T-statistics in parenthesis are calculated on industry 
clustered standard errors.  Upper-asterisks such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ExT Dollar   -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.016***    
 (-4.156) (-3.562) (-7.056)    
ExR Dollar      0.019*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
    (4.156) (3.562) (7.056) 
Venture capital 0.077*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.077*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 
 (5.803) (4.259) (5.028) (5.803) (4.259) (5.028) 
Log(1+Age) -0.031** -0.028* -0.030* -0.031** -0.028* -0.030* 
 (-2.087) (-1.856) (-1.863) (-2.087) (-1.856) (-1.863) 
Log(1+Proceeds) 0.304*** 0.302*** 0.288*** 0.304*** 0.302*** 0.288*** 
 (5.154) (5.290) (6.361) (5.154) (5.290) (6.361) 
No. of bookrunners -0.052** -0.052*** -0.032** -0.052** -0.052*** -0.032** 
 (-2.512) (-2.765) (-2.046) (-2.512) (-2.765) (-2.046) 
R&D -0.167*** -0.172*** -0.145*** -0.167*** -0.172*** -0.145*** 
 (-3.522) (-3.656) (-3.447) (-3.522) (-3.656) (-3.447) 
Sales 0.011 -0.001 -0.004 0.011 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.539) (-0.059) (-0.155) (0.539) (-0.059) (-0.155) 
Positive 1d Return 0.190*** 0.182*** 0.183*** 0.190*** 0.182*** 0.183*** 
 (5.530) (5.580) (6.634) (5.530) (5.580) (6.634) 
Log(1+Assets) 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 
 (5.196) (5.403) (4.956) (5.196) (5.403) (4.956) 
Top Tier 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.022 
 (0.990) (1.049) (1.378) (0.990) (1.049) (1.378) 
Walk-Up 0.010 -0.006 -0.067 0.010 -0.006 -0.067 
 (0.633) (-0.388) (-0.872) (0.633) (-0.388) (-0.872) 
N 742 742 742 742 742 742 
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes 
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4.7. Robustness Checks 
Our first robustness check follows Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) that looks at only the 
IPOs that have higher than filing range.  
Our second robustness check is on model specification. Instead of having continued 
measure of price revision, we truncated price revision setting negative values to zero. We then run 
the tobit model and include the same Innovation Power, ExR and ExT ratios independent variables, 
as well as the same set of control variables. Results are reported in Table 11. To a large extent, 
those results are robust to our main results in Table 3  
One next robustness check is to follow Brav et al (2016) to add firms that have non-missing 
R&Ds.  In an unreported table, we find out that the results are consistent with our main results in 
Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4  
To assure our main DiD results are valid, we repeat our DiD analysis, but only considering 
the successfully gone public firms.  To a larger extent, our new DiD results confirm the conclusion 
from Table 7 that more explorative firms tend to seek exploitative innovation projects since they 
became public.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Using a sample of innovative issuing firms from 1986 to 2012, we examine the effects of 
innovation strategies on IPO pricing. Our primary objective is to examine the effects of an issuer’s 
innovation portfolio on the IPO pricing in terms of two dimensions of the issuer’s innovativeness: 
innovation power and innovation strategy. We contribute to the existing literature in two ways. 
First, we introduce a measure that captures innovation power relative to its peers in the same 
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technological space. Second, we explicitly examine the effect of strategic orientation of patent 
portfolios, in terms of the explorative and exploitative nature of innovations, on IPO underpricing 
and offer price adjustment.   
 We show that the US innovative IPOs with higher explorative innovation have higher 
bargaining power. We conclude that the higher portion of explorative patents in the portfolio can 
curb underpricing. The higher innovation power is associated with a shorter negotiation process 
and lower underpricing. We find that bargaining power of an innovative issuer stems from 
innovation strategies and value of innovation portfolio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
References 
    Aggarwal, R. K., Krigman, L. & Womack, K. L. (2002), ‘Strategic ipo underpricing, information 
momentum, and lockup expiration selling’, Journal of financial economics 66(1), 105–137. 
    Aggarwal, V. A. & Hsu, D. H. (2013), ‘Entrepreneurial exits and innovation’, Management 
Science 60(4), 867–887. 
Ahuja, G. & Morris Lampert, C. (2001), ‘Entrepreneurship in the large corporation: A longitudinal 
study of how established firms create breakthrough inventions’, Strategic management 
journal 22(6-7), 521–543. 
Arikan, A. M. & Stulz, R. M. (2016), ‘Corporate acquisitions, diversification, and the firm’s life 
cycle’, The Journal of Finance 71(1), 139–194. 
Barcaskey, M. J. (2005), ‘Do sec regulations constrain offer price revisions of ipos?’. 
Baron, D. P. (1979), ‘The incentive problem and the design of investment banking contracts’, 
Journal of Banking & Finance 3(2), 157–175. 
Baron, D. P. (1982), ‘A model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution 
services for new issues’, The Journal of Finance 37(4), 955–976. 
Bena, J. & Li, K. (2014), ‘Corporate innovations and mergers and acquisitions’, The Journal of 
Finance 69(5), 1923–1960. 
Benveniste, L. M. & Spindt, P. A. (1989), ‘How investment bankers determine the offer price and 
allocation of new issues’, Journal of financial Economics 24(2), 343–361. 
Benveniste, L.M., A. Ljungqvist, W.J. Wilhelm, and X. Yu, (2003), Evidence of information 
spillovers in the production of investment banking services, Journal of Finance 58, 577-
608. 
Bernstein, S. (2015), ‘Does going public affect innovation?’, The Journal of Finance 70(4), 
1365–1403. 
Biais, B. & Faugeron-Crouzet, A. M. (2002), ‘Ipo auctions: English, dutch, french, and internet’, 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 11(1), 9–36. 
Bouis, R. (2009), ‘The short-term timing of initial public offerings’, Journal of Corporate 
Finance 15(5), 587–601. 
Bradley, D. J., Cooney, J. W., Jordan, B. D. & Singh, A. K. (2004), ‘Negotiation and the ipo 
offer price: A comparison of integer vs. non-integer ipos’, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 39(3), 517–540. 
Bradley, D. J., Jordan, B. D. & Ritter, J. R. (2003), ‘The quiet period goes out with a bang’, 
The Journal of Finance 58(1), 1–36. 
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Ma, S. & Tian, X. (2016), How does hedge fund activism reshape corporate 
innovation?, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Busaba, W. Y. (2006), ‘Bookbuilding, the option to withdraw, and the timing of ipos’, Journal of 
Corporate Finance 12(2), 159–186. 
Busaba, W. Y., Benveniste, L. M. & Guo, R.-J. (2001), ‘The option to with- draw ipos during 
the premarket: empirical analysis’, Journal of Financial Economics 60(1), 73–102. 
96 
 
Carter, R. B. (1992), ‘Underwriter reputation and repetitive public offerings’, Journal of 
Financial Research 15(4), 341–354. 
Chen, H.-C. & Ritter, J. R. (2000), ‘The seven percent solution’, The Journal of Finance 55(3), 
1105–1131. 
Cliff, M. T. & Denis, D. J. (2004), ‘Do initial public offering firms purchase analyst coverage 
with underpricing?’, The Journal of Finance 59(6), 2871– 2901. 
C¸ olak, G. & Gu¨nay, H. (2011), ‘Strategic waiting in the ipo markets’, Journal of Corporate Finance 
17(3), 555–583. 
Evans, D. S. & Schmalensee, R. (2002), ‘Some economic aspects of antitrust analysis in 
dynamically competitive industries’, Innovation policy and the economy 2, 1–49. 
Ferreira, D., Manso, G. & Silva, A. C. (2012), ‘Incentives to innovate and the decision to go 
public or private’, The Review of Financial Studies 27(1), 256–300. 
Gao, H., Hsu, P.-H. & Li, K. (2018), ‘Innovation strategy of private firms’, Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 53(1), 1–32. 
Giammarino, R. M. & Lewis, T. (1988), ‘A theory of negotiated equity financing’, The Review 
of Financial Studies 1(3), 265–288. 
Hall, B. H., Jaffe, A. & Trajtenberg, M. (2005), ‘Market value and patent citations’, RAND 
Journal of economics pp. 16–38. 
Hanley, K. W. (1993), ‘The underpricing of initial public offerings and the partial adjustment 
phenomenon’, Journal of financial economics 34(2), 231–250. 
Harris, L. (1991), ‘Stock price clustering and discreteness’, The Review of Financial Studies 
4(3), 389–415. 
Henderson, R. (1993), ‘Underinvestment and incompetence as responses to radical innovation: 
Evidence from the photolithographic alignment equipment industry’, The RAND Journal 
of Economics pp. 248–270. 
Hoberg, G., Phillips, G. & Prabhala, N. (2014), ‘Product market threats, payouts, and financial 
flexibility’, The Journal of Finance 69(1), 293–324. 
Hovenkamp, H. J. (2008), ‘Schumpeterian competition and antitrust’. 
Hu, Y. & Ritter, J. R. (2007), Multiple bookrunners in IPOs, PhD thesis, University of Florida 
Florida. 
Ince, O¨ .  S¸.  (2014), ‘Why do ipo offer price only partially adjust?’, The Quarterly Journal of 
Finance 4(03), 1450009. 
Jaffe, A. B. (1989), ‘Characterizing the “technological position” of firms, with application to 
quantifying technological opportunity and research spillovers’, Research Policy 18(2), 
87–97. 
Jeon, J. Q., Lee, C., Nasser, T. & Via, M. T. (2015), ‘Multiple lead underwriter ipos and firm 
visibility’, Journal of Corporate Finance 32, 128–149. 
97 
 
Kogan, L., Papanikolaou, D., Seru, A. & Stoffman, N. (2017), ‘Technological innovation, 
resource allocation, and growth’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132(2), 665–712. 
Krigman, L., Shaw, W. H. & Womack, K. L. (1999), ‘The persistence of ipo mispricing and the 
predictive power of flipping’, The Journal of Finance 54(3), 1015–1044. 
Krigman, L., Shaw, W. H. & Womack, K. L. (2001), ‘Why do firms switch underwriters?’, 
Journal of financial economics 60(2-3), 245–284. 
Kutsuna, Kenji, Janet Kiholm Smith, and Richard L. Smith, 2009, Public information, ipo price 
formation and long-run returns: Japanese evidence, The Journal of Finance 54, 505-546. 
Levinthal, D. A. & March, J. G. (1993), ‘The myopia of learning’, Strategic management 
journal 14(S2), 95–112. 
Lind, J. T. & Mehlum, H. (2010), ‘With or without u? the appropriate test for a u-shaped 
relationship’, Oxford bulletin of economics and statistics 72(1), 109–118. 
Liu, X. & Ritter, J. R. (2011), ‘Local underwriter oligopolies and ipo under- pricing’, Journal of 
Financial Economics 102(3), 579–601. 
Ljungqvist, A. & Wilhelm, W. J. (2003), ‘Ipo pricing in the dot-com bubble’, The Journal of 
Finance 58(2), 723–752. 
Ljungqvist, A. & Wilhelm, W. J. (2005), ‘Does prospect theory explain ipo market behavior?’, 
The Journal of Finance 60(4), 1759–1790. 
Loughran, T. & Ritter, J. (2004), ‘Why has ipo underpricing changed over time?’, Financial 
management pp. 5–37. 
Loughran, T. & Ritter, J. R. (2002), ‘Why don’t issuers get upset about leaving money on the 
table in ipos?’, The Review of Financial Studies 15(2), 413–444. 
Lowry, M. & Schwert, G. W. (2002), ‘Ipo market cycles: Bubbles or sequential learning?’, The 
Journal of Finance 57(3), 1171–1200. 
Maksimovic, V. & Phillips, G. M. (2013), ‘Conglomerate firms, internal capital markets, and 
the theory of the firm’, Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ. 5(1), 225–244. 
Manso, G.   (2011), ‘Motivating innovation’, The Journal of Finance 66(5), 1823–1860. 
March, J. G. (1991), ‘Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning’, Organization 
science 2(1), 71–87. 
Nicholas, T. (2003), ‘Why schumpeter was right: innovation, market power, and creative 
destruction in 1920s america’, The Journal of Economic His- tory 63(4), 1023–1058. 
Pa´stor, L.  & Veronesi, P.  (2005), ‘Rational ipo waves’, The Journal of Finance 60(4), 1713–1757. 
Reuter, J. (2006), ‘Are ipo allocations for sale? evidence from mutual funds’, 
The Journal of Finance 61(5), 2289–2324. 
Ritter, J. R. (2011), ‘Equilibrium in the initial public offerings market’, Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ. 
3(1), 347–374. 
Ritter, J. R. & Welch, I. (2002), ‘A review of ipo activity, pricing, and allocations’, The Journal 
of Finance 57(4), 1795–1828. 
98 
 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1934), The schumpttr: Theory economic development, Harvard University Press. 
Sherman, A. G. (1992), ‘The pricing of best efforts new issues’, The Journal of Finance 47(2), 
781–790. 
Smith, W. K. & Tushman, M. L. (2005), ‘Managing strategic contradictions: A top management 
model for managing innovation streams’, Organization science 16(5), 522–536. 
Trajtenberg, M. (1990), ‘A penny for your quotes: patent citations and the value of innovations’, 
The Rand Journal of Economics pp. 172–187. 
Uotila, J., Maula, M., Keil, T. & Zahra, S. A. (2009), ‘Exploration, exploitation, and financial 
performance: analysis of s&p 500 corporations’, Strategic Management Journal 30(2), 
221–231. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
Appendix A. 
   
Table A1: DLOs and New Issued Debt by Year. 
This table summarize DLOs activism by year. We define DLOs as the percentage of newly issued 
long-term debt that belong to less regulated institutional owners that simultaneously hold both 
equity and new issued debt in the same entity. We define less regulated institutional owners as 
institutional investors that do not belong to Pension Fund, Insurance Company or Mutual Fund 
categories. We derived bond ownership from various fillings since some funds have engaged in 
activism with less than a 5% ownership in assets of a DLOs company. We determined Bond 
ownership by using several SEC filings (Schedule 13D and for other owners with beneficial 
ownership of less than 5% in bonds Schedule 13F and Proxy Statements). The sample includes 
US MNC that have at least one DLOs event during 2007 to 2014 inclusive.  The percentage of 
shares outstanding held by DLOs denoted as DLO_SH. All variables in Panel A are measured at 
the event year.    
Number of 
Events 
Average amount of new 
issued debt in billions of 
USD held by DLOs 
DLO_SH 
(2) (3) (4) 
88 1.777 5.43% 
71 2.237 4.19% 
113 0.191 6.90% 
138 0.076 6.42% 
179 1.477 4.57% 
280 0.122 7.61% 
358 8.879 6.93% 
57 0.197 8.30% 
1284 14.958 6.13% 
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Table A2. This panel presents average distribution of DEO for each of the Fama-French 12 
industries.  The percentage of shares outstanding held by DLOs denoted as DLO_SH. This panel 
shows percentage of equity held by DLOs during whole sample period. The DLO_SH has value 
of zero for DLOs, which did not hold an equity in year t. The column (1) through (3) describe 
average DLO_SH for whole sample. The columns (4) through (6) test difference between three 
years before DLOs and three years after DLOs, while excluding the event year.  Upper-asterisks 
such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.     
Industry 
All Years 
Difference between three years 
before and after the event 
N  
Percentage 
of Main 
Sample 
Mean 
DLO_S
H 
Mean 
After 
Mean 
Before 
After - 
Before 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Consumer nondurables 378 7% 6.17% 8.85% 5.14% 3.71%*** 
Consumer durables 154 3% 7.21% 11.68% 6.09% 5.59%*** 
Manufacturing 801 15% 4.98% 6.49% 4.57% 1.93%*** 
Energy 610 12% 5.78% 7.83% 4.86% 2.97%*** 
Chemicals 290 5% 5.61% 7.19% 5.04% 2.15%*** 
Business equipment 851 16% 5.34% 7.58% 5.00% 2.58%*** 
Telecom 331 6% 6.57% 13.91% 4.00% 9.9%*** 
Shops 627 12% 6.23% 9.15% 4.77% 4.38%*** 
Health 501 9% 6.64% 8.53% 5.76% 2.77%*** 
Other 745 14% 7.10% 9.86% 6.21% 3.65%*** 
Total 5288 100% 6.16% 9.11% 5.14% 3.96% 
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Table A3. Panel A: Pre-dual Excess Return and DLOs’ Innovation Efficiency. This table reports 
estimated average innovative efficiency and post activism excess monthly return. The Tables consist of 
two panels, DLOs firms (Panel A) and Control firms (Panel B). The average slopes estimated following 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is monthly excess return 
(return with dividends – monthly risk-free rate) in year t+1 and expressed in percentages. Explanatory 
variables are geometric growth of patent innovation efficiency (GIE Pat), citation innovation efficiency 
(GIE Cite), scope innovation efficiency (GIE Scope) and geometric growth of total number of patent as 
well as exploratory number of patents.  The explanatory and control variables are measured in year t from 
2007 to 2014 and include post activism period. ΔROA is the change in ROA between year t and year t – 
1. MTB is market to book assets. CAPX (capital expenditure) and R&D (expenditure on research and 
development) divided by lagged total assets. Volume is the average daily dollar trading volume from the 
preceding year. CRet is cumulative average return over the past 12 months skipping the recent month.  
Industry dummy is based on the Fama and French (1997) 49 industries classification. Average R-squred 
is the time-series average of the R-squared from the annual cross-sectional regressions. To dilute the 
influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined 
at Appendix B. T-statistics (based on adjusted standard errors for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlations following Newey and West, 1987) are reported in parenthesis. Upper-asterisks such as *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GIE Pat  1.425***     
 (2.929)     
GIE Cite   -0.130    
  (-1.232)    
GIE Scope    0.685**   
   (2.187)   
GPat     0.478**  
    (2.139)  
GExplore      0.420*** 
     (5.297) 
Log(1+ME) 0.085 0.093 0.101 -0.183 0.069 
 (0.332) (0.364) (0.391) (-0.886) (0.269) 
Volume 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (1.579) (1.554) (1.562) (-0.250) (1.252) 
M/B 0.309*** 0.309*** 0.308*** 0.243*** 0.310*** 
 (3.682) (3.689) (3.666) (3.595) (3.690) 
∆ROE -0.031 -0.034 -0.031 -0.042 -0.031 
 (-1.159) (-1.251) (-1.135) (-1.582) (-1.142) 
R&D -11.977*** -11.236*** -11.604*** -11.363*** -13.795*** 
 (-4.561) (-4.295) (-4.460) (-4.184) (-4.867) 
CAPX -8.910*** -8.940*** -8.894*** -8.986*** -8.734*** 
 (-3.728) (-3.695) (-3.778) (-3.812) (-3.659) 
IO 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.037*** 0.017 
 (1.230) (1.217) (1.204) (3.018) (1.294) 
CRet 1.734*** 1.747*** 1.732*** 1.971*** 1.760*** 
 (3.118) (3.162) (3.114) (3.574) (3.186) 
∆TA 1.222 1.309 1.298 1.291 1.359 
 (1.260) (1.368) (1.356) (1.350) (1.424) 
R-sq 0.370 0.370 0.370 0.370 0.372 
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Table A3. Panel B: Pre-dual Excess Return and Controls’ Innovation Efficiency.  
This table reports estimated average innovative efficiency and post activism excess monthly return for control firms. The 
average slopes estimated following Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is 
monthly excess return (return with dividends – monthly risk-free rate) in year t+1 and expressed in percentages. Explanatory 
variables are geometric growth of patent innovation efficiency (GIE Pat), citation innovation efficiency (GIE Cite), scope 
innovation efficiency (GIE Scope) and geometric growth of total number of patent as well as exploratory number of patents.  
The explanatory and control variables are measured in year t from 2007 to 2014 and include post activism period. ΔROA 
is the change in ROA between year t and year t – 1. MTB is market to book assets. CAPX (capital expenditure) and R&D 
(expenditure on research and development) divided by lagged total assets. Volume is the average daily dollar trading volume 
from the preceding year. CRet is cumulative average return over the past 12 months skipping the recent month.  Industry 
dummy is based on the Fama and French (1997) 49 industries classification. Average R-squred is the time-series average 
of the R-squared from the annual cross-sectional regressions. To dilute the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined at Appendix B. T-statistics (based on adjusted standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlations following Newey and West, 1987) are reported in parenthesis. Upper-asterisks 
such as *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GIE Pat  -7.736***     
 (-3.466)     
GIE Cite   -1.045***    
  (-4.240)    
GIE Scope    0.881   
   (1.569)   
GPat     -0.016***  
    (-4.052)  
GExplore      0.869** 
     (2.553) 
Log(1+ME) 0.475** 0.466** 0.502** 0.427** 0.422** 
 (2.452) (2.500) (2.578) (2.228) (2.182) 
Volume -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* 
 (-2.166) (-2.099) (-2.088) (-1.980) (-1.914) 
M/B 0.140*** 0.123** 0.131*** 0.127** 0.103** 
 (2.772) (2.581) (2.743) (2.607) (2.212) 
∆ROE -0.064 -0.063 -0.052 -0.057 -0.050 
 (-1.602) (-1.599) (-1.256) (-1.395) (-1.257) 
R&D -9.446** -8.736** -10.111*** -10.120*** -11.120*** 
 (-2.633) (-2.601) (-2.799) (-2.698) (-2.897) 
CAPX 11.167*** 10.875*** 10.102*** 11.057*** 10.650*** 
 (3.935) (3.975) (3.563) (3.899) (3.712) 
IO 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.133) (0.220) (0.183) (0.290) (0.131) 
CRet 0.929** 0.913** 0.975** 0.978** 0.990** 
 (2.065) (2.012) (2.158) (2.180) (2.195) 
∆TA 1.545 1.635 1.625 1.775 1.723 
 (1.323) (1.452) (1.415) (1.489) (1.479) 
R-sq 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.292 0.293 
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Table A4. Panel A: Pre-Dual Exploration Strategy (ES) and Risk Factor Models. This table illustrates the capability 
of ES to predict the risk adjusted return. We first sort firms into small (S) and big (B) based on the NYSE median size break 
points. We also perform further sort into Low(L), Medium (M) and High (H) values of ES based on 70 and 30 percentiles 
over three years following the event in year t. Then we hold portfolio over three years starting at the end of June of year t-
3 (Panel A, three-year pre-event window) and t+1(Panel B, three-year post-event window) and compute the monthly size 
adjusted value-weighted return for the both periods.  We adjust the monthly value-weighted return as taking average of Big 
(B) and Small (S) within each of ES group (e.g. (S/L+B/L)/2, (S/M+B/M)/2, (S/H+B/H)/2). This table reports average 
excess return in percentages (columns 1 and 2), alpha (α) from Carhart four-factor model (column 4 and 5) and alpha (α) 
from Fama-French three factor model (columns 7 and 8). The columns (6) and (9) reports difference in alpha between 
DLOs and Control firms. The excess return is defined as difference between value-weighted size adjusted monthly return 
and the one-month Treasury bill rate. The excess return and alpha are expressed in percentages. We use the following 
factors: MOM, the momentum factor of Carhart (1997); MKT, HML, SMB factors of Fama and French (1993); ES is 
computed as the ratio between number of explorative patents at time t and total number of patents at time t. Patent used 
new knowledge about the benchmark. The benchmark is computed as the median value of new knowledge used by its peers 
in the same technological class in the same year t. We measure new knowledge by citation outside of an inventor’s current 
expertise (technological classes). Robust t-statistics, computed following Newey and West (1987) using six legs, are 
presented in parentheses.  
  Excess Return   Carhart four-factor model Fama-French three factor model 
   
DLOs-
Control 
  
DLOs-
Control 
  
DLOs-
Control  DLOs  Control 
DLOs Control DLOs  Control 
 (α)  (α) (α) (α) 
   (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  
Low 1.527*** 1.722*** -0.195 0.141 0.247** -0.106 0.145 0.253*** -0.109 
 (15.087) (18.395) (-1.418) (1.238) (2.509) (-0.849) (1.277) (2.589) (-0.872) 
Medium 0.738*** 0.879*** -0.141 -0.069 -0.195 0.126 -0.103 -0.189 0.086 
 (6.402) (6.562) (-0.798) (-0.355) (-0.706) (0.366) (-0.513) (-0.686) (0.251) 
High 1.284*** 1.3548*** -0.071 0.043 -0.115 0.158 0.027 -0.126 0.153 
 (11.664) (12.547) (-0.459) (0.212) (-0.878) (0.672) (0.135) (-0.961) (0.658) 
H-L 
-
0.243*** -0.368*** 0.125 -0.098 
-
0.361** 0.264 -0.118 -0.379** 0.262 
 (-2.796) (-5.828) (1.161) (-0.431) (-2.312) (0.999) (-0.517) (-2.416) (0.999) 
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Table A4. Panel B. Post-Dual Exploration Strategy (ES) and Risk Factor Models. The excess return, alpha and 
loading factors are expressed in percentages. This panel reports excess return and risk-adjusted return form the 
explorative strategy.  ES is computed as the ratio between number of explorative patents at time t and total number of 
patents at time t. Patent used new knowledge about the benchmark. The benchmark is computed as the median value of 
new knowledge used by its peers in the same technological class in the same year t. We measure new knowledge by 
citation outside of an inventor’s current expertise (technological classes). Robust t-statistics, computed following Newey 
and West (1987) using six legs, are presented in parentheses.  
  Excess Return   Carhart four-factor model Fama-French three factor model 
   
DLOs-
Control 
  
DLOs-
Control 
  
DLOs-
Control  DLOs  Control 
DLOs Control DLOs  Control 
 (α)  (α) (α) (α) 
   (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  
Low 1.439*** 1.616*** -0.178 -0.276*** -0.358*** 0.082 -0.279*** -0.358*** 0.079 
 (12.284) (15.774) (-1.142) (-3.030) (-4.866) (1.152) (-2.848) (-4.838) (1.045) 
Medium 1.326*** 0.653*** 0.673*** 0.025 -0.845*** 0.870*** 0.024 -0.849*** 0.873*** 
 (11.758) (3.385) (3.011) (0.202) (-3.338) (3.252) (0.199) (-3.310) (3.232) 
High 1.823*** 1.354*** 0.469*** 0.465*** -0.288*** 0.753*** 0.465*** -0.289*** 0.754*** 
 (15.025) (12.483) (2.884) (2.979) (-3.165) (4.539) (2.981) (-3.160) (4.549) 
H-L 0.385*** -0.262*** 0.647*** 0.741*** 0.070 0.671*** 0.745*** 0.070 0.675*** 
 (5.165) (-5.489) (7.311) (3.822) (0.526) (3.679) (3.789) (0.526) (3.649) 
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Appendix B. 
 
Variable Definition 
DLO_SH 
The percentage of shares outstanding held by dual less regulated owners (DLOs) in 
year t. 
IO Year-end fraction of shares held by institutional investor in year t. 
LRF/TSO 
The shares held by less regulated funds (LRF) as the percent of total shares outstanding 
(TSO).  
Size   Log transformation of one plus total assets (publicly traded foreign subsidiary assets) 
Cash /Total 
Assets   
Cash plus marketable securities (CHE) scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. 
Leverage Ratio of Total Debt to Total Asset 
Dividend-
paying 
firms/total # 
of firms 
Number of US MNCs, which at least once paid dividends during sample period scaled 
by total number of US MNCs. 
Domestic 
(foreign) 
profit margin 
The domestic (foreign) profit margin is calculated as the ratio of domestic (foreign) net 
income over domestic (foreign) sales. 
FPI/TI Pre-tax Income foreign (FPI) scaled by total income (TI).   
THS/TFS 
# of foreign subsidiaries (TFS) scaled by # tax haven subsidiaries (THS).  If no 
information is reported we set # of subsidiaries in tax haven countries to zero.  Both 
variables come from 10-k filings. 
MTB The ratio of the market value of equity to book value of equity in year t. 
EBITDA 
The amount of earnings before income taxes, depreciation and amortization at year t 
scaled by total assets.  
FCF 
This variable is computed as net cash flow from operating activities less dividends paid 
and capital expenditures in year t. 
Div/E 
This variable represents ratio of dividends per share to earnings per share. This 
measure is yearly and compute for each year t. 
CAPX 
Measured at the end of the fiscal year as capital expenditure scaled by total assets in 
year t. 
Age 
Log transformation of one plus company i’s age. Company i’s age in year t equals to 
the number of years the corporation has existed since the founding year. 
R&D R&D expenses divided by total assets in year t. 
CR CR is cumulative average return over the past 12 months skipping the recent month. 
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Appendix B Continued     
Investment 
Delay 
Hoberg & Maksimovic (2014) text based continuous measure of a firm overall 
financial constraint due to delay in investment.  The higher value of a dependent 
variable shows that a firm is more similar to a set of firms known to be at risk of 
liquidity issues.  
Equity Delay 
Hoberg & Maksimovic (2014) text based continuous measure of a firm overall 
financial constraint due to delay in investment.  The higher value of a dependent 
variable shows that a firm is more similar to a set of firms known to be at risk of 
liquidity issues and presumes solving this delay by issuance of equity.   
Debt Delay 
Hoberg & Maksimovic (2014) text based continuous measure of a firm overall 
financial constraint due to delay in investment.  The higher value of a dependent 
variable shows that a firm is more similar to a set of firms known to be at risk of 
liquidity issues and presumes solving this delay by issuing new debt.   
Private 
Placement 
Hoberg & Maksimovic (2014) text based continuous measure of a firm overall 
financial constraint due to delay in investment.  The higher value of a dependent 
variable shows that a firm is more similar to a set of firms known to be at risk of 
liquidity issues and presumes solving this delay by private placement.   
ISP The total amount of stock purchased by an insider at year t scaled by total assets. 
ISS The total amount of stock sold by an insider at year t scaled by total assets. 
IS 
Insider Ownership measured as percent of stock held by insiders relative in total shares 
outstanding in year t. 
CV 
CV is an indicator variable that takes value of 1 if information about a firm covenant 
violation is available in the dataset of Roberts and Sufi, (2009). The dataset contains all 
covenants violation filed with SEC during 1996 to 2012. 
Vict 
An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a shareholder activist partially or 
fully won a proxy fight and zero otherwise. 
Vict Part 
An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a shareholder activist partially won 
a proxy fight and zero otherwise. 
Vict Full 
An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a shareholder activist fully won a 
proxy fight and zero otherwise. 
Settle 
An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a proxy fight ended in settlement 
and zero otherwise. 
CBoard 
An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm implemented the classify 
(staggered) board and zero otherwise. 
Bylaw 
An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm implemented the Bylaw 
provision and zero otherwise. 
Poison Pills 
An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm implemented poison pills and 
zero otherwise. 
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Appendix B Continued     
Golden 
Parachute 
An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm implemented golden 
parachute and zero otherwise. 
Pat(Fpat) 
Pat is log transformation of one plus patent counts, where patent counts are constructed 
following Bena and Li (2014) as number of awarded patents to firm i in technology 
class k with application year t scaled by the median value of granted application 
corresponding to firm’s i technology class and application year. Pat is aggregated at the 
parent level.  Fpat constructed in the similar manner as the Pat but aggregated at the 
foreign level. 
Cite(Fcite) 
Cite is log transformation of one plus the number of citations received scaled by the 
median value of received citations in corresponding to firm’s i technology class and 
application year. Cite is aggregated at the parent level.  Fcite is constructed in the same 
manner as the Cite but with aggregation at the foreign level. 
Scope(Fscope) 
Patent scope is the number of unique four digits classes of International Patent 
Classification (IPC) in a given patent documentation relative to the maximum scope in 
the same IPC class and application year. The higher patent scope, the higher is the 
market value of a patent. The scope is aggerated at the parent level. FScope is 
constructed in the same manner but with aggregation at the foreign level. 
 IE Pat (IE 
FPat) 
Following Hirshleifer et al (2013), IE_pat is constructed as patents count scaled by 
cumulative R&D over past five years with 20%. This measure is aggregated at the US 
MNCs (foreign) level.  
IE Cite (IE 
FCite) 
Following Hirshleifer et al (2013), IE_cite is constructed as the sum of citation 
received during last five years scaled by cumulative legged R&D over past five years 
starting t-3.  This measure is aggregated at the US MNCs (foreign) level.  
IE scope (IE 
FScope) 
IE_scope is constructed as the patent scope scaled by cumulative legged R&D over 
past five years starting t-3.  This measure is aggregated at the US MNCs (foreign) 
level.  
GIE Pat (%) Three-year geometric growth in patent innovation efficiency (GIE Pat). 
GIE Cite (%) Three-year geometric growth in citation innovation efficiency (GIE Cite). 
GIE Scope 
(%) 
Three-year geometric growth in scope innovation efficiency (GIE Scope). 
GPat (%) Three-year geometric growth in patent counts. 
GExplore (%) 
Three-year geometric growth in exploratory number of patents. A patent i is 
categorized as “explorative” if the percentage of citations made, which correspond to 
the outside of firm i’s existing expertise, is greater than the 80%.  
Completion 
FA  
The successfully completed foreign acquisition as a percent of total number of 
acquisitions in year t. 
Completion 
DA  
The successfully completed domestic acquisition as a percent of total number of 
acquisitions in year t. 
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Appendix B Continued     
Completion 
Focused FA 
The successfully completed focused acquisition as a percent of total number of 
acquisitions in year t. An acquisition defined as a focused based on equivalence of a 
DLOs’s and an acquirer’s three-digits SIC code. 
Premium 7d 
Px Completed 
DA 
Acquisition premium with respect to the DLOs's average stock price 7 days prior to the 
foreign acquisition announcement. 
Premium 7d 
Px Completed 
FA 
Acquisition premium with respect to the DLOs's average stock price 7 days prior to the 
domestic acquisition announcement. 
Premium 7d 
Px Focused 
Acq. 
Acquisition premium with respect to the DLOs's average stock price 7 days prior to the 
foreign focused acquisition announcement. An acquisition defined as a focused based 
on equivalence of a DLOs’s and an acquirer’s three-digits SIC code. 
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Variables                  Definitions  
IPO  
Underpricing 
Defined as the first day return: the first day closing price over initial offering 
price, minus one.  Formula: (1st Day Closing Price - Initial Offering Price)/Initial 
Offering Price. Prices obtained from SDC. If the first day closing price is missing 
it is replaced with the value from CRSP.    
Price Revision 
Following Bradley et al (2015) we define the price revision as difference between 
the final offer price and the mid-price of original file range with further division 
the difference by the mid-price of original file range.   Midpoint price ranges are 
from SDC. Missing midpoint price ranges are replaced with values from 
Bloomberg.   
Up-Revision  
Following Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, (2003), the Up-Revision is equal to price 
revision if the difference between the midpoint of the filing price range and the 
final offering price is positive, and zero otherwise    
Positive 
Adjustment 
The Positive Adjustment is an indicator variable, which takes value of one if an 
issuer experiences positive price adjustment and zero otherwise.  
Speed-of-IPO  
The Speed-of-IPO is defined as the difference between the IPO date and the first 
filling date of IPO prospectus.    
N. of 
Bookrunners 
The number of bookrunners defined as the number of managers with the 
responsibility of the bookrunner's role. 
Walkup 
The indicator variable, which takes value of one if year corresponds to year of an 
underwriter walkup strategy such as 1999 or 2000.   
Adj. 
The Analyst predicted P/E ratio from actual P/E ratio at the end of period (90, 
180 and 270 days after IPO).  P/E adjustment (Adj.) is computed as actual P/E 
ratio over the analysts predicted P/E ratio minus one. 
Buy (Sell) 
Buy is an indicator variable if an Analyst made strong buy or buy 
recommendation stock within 90,180 and 270 days after IPO and zero otherwise. 
In contrast, Sell is an indicator variable that take value of one if an Analyst makes 
hold, sell or strong sell recommendation and zero otherwise.  
Innovation  
Innovation 
Power 
Innovation power is distance of firm’ eleven innovation portfolios relative to its 
technological space.  The detailed discussion of this variable presented in the 
Section 3.1.  
Patents ExR 
This measure represents cumulative sum of firm i the number of explorative 
patents for pre-ipo period.   A patent i is categorized as “explorative” if the 
percentage of citations made, which correspond to the outside of firm i’s existing 
expertise, is greater than the median value of the existing expertise of 
corresponding technological class.  
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Appendix C Continued     
Patents ExT 
This measure represents cumulative sum of firm i the number of exploitative 
patents for pre-ipo period.   A patent i is categorized as “exploitative” if the 
percentage of citations made, which correspond to the outside of firm i’s existing 
expertise, is lower than the median value of the existing expertise of 
corresponding technological class.   
ExR   
Ratio of the cumulative number of explorative patents (ExR) to the total 
cumulative number of a firm patents at the time of IPO (Patents).   
ExT   Computed as one minus ratio of the explorative ratio (ExR Ratio).      
ExR (ExT) 
Dollar 
Constructed similar to the ExR (ExR) Ratios but instead of using patent quantity, 
Kogan’s et al (2015) Dollar value of a patent is used.   
Patents 
This variable represents cumulative sum of patent counts at time of IPO.  Where 
patent counts are constructed as number of awarded patents to firm i in 
technology class k with application year t. Next, sum all patents of firm i up to 
time of firm i’s IPO.   
Firm Characteristics  
Age at IPO 
Defined as the natural log transformation of the one plus the difference between 
the calendar year at the time of IPO and the firm founding year (in years). 
Formula: log (1+ number of years since the firm founding date). 
Assets 
Defined as the natural log transformation of one plus total assets at the time of 
IPO (in $millions). 
Proceeds 
Defined as the natural log transformation of one plus IPO proceeds. IPO proceeds 
is the amount raised during IPO from investors and calculated as the offer price 
times number of shares offered at the time of IPO (in $millions). 
Appendix C continued  
R&D 
Defined as the cumulative sum of expenses on research and development made 
by the firm during pre-IPO period, scaled by total assets at time of IPO (in 
$millions).  Main values are obtained from COMPUSTAT. Missing values are 
replaced by ones from Bloomberg. 
Sales 
Defined as the total sales scaled by firm's total assets at the time of IPO.  Values 
are obtained from COMPUSTAT. Missing values are replaced with the ones 
form Bloomberg. 
Venture 
Capital 
The venture capital variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if 
the IPO is backed by venture capital, otherwise it is zero. 
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Appendix D.   
 
Pairwise Correlation Matrix of Innovation Measures. P-value reported below correlation coefficients in the 
parenthesis.  
  Patents 
Patents 
ExR 
Patents 
ExT  
Innovation 
Power ExT   
ExT 
Dollar   ExR   
ExR 
Dollar   R&D 
          
Patents 1         
          
Patents 
ExR 0.5286 1        
 (0.000)         
Patents 
ExT 0.7082 0.2398 1       
 (0.000) (0.000)        
Innovation 
Power 0.2541 0.1852 0.2311 1      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
ExT   0.132 -0.4581 0.4273 0.0096 1     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.752)      
ExT Dollar   0.1335 -0.4466 0.4106 0.0455 0.984 1    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.168) (0.000)     
ExR   -0.132 0.4581 -0.4273 -0.0096 -1 -0.984 1   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.752) (0.000) (0.000)    
ExR Dollar   -0.1335 0.4466 -0.4106 -0.0455 -0.984 -1 0.984 1  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.168) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
R&D 0.1432 0.0405 0.1339 0.1201 0.0565 0.0794 -0.0565 -0.0794 1 
  (0.000) (0.180) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.016) (0.061) (0.016)   
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